Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a suspicious sequence of activity involving persistence via Registry Run keys (specifically targeting SMQDService or winappx entries) followed by modifications to Microsoft Defender configuration (adding exclusions via PowerShell) within a two-hour window on the same device.
Detects a suspicious sequence of activity involving persistence via Registry Run keys (specifically targeting SMQDService or winappx entries) followed by modifications to Microsoft Defender configuration (adding exclusions via PowerShell) within a two-hour window on the same device.
This rule detects the addition of Microsoft Defender exclusions via PowerShell cmdlets (Add-MpPreference, Set-MpPreference) or direct Registry key modifications, occurring within two hours of a new autorun persistence entry being created on the same device. This behavior is indicative of a persistence-then-evasion sequence often used to ensure malicious tools remain undetected.
Detects the modification of network interface IP addresses using netsh or PowerShell cmdlets. This activity can be associated with unauthorized network configuration changes, static IP assignment for persistence, or evasion techniques.
Detects the execution of PowerShell commands initiated from a .lnk file that query system information related to virtualization technologies (e.g., VMware, VirtualBox, Hyper-V) or hardware details (e.g., BIOS, VideoController). This pattern is often used for environmental awareness or anti-sandbox/anti-analysis techniques by malware.
Detects long PowerShell command lines that perform in-memory assembly loading, often utilizing compression (GzipStream), encryption (Aes), or base64 decoding (FromBase64String). This combination is highly indicative of malicious payloads attempting to load reflective DLLs or executables directly into memory to evade file-based detection.
Detects attempts to clear Windows event logs using built-in utilities such as wevtutil.exe or PowerShell cmdlets (Clear-EventLog, Clear-WinEvent). Adversaries often perform this action to remove traces of malicious activity from the system.
Detects attempts to clear Windows event logs using administrative tools like wevtutil.exe, PowerShell, or through the detection of mass log-clear audit events (such as Event IDs 1102 and 104) occurring in a rapid burst. This activity is often used by adversaries to hide evidence of post-compromise actions.
Detects pre-encryption defensive measures employed by the Monkey ransomware C++ variant. This rule triggers on behaviors including Microsoft Defender exclusion management, disabling of AMSI or ETW components, manipulation of system security settings via registry, and attempts to clear PowerShell or command-line history to facilitate anti-forensic evasion.
Detects instances where PowerShell attempts to execute an external process with elevated privileges using 'Start-Process -Verb RunAs' combined with hidden window flags. The rule specifically looks for evidence that the targeted executable was recently initiated or exists in the context of the PowerShell operation, potentially indicating a UAC bypass attempt or malicious elevation of privileges.
Detects suspicious PowerShell command-line activity involving the use of encoded, obfuscated, or stealth-focused flags, as well as common patterns associated with fileless payload delivery and execution.
Detects the use of PowerShell to download content from an external URL and immediately execute it in memory using common download cradles (e.g., Net.WebClient, IWR) combined with execution commands like IEX (Invoke-Expression). This is a common pattern for fileless malware delivery and post-exploitation activity.
Detects the use of the 'Add-MpPreference' PowerShell cmdlet with the '-ExclusionPath' parameter, which is used to add file, folder, or extension exclusions to Microsoft Defender. Attackers frequently use this technique to prevent security software from scanning or detecting malicious files or directories.
This rule detects the use of the 'Add-MpPreference' PowerShell cmdlet with the '-ExclusionPath' argument to add specific file or directory paths to Microsoft Defender's exclusion list. This behavior is a common technique used by adversaries to bypass security controls by ensuring malicious tools or scripts are not scanned by Windows Defender. The rule specifically alerts on exclusions related to common staging areas or specific tools such as Telegram Desktop, SSH cache folders, and package management directories.
This rule monitors for PowerShell commands that combine common data collection flags ('-Recurse', 'Documents') with 'Invoke-WebRequest' to perform a POST method upload. This pattern is commonly associated with the staging and exfiltration of sensitive files from local directories to a remote destination via HTTP/S.
Detects attempts to disable or modify Windows Defender security features, such as Real-time Monitoring, Tamper Protection, or adding unauthorized exclusion paths via PowerShell cmdlets or direct registry modifications.
Detects attempts to disable or modify Windows Defender security features, such as Real-time Monitoring, Tamper Protection, or adding unauthorized exclusion paths via PowerShell cmdlets or direct registry modifications.
This rule detects potential persistence mechanisms and suspicious execution patterns associated with the ChainScript malware. It specifically monitors for the creation of scheduled tasks using PowerShell with indicators like 'StreamServiceSharedBridge.ps1' or 'ComponentTask33Agent', and the execution of VBScript-based agents via wscript.exe. It also flags tasks configured with specific execution time limits often associated with this malware's behavior.
This rule detects potential persistence mechanisms and suspicious execution patterns associated with the ChainScript malware. It specifically monitors for the creation of scheduled tasks using PowerShell with indicators like 'StreamServiceSharedBridge.ps1' or 'ComponentTask33Agent', and the execution of VBScript-based agents via wscript.exe. It also flags tasks configured with specific execution time limits often associated with this malware's behavior.
This rule detects the execution of PowerShell commands that simultaneously perform reconnaissance for security analysis tools and virtual machine environment indicators. The presence of encoded, hidden, or non-interactive PowerShell flags in conjunction with these discovery actions is indicative of an adversary attempting to verify their execution environment to evade detection and analysis by security researchers or automated sandbox systems.
Detects suspicious PowerShell commands involving node.js, hidden window styles, and file downloads or transfers.
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