Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
167 detections
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Detects when a single rules or all of the rules have been deleted from the Windows Defender Firewall
Detects the degradation of the system firewall security by the creation or re-enabling of per-application
exceptions via registry writes to the AuthorizedApplications\List keys under FirewallPolicy, which grants
the targeted executable network access and can be abused by malware to bypass network restrictions.
exceptions via registry writes to the AuthorizedApplications\List keys under FirewallPolicy, which grants
the targeted executable network access and can be abused by malware to bypass network restrictions.
Detects outbound network connections to common TOR entry, guard, or client service ports, or the execution of TOR-related processes. This behavior may indicate an adversary establishing C2 communication channels or attempting to perform anonymized data exfiltration.
This rule detects potential unauthorized or suspicious installation of an RMM (Remote Monitoring and Management) agent on a Windows host. It flags cases where a process performs multiple suspicious actions within a 24-hour window, specifically combining the installation or starting of a service related to an RMM agent, the creation of a Windows Firewall rule for the RMM agent executable, and/or the creation of log events related to the installer.
This rule detects potential unauthorized or suspicious installation of an RMM (Remote Monitoring and Management) agent on a Windows host. It flags cases where a process performs multiple suspicious actions within a 24-hour window, specifically combining the installation or starting of a service related to an RMM agent, the creation of a Windows Firewall rule for the RMM agent executable, and/or the creation of log events related to the installer.
Detects anomalous outbound lateral movement attempts where a single source host initiates WinRM connections (ports 5985/5986) to an unusually high number of distinct destination hosts within a short timeframe, which is often indicative of automated credential propagation or internal scanning by an adversary.
Detects the manual enablement of network discovery services (fdrespub, fdPHost, SSDPSRV, upnphost) and the associated Windows Firewall rules. This activity is a known tactic used by Gentlemen ransomware to facilitate lateral movement and network share enumeration by making the compromised host visible to others and allowing it to discover peers.
This rule detects potential unauthorized or suspicious installation of an RMM (Remote Monitoring and Management) agent on a Windows host. It flags cases where a process performs multiple suspicious actions within a 24-hour window, specifically combining the installation or starting of a service related to an RMM agent, the creation of a Windows Firewall rule for the RMM agent executable, and/or the creation of log events related to the installer.
Detects the specific pattern associated with Storm-2570 for enabling Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) on a target host to facilitate lateral movement. The detection looks for registry modifications to disable RDP denial (fDenyTSConnections=0), firewall rules allowing TCP port 3389 via netsh or PowerShell, and the deployment of these configurations using PsExec against a target host list file.
This rule detects modification of the Windows Registry to disable the Windows Firewall. Specifically, it monitors for EventID 4657 (A registry value was modified) where the 'EnableFirewall' value is set to '0' within the FirewallPolicy service registry path, indicating an attempt to disable the host-based firewall.
Detects the installation or execution of common Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tools (e.g., ScreenConnect, AnyDesk, Atera) that are initiated from potentially untrusted parent processes like browsers, mail clients, or archive utilities, or that exhibit a code signing discrepancy. The rule further correlates these installation events with subsequent modifications to the Windows firewall within a two-hour window, which is indicative of an adversary establishing remote access persistence.
Detects potential persistence and network persistence mechanisms associated with the MSP360 RMM agent. The rule correlates the creation of a Windows service for RMM.Agent.exe or RMM.Agent.Launcher.exe with the addition of a firewall rule allowing UDP traffic on port 48678 by netsh or PowerShell, occurring within a one-hour window.
Detects potential persistence and network persistence mechanisms associated with the MSP360 RMM agent. The rule correlates the creation of a Windows service for RMM.Agent.exe or RMM.Agent.Launcher.exe with the addition of a firewall rule allowing UDP traffic on port 48678 by netsh or PowerShell, occurring within a one-hour window.
Detects unauthorized attempts to disable or modify Windows Firewall settings across multiple devices. The rule identifies suspicious registry modifications, firewall service termination events, or security policy changes that suggest an adversary is attempting to impair defensive mechanisms.
This rule detects potential unauthorized or suspicious installation of an RMM (Remote Monitoring and Management) agent on a Windows host. It flags cases where a process performs multiple suspicious actions within a 24-hour window, specifically combining the installation or starting of a service related to an RMM agent, the creation of a Windows Firewall rule for the RMM agent executable, and/or the creation of log events related to the installer.
This rule detects potential unauthorized or suspicious installation of an RMM (Remote Monitoring and Management) agent on a Windows host. It flags cases where a process performs multiple suspicious actions within a 24-hour window, specifically combining the installation or starting of a service related to an RMM agent, the creation of a Windows Firewall rule for the RMM agent executable, and/or the creation of log events related to the installer.
Detects network connections from workstation subnets to domain controllers using administrative protocols such as SMB (445), RPC (135), RDP (3389), or WinRM (5985/5986). This activity is indicative of lateral movement attempts by an adversary attempting to reach critical infrastructure from a compromised workstation in a flat or poorly segmented environment.
This rule detects the addition or modification of Windows Firewall rules by applications residing in non-standard or suspicious directories. It monitors Security Events 2004, 2071, and 2097, filtering out known legitimate system paths, common temporary directories, and updates from trusted Microsoft processes such as Windows Defender, svchost.exe, and dllhost.exe. By excluding standard operating system folders and common software installation paths, the rule highlights potentially malicious attempts to establish persistence or facilitate unauthorized network communication by bypassing standard firewall management channels.
This rule detects the addition or modification of Windows Firewall rules by applications residing in non-standard or suspicious directories. It monitors Security Events 2004, 2071, and 2097, filtering out known legitimate system paths, common temporary directories, and updates from trusted Microsoft processes such as Windows Defender, svchost.exe, and dllhost.exe. By excluding standard operating system folders and common software installation paths, the rule highlights potentially malicious attempts to establish persistence or facilitate unauthorized network communication by bypassing standard firewall management channels.
Detects the presence and execution of components related to the 'GhostCode' activity, specifically the installation of a rogue self-signed root certificate authority (CA) masquerading as Google Trust Services and the subsequent configuration of a local TLS-intercepting proxy. The detection monitors for the creation of specific archive files, modification of the system certificate store, addition of local firewall rules, and modification of the local hosts file.
Detects processes running from user-writable locations (Temp/AppData/Public/Downloads) creating a self-referential Windows Firewall allow rule via netsh, consistent with NJRAT establishing outbound C2 connectivity while evading network-based blocking.
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