Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
40,407 detections
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Detects a sequence where a local user account is created or added to a local group using net.exe or net1.exe, followed by reg.exe configuring AnyDesk persistence under the SafeBoot Network registry key on the same device within a 24-hour window.
Detects a sequence of events where a known vulnerable driver is dropped or modified on a device, followed shortly by the execution of a specific callback tool (such as gbbsym.exe or symgooq.exe) or a tool matching known hashes, often associated with Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) tactics.
Detects the AgtaBackup implant executing command shells or PowerShell sessions where the parent process is either a masqueraded Credential Guard.exe outside standard paths or associated with AgtaBackup service paths/command lines.
Detects the installation of a Google Meet-named MSI package via msiexec.exe from user-writable paths or non-Google URLs, correlated with the creation of a GoogleMeet.exe binary in the Google Meet Agent directory.
Detects the AgtaBackup implant executing command shells or PowerShell sessions where the parent process is either a masqueraded Credential Guard.exe outside standard paths or associated with AgtaBackup service paths/command lines.
Detects PowerShell and msiexec activity referencing AgtaBackupAgent.msi where the parent process or initiator is associated with known Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tools such as LogMeIn Resolve, ConnectWise ScreenConnect, Ops RMM, or TraceRMM.
Detects the AgtaBackup implant executing command shells or PowerShell sessions where the parent process is either a masqueraded Credential Guard.exe outside standard paths or associated with AgtaBackup service paths/command lines.
Detects potential malicious software installation via two branches: Branch A identifies MSI files downloaded from suspicious URLs or with meeting/update lures (e.g., Zoom, Google Meet) followed by msiexec installation within one hour. Branch B detects msiexec command lines referencing RMM tools (ScreenConnect, LogMeIn, GoToResolve) combined with paths like Downloads, Temp, or AppData.
Detects potential ESC8 NTLM relay attacks against Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) Web Enrollment, where a domain controller machine account authenticates over NTLM from a non-DC IP address followed by a certificate request or retrieval via IIS.
Detects network communication to api.telegram.org from a process that is not identified as an authorized Telegram client application, potentially indicating command and control (C2) activity.
Detects non-browser processes communicating with both mail.google.com and api.telegram.org within a 60-minute window, which may indicate automated email exfiltration via Telegram using stolen session cookies.
Detects outbound IPv4 and IPv6 connections from endpoints to public addresses on ports other than DNS (53), HTTP (80), HTTPS (443), 8000.
Command-and-control tools and tunnels often use uncommon ports to avoid web-focused filtering. Private, loopback, link-local, multicast and documentation ranges are excluded, and repeated connections are grouped by endpoint, process, remote IP and port. Custom apps and admin tools also use these ports, so triage by process, destination reputation and how rare the destination is.
Command-and-control tools and tunnels often use uncommon ports to avoid web-focused filtering. Private, loopback, link-local, multicast and documentation ranges are excluded, and repeated connections are grouped by endpoint, process, remote IP and port. Custom apps and admin tools also use these ports, so triage by process, destination reputation and how rare the destination is.
Sweeps endpoint telemetry for known IOCs from the trojanized anthropic.claude-code (Open-VSX v2.1.313) SSH backdoor: C2 IP 134.209.82.225, beacon URL, extension.js and tunnel key SHA-256 hashes, and ifconfig.me lookups from VS Code-family/extension-host processes. Results are summarized per device and IOC.
Detects machine account NTLM logons to an Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) Web Enrollment server where the source device differs from the account's own host (indicative of NTLM coercion like PetitPotam), followed within 10 minutes by certificate enrollment requests (/certsrv/) from the same source host.
Node.js has announced upcoming security updates addressing multiple vulnerabilities, including high-severity issues. Organizations should start identifying installed Node.js versions across their environments, especially outdated or End-of-Life (EOL) releases that may no longer receive security patches. I created the following Query to quickly identify devices running Node.js, review their installed versions, and prioritize those requiring attention before the security updates become available
Detects the shell open key manipulation (exefile and ms-settings) used for persistence and the pattern of UAC Bypass using fodhelper.exe, computerdefaults.exe, slui.exe via registry keys (e.g. UACMe 33 or 62)
Detects when an attacker modifies the registry value of the "hhctrl" to point to a custom binary
Correlates a certificate-based (PKINIT) Kerberos logon by an account with a DCSync-style directory replication from the same account within a 5-minute window, using Microsoft Defender for Identity logs.
Detects behavioral artifacts associated with Impacket remote execution tools (such as wmiexec, smbexec, and atexec) on target hosts using Microsoft Defender XDR process telemetry. It identifies command-line signatures spawned by system processes like WmiPrvSE.exe, services.exe, and svchost.exe.
Detects wscript.exe or cscript.exe executing a VBScript that uses MSXML2.XMLHTTP and ADODB.Stream to download a file in chunks (using the Range header) to a temporary or AppData location. This technique is often used by malware to evade detection by downloading payloads in smaller pieces.
Detects a single non-browser process that touches, copies, or stages files from multiple browser profile stores along with OpenVPN configuration files within a short timeframe, which is indicative of credential harvesting or session hijacking activity.
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