Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
167 detections
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Detects processes running from user-writable locations (Temp/AppData/Public/Downloads) creating a self-referential Windows Firewall allow rule via netsh, consistent with NJRAT establishing outbound C2 connectivity while evading network-based blocking.
Detects network communication to known MovieReaper C2 infrastructure (deadhub.org or 193.23.118.155) originating from a masqueraded 'msedge.exe' process located in 'C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Telemetry\', indicating potential C2 check-ins or data exfiltration by the file manager module.
Detects processes running from user-writable locations (Temp/AppData/Public/Downloads) creating a self-referential Windows Firewall allow rule via netsh, consistent with NJRAT establishing outbound C2 connectivity while evading network-based blocking.
Detects processes running from user-writable locations (Temp/AppData/Public/Downloads) creating a self-referential Windows Firewall allow rule via netsh, consistent with NJRAT establishing outbound C2 connectivity while evading network-based blocking.
Detects processes running from user-writable locations (Temp/AppData/Public/Downloads) creating a self-referential Windows Firewall allow rule via netsh, consistent with NJRAT establishing outbound C2 connectivity while evading network-based blocking.
Detects outbound network connections over TCP port 445 directed toward common internal IP address ranges (RFC 1918) by processes other than standard system binaries. This pattern is characteristic of SMB network scanning or lateral movement activities, such as those used by the DragonForce locker ransomware to discover target hosts within a network.
Detects the disabling of host-based firewalls (Windows Filtering Platform/Advanced Firewall, iptables, or nftables) via command-line tools. The rule excludes common management tools, system accounts, and events where the firewall is re-enabled within a short timeframe, effectively filtering for potentially unauthorized attempts to impair security defenses.
Detects the XHOPELESS wiper routine 'KillNetworkPermanent' which severs network connectivity by resetting the TCP/IP stack using netsh, blocking all traffic via Windows Advanced Firewall commands, and disabling network adapters via devcon.exe as a final destructive action.
Detects the disabling of host-based firewalls (Windows Filtering Platform/Advanced Firewall, iptables, or nftables) via command-line tools. The rule excludes common management tools, system accounts, and events where the firewall is re-enabled within a short timeframe, effectively filtering for potentially unauthorized attempts to impair security defenses.
Detects the disabling of host-based firewalls (Windows Filtering Platform/Advanced Firewall, iptables, or nftables) via command-line tools. The rule excludes common management tools, system accounts, and events where the firewall is re-enabled within a short timeframe, effectively filtering for potentially unauthorized attempts to impair security defenses.
Detects the disabling of host-based firewalls (Windows Filtering Platform/Advanced Firewall, iptables, or nftables) via command-line tools. The rule excludes common management tools, system accounts, and events where the firewall is re-enabled within a short timeframe, effectively filtering for potentially unauthorized attempts to impair security defenses.
This rule monitors for suspicious activity targeting security software and host security configurations. It detects the termination of security-related processes using 'taskkill' or service management commands, the disabling of Windows Firewall via 'netsh', and the modification of critical Registry keys related to User Account Control (UAC), Registry editing access, and Task Manager functionality.
Detects the disabling of host-based firewalls (Windows Filtering Platform/Advanced Firewall, iptables, or nftables) via command-line tools. The rule excludes common management tools, system accounts, and events where the firewall is re-enabled within a short timeframe, effectively filtering for potentially unauthorized attempts to impair security defenses.
Detects a sequence of commands characteristic of the Stealer/1.0 malware, involving the systematic disabling of security features including Windows Defender, Firewall, UAC, System Restore, Windows Recovery Environment, SafeBoot, and the deletion of Volume Shadow Copies as a precursor to destructive data operations.
Detects the addition of a new "Allow" firewall rule by the WMI process (WmiPrvSE.EXE).
This can occur if an attacker leverages PowerShell cmdlets such as "New-NetFirewallRule", or directly uses WMI CIM classes such as "MSFT_NetFirewallRule".
This can occur if an attacker leverages PowerShell cmdlets such as "New-NetFirewallRule", or directly uses WMI CIM classes such as "MSFT_NetFirewallRule".
Detects when a rule has been added to the Windows Firewall exception list
The following analytic detects the EDRSilencer-specific Windows Filtering Platform filter name "Custom Outbound Filter" when it is configured with a block action.
EDRSilencer creates WFP filters to block outbound traffic from EDR and security agent processes, impairing endpoint telemetry without requiring the tool binary to keep its original process name.
EventCode 5447 identifies creation of the runtime filter with ChangeType %%16384, while EventCode 5441 can show the same persistent filter when the Base Filtering Engine starts.
EDRSilencer creates WFP filters to block outbound traffic from EDR and security agent processes, impairing endpoint telemetry without requiring the tool binary to keep its original process name.
EventCode 5447 identifies creation of the runtime filter with ChangeType %%16384, while EventCode 5441 can show the same persistent filter when the Base Filtering Engine starts.
The following analytic detects Windows Filtering Platform filters that are added and configured to block outbound traffic for known EDR and security agent processes.
Tools such as EDRSilencer abuse WFP to disrupt outbound telemetry from EDR processes, which can bypass detections that only look for the tool process name.
This detection looks for WFP add events with a block action and EDR process names embedded in the hexdump-like Conditions field.
Tools such as EDRSilencer abuse WFP to disrupt outbound telemetry from EDR processes, which can bypass detections that only look for the tool process name.
This detection looks for WFP add events with a block action and EDR process names embedded in the hexdump-like Conditions field.
Detects DNS resolution and outbound network connection attempts to the hardcoded C2 domain 'aroclenetapp.net' associated with the SynkLoader StreamMaster reverse VNC module. This module is used to exfiltrate screenshots and capture keyboard/mouse input.
Detects the creation of inbound firewall rules using the New-NetFirewallRule PowerShell cmdlet where the DisplayName parameter is set to 'Microsoft.Windows.CloudExperienceHost'. This behavior is indicative of the GigaWiper malware attempting to masquerade as a legitimate Windows component to facilitate network persistence or remote access capabilities.
Detects the creation of inbound firewall rules using the New-NetFirewallRule PowerShell cmdlet where the DisplayName parameter is set to 'Microsoft.Windows.CloudExperienceHost'. This behavior is indicative of the GigaWiper malware attempting to masquerade as a legitimate Windows component to facilitate network persistence or remote access capabilities.
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