Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects anomalous access to the SharePoint WebPartPages.asmx SOAP endpoint, specifically using the GetWebPartPageConnectionInfo method. This query identifies patterns consistent with the exploitation of CVE-2026-65660, where adversaries attempt to smuggle WebPart template markup (e.g., <%@ Register, XamlServices) after legitimate preview methods have been disabled.
Detects mailbox items being accessed or bound by an OAuth-based application (app-only context) in Microsoft 365, filtering out expected interactive client signatures like Outlook or OWA. This behavior is indicative of potential post-compromise mailbox enumeration or data harvesting by malicious applications using stolen or illicitly granted OAuth access tokens.
Detects anomalous child process execution (e.g., cmd.exe, powershell.exe) by the Microsoft Exchange IIS worker process (w3wp.exe) or the creation of .aspx files in Exchange web directories. This behavior is highly indicative of post-exploitation activity, such as web shell deployment, frequently observed in attacks targeting vulnerabilities like ProxyShell and ProxyLogon.
This rule detects potentially malicious POST requests to SharePoint endpoints (such as AddGallery.aspx) that include indicators of WebPartMarkup or ToolPane payloads. This activity attempts to bypass the SPUtility.EnsureAuthentication() check that is typically enforced on the ToolPane.aspx page, potentially allowing unauthorized code execution or configuration manipulation.
Detects the creation of .aspx, .ashx, or .asp files within Exchange OWA/ECP or IIS wwwroot directories by web server processes (w3wp.exe or UMWorkerProcess.exe). This pattern is consistent with web shell deployment following the exploitation of public-facing web applications, a technique often used by threat actors like APT40.
Detects inbound email or ticketing messages containing extortion language (such as payment deadlines, leak-site references, and data-shredding threats) specifically directed at high-value internal targets like executives, security teams, and legal departments. This pattern is consistent with the ShinyHunters 'pay-or-leak' extortion model.
Detects an exploitation attempt targeting SharePoint through the EditingPageParser by injecting a Register directive. This attempt involves bypassing SafeControls through specifically crafted HTTP POST requests to ToolPane.aspx, utilizing the GetPartPreviewAndPropertiesFromMarkup function to execute malicious tag patterns.
This rule detects a multi-stage Business Email Compromise (BEC) attack involving executive impersonation via look-alike domains, followed by the creation of suspicious inbox rules (forwarding/deletion) by the victim, and concurrent external communication (Teams/Zoom meeting invites) from a newly created account. It correlates these activities to identify sophisticated payment fraud campaigns.
Detects modifications to Microsoft Exchange mailbox folder permissions where the 'Default' user is granted 'Owner' access. This activity, which may involve operations such as 'UpdateFolder', 'Add-MailboxFolderPermission', or 'Set-MailboxFolderPermission', is a known server-side persistence mechanism. By granting 'Owner' rights to the 'Default' user, an attacker can bypass standard authentication and device-level controls to access mailbox contents, often following initial exploitation such as OWA XSS.
Detects post-exploitation indicators of CVE-2026-62911, an authentication-bypass-by-capture-replay vulnerability in Microsoft Exchange. The rule identifies anomalous behavior following a potential bypass: either the assignment of the ApplicationImpersonation management role or a single impersonation session accessing an abnormally high number of distinct mailboxes (FolderBind, MessageBind, or SendAs).
Detects a sequence of events where a single user receives an unusually high volume of inbound emails (potentially vishing-related), followed shortly thereafter by the user executing common remote assistance or remote access tools (e.g., Quick Assist, AnyDesk). This pattern is consistent with social engineering tactics used in IT-support impersonation scams to facilitate the delivery of malware such as Sauron Loader.
Detects the creation or modification of Microsoft 365/Exchange inbox rules that suggest malicious staging or exfiltration activities. This includes rules configured for external email auto-forwarding, automatic deletion of messages, or movement of emails into hidden/system folders (e.g., RSS Subscriptions, Archive) which may be filtered based on sensitive keywords related to financial or credential theft (e.g., invoice, wire, payment).
Detects instances where a user account performs non-interactive or legacy authentication (e.g., IMAP, POP3, SMTP, ActiveSync) shortly after an endpoint associated with that same user is flagged for malware or infostealer activity. This pattern is indicative of an adversary using exfiltrated credentials to maintain access to cloud services while bypassing MFA policies.
This rule detects a multi-stage Business Email Compromise (BEC) attack involving executive impersonation via look-alike domains, followed by the creation of suspicious inbox rules (forwarding/deletion) by the victim, and concurrent external communication (Teams/Zoom meeting invites) from a newly created account. It correlates these activities to identify sophisticated payment fraud campaigns.
This rule detects a multi-stage Business Email Compromise (BEC) attack involving executive impersonation via look-alike domains, followed by the creation of suspicious inbox rules (forwarding/deletion) by the victim, and concurrent external communication (Teams/Zoom meeting invites) from a newly created account. It correlates these activities to identify sophisticated payment fraud campaigns.
Detects malicious HTTP POST requests targeting SharePoint servers that attempt to inject 'Register' directives into pages or manipulate WebPartPage ToolPane markup, indicative of attempts to bypass SafeControls or exploit vulnerable SharePoint features for code execution.
Detects an attempt to bypass SharePoint authentication using a 'Register' directive in a POST request body directed at an .aspx page that is not a recognized ToolPane page. This pattern is indicative of an exploit attempt against a public-facing SharePoint server, specifically targeting vulnerability CVE-2026-65660.
Detects a suspicious spike in MailItemsAccessed operations occurring across multiple distinct tenant organization IDs within a 60-second window, using the same ClientAppId. This behavior is indicative of automated, centralized credential abuse or mailbox collection tools (often associated with campaigns like Storm-2755) rather than legitimate, isolated user or service-level activity.
Detects the presence of specific .NET deserialization gadget chain components (ExpandedWrapper, XamlServices, ObjectDataProvider, LosFormatter) within application traffic or logs, which are indicative of exploitation attempts targeting SharePoint pre-authentication remote code execution vulnerabilities like CVE-2026-65660.
Detects HTTP POST requests to SharePoint ToolPane or WebPartPage endpoints containing serialized gadget chains (e.g., ysoserial ExpandedWrapper/ObjectDataProvider or XamlServices) indicative of deserialization exploitation attempts, specifically targeting CVE-2026-65660.
Detects unauthenticated HTTP POST requests targeting SharePoint WebPartPage-derived endpoints using the 'webPartMarkup' parameter. This activity attempts to exploit a vulnerability (CVE-2026-65660) where anonymous access to specific pages bypasses authentication, allowing an attacker to invoke internal methods for malicious register-directive injection.
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