Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects suspicious PowerShell commands involving node.js, hidden window styles, and file downloads or transfers.
Detects multiple defense evasion techniques typically associated with the Monkey ransomware family, including clearing Windows Event Logs, clearing PowerShell command history, tampering with AMSI and ETW, modifying Microsoft Defender exclusions, and disabling Task Manager or CMD via registry keys.
Detects execution of PowerShell or CMD initiated by the Kimsuky GitPower loader. The rule identifies suspicious command-line artifacts including excessive character padding (leading spaces), extremely long command lines, and the presence of a hardcoded, unique base64 decoding variable ('$VIUSBvejbawf') associated with this specific malware family.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with specific command-line arguments (-NonInteractive, -NoProfile, -Command) often used by the Bird Agent backdoor or similar malicious scripts to execute code silently without user intervention or profile configuration.
Detects the execution of PowerShell commands that utilize both obfuscation techniques (such as Base64 encoding or 'FromBase64String') and remote payload retrieval or memory execution methods (such as 'IEX', 'DownloadString', or 'Invoke-WebRequest'). This combination is a classic indicator of malicious PowerShell activity designed to download and execute second-stage payloads.
Detects potential ClickFix-style social engineering attacks where a victim is prompted to execute an encoded PowerShell command (often via copy-paste into a terminal). The rule specifically monitors PowerShell processes initiated by shell environments (explorer.exe, cmd.exe, or WindowsTerminal.exe) that execute encoded, hidden scripts to perform multiple suspicious network requests for files (e.g., .zip, .enc, .bin) from non-standard domains.
This rule detects the execution of PowerShell from a WScript or CScript parent process where the PowerShell script also performs suspicious actions such as reading environment variables (specifically those following a 'Kv\d+' pattern) and accessing files using 'IO.File::ReadAllText'. This behavior is indicative of malicious scripts, such as those used by specific malware or post-exploitation tools, attempting to retrieve configuration data or credentials stored in environment variables.
Detects malicious PowerShell scripts that perform reflective loading of .NET DLLs into memory. The rule identifies patterns associated with the 'ClickFix' or 'StealC' loaders, specifically looking for combinations of Assembly.Load, GZip decompression, and hardcoded AES encryption keys/IVs frequently used by these campaigns.
This rule detects PowerShell command lines that include .NET API calls typically used for anti-debugging and anti-analysis evasion, such as 'Debugger.IsAttached', 'Debugger.IsLogging', 'CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent', and 'Environment.FailFast'. These checks are common in malicious loaders and implants to determine if the process is being analyzed or monitored, allowing the malware to modify its behavior accordingly.
Detects the use of the [Reflection.Assembly]::Load method within PowerShell command lines. This method is often abused by attackers to reflectively load malicious .NET assemblies directly into memory, bypassing disk-based security controls.
Detects the use of PowerShell commands that perform decryption (AES-256-CBC) and decompression (Gzip) of data, followed by the reflective loading of a .NET assembly into memory using [Reflection.Assembly]::Load. This behavior is indicative of fileless malware execution where a payload is hidden in an obfuscated or compressed format and unpacked at runtime.
Detects instances of PowerShell being launched directly from Windows Explorer (explorer.exe) using suspicious command-line arguments. This pattern is commonly associated with malicious scripts, remote access trojans, or fileless execution techniques where an adversary executes code through shell-based file interaction.
Detects PowerShell attempts to perform remote process injection into potentially suspicious or sensitive processes (csc.exe, chrome.exe, msedge.exe, SearchIndexer.exe) by searching for command line arguments indicating the usage of Windows memory allocation or thread context manipulation APIs such as NtAllocateVirtualMemoryRemote and NtSetContextThreadRemote.
Detects the execution of obfuscated PowerShell commands initiated from the Windows Run dialog (explorer.exe). This pattern is consistent with 'ClickFix' social engineering attacks where users are coerced into copying and pasting malicious, obfuscated code into the Run dialog. The rule monitors for common obfuscation artifacts such as carets, hidden window flags, encoded command arguments, and large base64-like blobs within the command line.
This rule detects PowerShell script execution patterns indicative of the StealC 'ClickFix' infection chain. It specifically looks for the reflective loading of an obfuscated .NET assembly from memory, involving common .NET cryptographic and compression classes such as AesCryptoServiceProvider, GzipStream, and assembly loading methods like Assembly.Load. The rule uses markers and script length heuristics to identify payloads characteristic of this malware delivery technique.
Detects the use of PowerShell to modify Windows Defender exclusions by adding the 'C:\' drive root as an exclusion path. This technique, which can be executed via 'Add-MpPreference', 'Set-MpPreference', or 'Invoke-CimMethod', effectively disables real-time scanning across the entire system drive and is often employed by adversaries to hide malicious activity from antivirus detection.
Detects the execution of PowerShell or PowerShell ISE with command line arguments indicative of suspicious activity, such as the use of GZipStream for payload decompression, AesManaged for payload decryption, or in-memory assembly loading via Reflection.Assembly or EntryPoint.Invoke, often associated with fileless malware execution or obfuscated script runners.
This rule detects PowerShell processes attempting to download specific ZIP files (e.g., DriverInstaller.zip, Automata-20.zip, ww.zip) from Backblaze B2 cloud storage buckets. This pattern is commonly associated with the delivery of malicious payloads or staged tools.
Detects the use of PowerShell cmdlets and parameters to perform system, hardware, and external drive discovery. This includes querying volume information, disk/partition details, and checking for removable or specific bus-type media (USB, SD, MMC), which is commonly associated with reconnaissance activities by an adversary.
Detects the creation of a specific JSON file named 'uploaded_files.json' within a 'SmartUploader' directory by PowerShell. This behavior may indicate an automated process, script, or actor staging data for exfiltration or managing uploaded content via PowerShell.
Detects the use of PowerShell to execute the 'Compress-Archive' cmdlet against a file named 'download.bin'. This behavior is commonly used by adversaries to compress staged data, potentially for exfiltration, or to manipulate artifacts downloaded from an external source.
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