Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the possible addition of shadow credentials to an Active Directory object by monitoring for Event ID 5136 (Directory Service Changes) where the 'msDS-KeyCredentialLink' attribute is modified. This attribute is used in shadow credential attacks to establish persistence and gain unauthorized access.
This rule detects modifications to Active Directory user accounts that could enable an attacker to control another user's or computer's account without needing their credentials. Specifically, it looks for changes to attributes related to delegation, such as 'msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo' and 'msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity', or the 'servicePrincipalName' attribute for user objects, which can be abused for Kerberoasting or other delegation attacks. Event ID 4738 indicates a user account was changed, and Event ID 5136 indicates a directory service object was modified.
Detects modifications to DNS records in Active Directory where the Distinguished Name (DN) contains a base64-encoded blob matching a pattern indicative of a marshaled CREDENTIAL_TARGET_INFORMATION structure. This pattern is commonly used in Kerberos coercion attacks where adversaries manipulate DNS records to spoof Service Principal Names (SPNs) and redirect authentication requests, such as in CVE-2025-33073. Investigation should focus on the user account making the changes, as it is likely a compromised low-privileged account.
This rule detects attempts to backdoor a domain object by granting DCSync rights to a regular user or machine account. This is achieved by modifying the 'ntSecurityDescriptor' attribute in Active Directory, specifically looking for GUIDs associated with DCSync extended rights. Such a modification allows the designated account to perform DCSync attacks, enabling the retrieval of password hashes for any user or computer in the domain.
The following analytic detects the use of default or publicly known named pipes associated with Cobalt Strike. It leverages Sysmon EventID 17 and 18 to identify specific named pipes commonly used by Cobalt Strike's Artifact Kit and Malleable C2 Profiles. This activity is significant because Cobalt Strike is a popular tool for adversaries to conduct post-exploitation tasks, and identifying its named pipes can reveal potential malicious activity. If confirmed malicious, this could indicate an active Cobalt Strike beacon, leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.
This rule detects the addition of a Security Identifier (SID) to an Active Directory object's SID History attribute. Attackers can manipulate the SID History to gain unauthorized privileges, often by adding SIDs of highly privileged accounts (like Domain Admins) to a compromised user or computer object. This allows the compromised account to impersonate the privileged account and bypass access controls. The rule specifically looks for Event IDs 4765 (SID History added to an account) or 4766 (SID History added to a group) or Event ID 4738 (User Account Changed) where the 'SidHistory' field is not null or '%%1793' (which indicates no SID History).
Detects when the 'SeEnableDelegationPrivilege' user right is assigned in Active Directory. This privilege allows a user to control other Active Directory user objects, which can be abused for privilege escalation and persistence within a domain.
Detects changes to the "NoLMHash" registry value to allow Windows to store LM Hashes. Setting this registry value to "0" (DWORD) enables the storage of LAN manager hashes of passwords in Active Directory and local SAM databases, which can facilitate 'Pass the Hash' attacks.
This rule detects modifications to the "DsrmAdminLogonBehavior" registry value. Attackers may modify this value to abuse the Directory Services Restore Mode (DSRM) administrator account for persistence and access to Active Directory. The DSRM account is a local administrator account on a Domain Controller, typically used for restoring AD backups or recovering from failures. By changing "DsrmAdminLogonBehavior" from its default value of '0' (only usable in DSRM) to '1' (usable when AD DS service is stopped) or '2' (always usable), attackers can gain persistent access to the Domain Controller outside of DSRM, facilitating credential access and defense evasion.
This analytic detects suspicious data transfer activities involving the use of the `split` syscall with the `-b` option, which specifies the size of each output file. This technique can be used by attackers to evade detection by breaking large files into smaller parts, bypassing size-based security controls, and facilitating covert exfiltration of sensitive data. By monitoring for unusual or unauthorized use of the `split` syscall with a specified block size, this analytic helps identify potential data exfiltration attempts.
This analytic identifies the bulk creation of ransomware notes (e.g., .txt, .html, .hta files) on an infected machine. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 11 to detect multiple instances of these file types being created within a short time frame (10 seconds). A detection is triggered if 15 or more unique readme paths are observed. This activity is a strong indicator of an active ransomware attack, where the attacker is notifying the victim of the encryption. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to widespread data encryption, rendering critical files inaccessible and potentially causing significant operational disruption.
The following analytic detects suspicious attempts to find credentials stored in password stores, indicating a potential attacker's effort to access sensitive login information. Password stores are critical repositories that contain valuable credentials, and unauthorized access to them can lead to significant security breaches. By monitoring for unusual or unauthorized activities related to password store access, this analytic helps identify potential credential theft attempts, allowing security teams to respond promptly and prevent unauthorized access to critical systems and data.
Detects a potential 'UnPAC the Hash' Kerberos attack, a technique used by Akira ransomware. The attack involves requesting an Active Directory certificate and then using it for a User-to-User (U2U) Kerberos authentication with PKINIT to extract NTLM hashes.
Detect when a user creates a new Discretionary Access Control List (DACL) in Active Directory for their own AD object. This can be an indicator of an adversary attempting to maintain persistence or escalate privileges by modifying permissions on their own account to grant themselves additional rights or to prevent other users from modifying their account.
Detects when a user account is added to a high-privilege domain group (e.g., Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, etc.)
This KQL audit all your AD service accounts ( account with PasswordNeverExpires attribute set) whether the password was updated based your service account password rotation policy. (E.g In this KQL it's set to one year)
Detects the creation of the Active Directory group "ESX Admins". Threat actors create this group to exploit CVE-2024-37085, which grants any member of this group administrative privileges on domain-joined VMware ESXi hypervisors.
The following analytic detects the creation of a new local user account on a Windows system. It leverages Windows Security Audit logs, specifically event ID 4720, to identify this activity. Monitoring the creation of local accounts is crucial for a SOC as it can indicate unauthorized access or lateral movement within the network. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to establish persistence, escalate privileges, or gain unauthorized access to sensitive systems and data.
This analytic detects the configuration of TFTP services on Cisco IOS devices that could be used to exfiltrate sensitive configuration files. Threat actors like Static Tundra have been observed configuring TFTP servers to make device configuration files accessible for exfiltration after gaining initial access. The detection specifically looks for commands that expose critical configuration files such as startup-config, running-config, and other sensitive system information through TFTP. This activity is particularly concerning as it may represent an attempt to steal credentials, network topology information, and other sensitive data stored in device configurations.
Detects the reconfiguration of a virtual machine where a virtual disk (.vmdk) from a different, often critical, VM is attached. This is a key tactic used by threat actors like UNC3944 to perform offline credential theft by mounting a Domain Controller's disk to a staging VM to access the NTDS.dit file.
This rule identifies and monitors deletion operations in Azure Active Directory (AAD) that could indicate unauthorized activity. It excludes routine deletions, such as security information or device removals, and captures details about the initiating user, target user/group, and their IP address. The rule helps detect potentially anomalous or suspicious deletion actions, enhancing AAD security monitoring.
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