Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects potentially suspicious file deletion activity originating from PowerShell processes (powershell.exe or pwsh.exe). It monitors for commands targeting temporary directories and specific file extensions (such as .vbs, .lnk, .js, or .ps1) combined with recursive deletion arguments. Additionally, it highlights scenarios where these PowerShell commands are executed by potentially unusual parent processes such as script engines (wscript.exe, cscript.exe, mshta.exe) or other command-line utilities.
Detects PowerShell command execution that uses bitwise XOR operations combined with the .NET [IO.File]::WriteAllBytes method. This pattern is commonly used by malware, such as AsyncRAT, to deobfuscate and drop secondary payloads or modules onto the file system during execution.
This rule detects PowerShell commands that exhibit signs of obfuscation by searching for specific string manipulation methods commonly used to hide malicious code. Specifically, it identifies the use of base64 decoding (FromBase64String) or string concatenation combined with character replacement techniques (Replace) on the command line, which are often used by threat actors to execute encoded payloads while bypassing simple string-based signatures.
Detects the use of PowerShell to add Microsoft Defender exclusions (paths or extensions) where the process was initiated by or involves LockAppHost.exe. This behavior is indicative of an attempt to bypass security protections by excluding malicious artifacts from scanning.
Detects the execution of hidden, base64-encoded PowerShell commands spawned directly from explorer.exe, a pattern observed in the CRPx0 ClickFix campaign where attackers trick users into pasting malicious commands into the Windows Run dialog.
Detects the use of PowerShell, pwsh, or cmd to execute the 'Add-MpPreference' command with the '-ExclusionPath' parameter, specifically targeting common directories like Telegram Desktop or specific system directories. This activity suggests an attempt to bypass security scanning by excluding known malicious locations or folders from Microsoft Defender's real-time monitoring.
Detects PowerShell command lines that attempt to hide the console window by calling ShowWindowAsync from user32.dll while assigning a randomly generated GUID as the window title. This technique is used to evade detection by keeping malicious PowerShell activity invisible to the user, as seen in recent StealC infostealer loader chains.
Detects PowerShell processes executing [Reflection.Assembly]::Load to load .NET assemblies directly into memory. This behavior is commonly used by fileless loaders such as StealC to execute malicious payloads while avoiding disk-based artifacts.
Detects instances of PowerShell executing process injection techniques (such as memory allocation and remote thread creation) targeting specific legitimate processes including csc.exe, chrome.exe, msedge.exe, or SearchIndexer.exe. This activity is indicative of the StealC malware attempting to masquerade its malicious code execution within trusted system or browser processes.
Detects malicious PowerShell activity using the -ExecutionPolicy Bypass flag combined with caret obfuscation or indicators related to known malicious infrastructure used in ClickFix-style social engineering campaigns. The rule specifically monitors for attempts to download or execute configuration.ps1 from identified attacker domains and IP addresses.
Detects the suspicious sequential execution of the 'wevtutil cl' command to clear multiple critical Windows Event Log channels, including security, system, and application logs. This behavior is indicative of anti-forensic activities performed by adversaries, such as the Settra ransomware, to hinder incident response and forensic analysis.
Detects execution of PowerShell commands containing suspicious arguments (e.g., encoded commands, download cradles) initiated by scheduled task binaries (svchost.exe, taskeng.exe, schtasks.exe) or involving specific suspicious strings associated with identified threat activity.
Detects a suspicious sequence of activities where PowerShell downloads or extracts specific zip files (node.zip, build.zip) to staging directories, followed by the execution of associated binaries like node.exe, winpty-agent.exe, or winpty.dll from those same locations. This behavior is indicative of an adversary staging and executing tooling within temporary user directories.
Detects PEEP Secure Preferences integrity-hash forgery (protection.macs/super_mac) and known PEEP persistence scripts (patch_secure_prefs.ps1, install_silent.ps1, force_enable.ps1), anchored to actual Chrome/Edge profile paths rather than generic terms like 'protection' or 'developer_mode' that appear in unrelated admin tooling.
This rule detects the execution of powershell.exe with command-line arguments that utilize 'curl' to download a file from a specific remote IP address (103.86.86.244). This behavior is characteristic of adversaries using built-in Windows tools or redirected utilities to perform ingress tool transfer as part of a malicious payload delivery.
This rule detects the use of PowerShell to modify Microsoft Defender settings to disable real-time, behavior, and IOAV protection, while simultaneously adding a full-drive exclusion for the root directory (C:\). This behavior is characteristic of an adversary attempting to disable security monitoring to facilitate further malicious activity or avoid detection.
Detects the HEAVYGRAM malware utilizing the Telegram Bot API to download file attachments, followed by the extraction of an archive using PowerShell to a masqueraded directory (C:\ProgramData\Kee_Pass), and the subsequent execution of a binary masquerading as KeePass.exe.
Detects the execution of AADInternals PowerShell toolkit commands. AADInternals is a known framework used for administration, enumeration, and exploitation of Azure Active Directory and Microsoft Entra ID, including the creation of backdoors and manipulation of federation settings.
Detects PowerShell command execution that uses bitwise XOR operations combined with the .NET [IO.File]::WriteAllBytes method. This pattern is commonly used by malware, such as AsyncRAT, to deobfuscate and drop secondary payloads or modules onto the file system during execution.
Detects anomalous system reconnaissance activity performed using WMIC or PowerShell Get-WmiObject commands. The rule tracks distinct command-line executions per device and flags hosts where three or more unique reconnaissance commands are executed within a short timeframe, which is indicative of an adversary enumerating system configuration, hotfixes, or hardware details.
This rule detects PowerShell processes spawned directly or indirectly by LNK files that include command-line arguments indicative of anti-analysis, anti-VM, or reconnaissance techniques. These include querying for specific WMI classes (e.g., Win32_Process, Win32_ComputerSystem), checking for virtualization artifacts (e.g., 'virtualbox', 'vmware', 'qemu', 'sandboxie'), or querying security and hardware information (e.g., 'antivirusproduct', 'securitycenter2', 'getmac').
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