Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects attempts to suppress PowerShell ETW telemetry by modifying the PSEtwLog object (setting it to null or 0) in conjunction with indications that AMSI initialization has failed, suggesting a coordinated effort to blind security monitoring during malicious script execution.
Detects malicious activity associated with the Yuta/Glove Stealer malware family. The rule identifies attempts to register persistent WMI event subscriptions (using wmic, powershell, or pwsh) to trigger execution or the registration of low-level keyboard hooks (WH_KEYBOARD_LL) for keylogging, originating from suspicious process paths like winupdate.exe or PyInstaller-compiled temporary directories.
Detects malicious attempts to clear Windows Event Logs using native utilities like wevtutil or PowerShell, or by direct file deletion of .evtx files. This behavior is common in post-exploitation cleanup phases by threat actors, such as The Gentlemen RaaS, to hinder incident response and forensic analysis.
Detects attempts to clear Windows Event Logs via common administrative tools such as 'wevtutil.exe', PowerShell, or the detection of specific system events indicating logs have been cleared (Event IDs 1102 and 104).
Detects malicious registry modifications performed via 'reg.exe', 'regedit.exe', or PowerShell that indicate attempts to establish persistence through Run keys and service creation, or to impair security defenses by disabling features such as Windows Defender's AntiSpyware and RealtimeMonitoring, as associated with the GOLD ENCOUNTER, STAC4713, and STAC3725 campaigns.
This rule detects potential AS-REP Roasting activities by monitoring process creations for the Rubeus toolset (using the asreproast command) and PowerShell scripts executing commands related to AS-REP Roasting (Get-ASREPHash or asreproast). This technique is used by adversaries to extract Kerberos TGTs for accounts with Kerberos pre-authentication disabled, allowing for offline password cracking.
This rule detects activities associated with the DSCourier technique, specifically the unauthorized installation of root certificates. It monitors for PowerShell commands importing certificates into the Root store, the use of insecure curl downloads of certificate files, and unauthorized process access to the Windows Root certificate registry hive.
Detects attempts to stop or disable critical security, backup, and logging services on Windows systems using command-line utilities (net.exe, sc.exe) or PowerShell. Adversaries frequently perform these actions to impair defensive monitoring, bypass security controls, or prepare the system for destructive activities like ransomware deployment.
Detects potential lateral movement activity involving Windows Remote Management (WinRM). The rule monitors for common WinRM-related tools (winrs.exe), PowerShell WinRM cmdlets (e.g., Invoke-Command) targeting non-local systems, and the spawning of suspicious processes by the WinRM host process (wsmprovhost.exe).
Detects the execution of PowerShell (powershell.exe or pwsh.exe) using command-line arguments typical of encoded commands, such as -enc, -EncodedCommand, or the use of 'frombase64string' within the command line. These patterns are frequently used by adversaries to hide malicious payloads and bypass simple string-based security controls.
Detects the execution of known Kerberoasting tools or commands, specifically identifying the use of Rubeus, GetUserSPNs, or processes containing strings related to Kerberoasting, which indicates attempts to extract Kerberos service tickets for offline brute-force attacks.
Detects the execution of command-line processes (e.g., PowerShell, cmd, mshta) where the command arguments contain indicators of copy-paste lures commonly associated with social engineering, such as fake CAPTCHA verification, human verification requests, or 'not a robot' prompts. This behavior is indicative of an attacker tricking a user into executing malicious code via their system's command interpreter.
Detects the creation or configuration of Windows services using sc.exe or PowerShell where the binary path points to suspicious, writable directories (Temp, AppData, or ProgramData). This behavior is often associated with persistence mechanisms where adversaries place malicious binaries in user-writable locations to execute with higher privileges.
Detects the use of living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBins) such as PowerShell, curl, certutil, bitsadmin, or mshta to download potential secondary payloads from self-hosted GitLab instances. This behavior is indicative of the Amadey loader chain, where compromised GitLab infrastructure is used as a repository to stage and distribute StealC or other malicious payloads.
This rule detects potential clipboard data theft by monitoring Windows Sysmon Event ID 10 for process access events involving clipboard-related APIs (OpenClipboard, GetClipboardData) by untrusted processes, and PowerShell Script Block Logging (Event ID 4104) for the use of Get-Clipboard cmdlets. This identifies attempts by non-standard or unauthorized processes to access sensitive information copied by a user.
Detects the use of PowerShell, PWSH, or CMD to modify file system timestamps, a technique commonly referred to as timestomping. This is often used by adversaries to hide malicious file activity or blend in with legitimate system files by manipulating file creation, modification, or access time metadata.
Detects attempts to tamper with Windows Defender configuration using PowerShell cmdlets 'Add-MpPreference' to add exclusions or 'Set-MpPreference' to disable real-time monitoring. This behavior is consistent with ClickFix attack techniques intended to evade endpoint security defenses.
Detects the use of PowerShell to manually modify file system timestamps (CreationTime, LastWriteTime, LastAccessTime) on ASPX files or within common web-accessible directories. This technique is often used by adversaries to hide the true creation or modification time of webshells, facilitating anti-forensic activities and timeline corruption.
Detects attempts to clear Windows Event Logs using common utilities including wevtutil, PowerShell (Clear-EventLog, EvtClearLog), or command-line wrappers. Clearing event logs is a common technique used by adversaries to disrupt incident response and cover their tracks after an intrusion.
Detects ClickFix attack patterns where users are coerced into pasting malicious PowerShell commands into the Windows Run dialog (explorer.exe). The command uses clipboard access (Get-Clipboard) or network download/execution (iwr, iex) methods, commonly associated with the Potemkin Loader or RMM-based distribution campaigns.
Detects the use of .NET reflection within PowerShell to resolve and invoke native Windows APIs (e.g., NtAllocateVirtualMemory, NtCreateThreadEx) typically used by the GIFTEDCROOK actor to perform in-memory shellcode or PE loading. The rule searches for command line patterns combining native API names with reflection-related keywords.
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