Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects attempts to read the Key Distribution Service (KDS) Root Key from Active Directory. This is often a preliminary step in the Golden dMSA attack, where an attacker with high privileges attempts to retrieve the key material needed to forge tickets for Delegated Managed Service Accounts (dMSA) to establish domain persistence. The rule looks for access to the 'msKds-ProvRootKey' object, identified either by its name or its schema ID GUID 'aa02fd41-17e0-4f18-8687-b2239649736b'.
This hunting rule searches for incoming ADWS connections on Domain Controllers from IP Addresses that cannot be linked to Microsoft Defender for Endpoint (MDE) onboarded devices. It aims to detect enumeration activities using ADWS from unmanaged or unknown devices, which might bypass typical monitoring tools.
Detects when a Group Policy Object (GPO) is modified to include Client-Side Extensions (CSEs) for managing local group memberships or user rights assignments. While this can be a legitimate administrative action, attackers can abuse this capability to escalate privileges by adding accounts to sensitive local groups (e.g., Administrators) or granting powerful user rights. This alert serves as an early warning to investigate the specific changes made within the GPO.
Detect possible ADCS ESC4 privilege escalation using Certipy's default template hijacking. This detects a change of the security descriptor on a certificate template granting full control to the Authenticated Users group. Event ID 4886 and 4898 will typically also be generated at the same time. Afterwards, Event ID 4886 and 4887 may appear to indicate a certificate request as a high-privilege user in the UPN field.
This analytic detects a user account initiating an Active Directory replication request, indicative of a DCSync attack. It leverages EventCode 4662 from the Windows Security Event Log, focusing on specific object types and replication permissions. This activity is significant because it can allow an attacker with sufficient privileges to request password hashes for any or all users within the domain. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, and potential compromise of the entire domain.
The following analytic identifies unauthorized Active Directory replication requests initiated from non-domain controller locations. It leverages EventCode 4662 to detect when a computer account with replication permissions creates a handle to domainDNS, filtering out known domain controller IP addresses. This activity is significant as it may indicate a DCSync attack, where an attacker with privileged access can request password hashes for any or all users within the domain. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive information and potential full domain compromise.
Detects potential DCSync attacks by identifying Event ID 4662 where specific DS-Replication access rights are used by a non-domain controller. This rule specifically looks for attempts to replicate directory changes (DS-Replication-Get-Changes, DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All, DS-Replication-Get-Changes-In-Filtered-Set) from an IP address that is not a known domain controller, while also excluding common system accounts.
The following analytic identifies the addition and quick deletion of a Service Principal Name (SPN) to a domain account within 5 minutes. This detection leverages EventCode 5136 from the Windows Security Event Log, focusing on changes to the servicePrincipalName attribute. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to perform Kerberoasting, a technique used to crack the cleartext password of a domain account offline. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to gain unauthorized access to sensitive information or escalate privileges within the domain environment.
This analytic detects the addition of a Service Principal Name (SPN) to a domain account. It leverages Windows Event Code 5136 and monitors changes to the servicePrincipalName attribute. This activity is significant because it may indicate an attempt to perform Kerberoasting, a technique where attackers extract and crack service account passwords offline. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to obtain cleartext passwords, leading to unauthorized access and potential lateral movement within the domain environment.
Detects the addition of a member to a sensitive Active Directory group related to VMware administration (e.g., 'vSphere Admins', 'ESX Admins') using net.exe executed via WinRM (wsmprovhost.exe). This behavior is a key TTP used by threat groups like UNC3944 to escalate privileges and gain control over the vSphere environment after an initial compromise.
Detects modifications to Group Policy Objects (GPOs) that enable script processing. Threat actors, such as Storm-2603, abuse GPOs to deploy ransomware (like Warlock) by adding malicious startup or logon scripts. This detection identifies when the "Group Policy Scripts" client-side extension is added to a GPO, which is a key step in this attack chain. This activity is logged under Event ID 5136 on Domain Controllers.
This rule detects when a user is added to an administrative or management role in Azure Active Directory outside of defined business hours. It specifically looks for 'Add member to role completed' or 'Add app role assignment grant to user' operations where the target role contains 'admin' or 'Manage', and the event occurs outside of the configured business hours (7 AM to 6 PM local time, Monday to Friday).
KQL Query from file: Kerberos Roasting Detection
KQL Query from file: Password Spraying Detection in Active Directory
KQL Query from file: BadSuccessor Detection
KQL Query from file: Detecting GOLDEN SAML Attack
KQL Query from file: Identity Blast Radius 2
KQL Query
SPL Query from file: NTDS.DIT Exfiltration Detection
This analytic detects the use of the Certify tool via an in-memory PowerShell function to enumerate Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) environments. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode 4104) to identify specific command patterns associated with Certify's enumeration and exploitation functions. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance or exploitation attempts against AD CS, which could lead to unauthorized certificate issuance. If confirmed malicious, attackers could leverage this to escalate privileges, persist in the environment, or access sensitive information by abusing AD CS.
The following analytic detects the creation of a new Group Policy Object (GPO) using Splunk's Admon data. It identifies events where a new GPO is created, excluding default "New Group Policy Object" entries. Monitoring GPO creation is crucial as adversaries can exploit GPOs to escalate privileges or deploy malware across an Active Directory network. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to control system configurations, deploy ransomware, or propagate malware, significantly compromising the network's security.
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