Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects Akira ransomware-associated PowerShell script execution that attempts to terminate backup, virtualization, and database services (such as VMware, Veeam, Hyper-V, and MSSQL) and inhibit system recovery by deleting Volume Shadow Copies or disabling boot recovery features.
Detects ClickFix-style attacks where users are social-engineered into pasting malicious PowerShell commands into the Windows Run dialog (explorer.exe). The rule specifically monitors for powershell.exe being initiated by explorer.exe with command-line arguments involving clipboard access (Get-Clipboard) or web-based script retrieval/execution (iwr, iex).
Detects the deletion of volume shadow copies using standard Windows utilities such as vssadmin.exe, wmic.exe, or PowerShell. This behavior is a common indicator of ransomware activity aimed at preventing system recovery.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity related to Group Policy Object (GPO) manipulation, including the execution of the SharpGPOAbuse tool and suspicious PowerShell commands intended to modify GPOs for persistence or privilege escalation, such as adding local administrators, creating immediate tasks, or applying domain-level policies.
This rule detects common activity patterns associated with the Havoc C2 framework and general malicious PowerShell usage. It monitors for three primary indicators: VBScript stagers spawning PowerShell processes (e.g., in a Havoc-like delivery chain), PowerShell processes initiating DNS queries to DuckDNS infrastructure, and PowerShell processes performing cross-process memory injection indicative of shellcode execution (e.g., Demon in-memory agent).
Detects an obfuscation technique where a threat actor hides Invoke-Expression (IEX) of a malicious script behind the Get-Alias or Get-Command cmdlet shortcuts (gal/gcm).
Detects suspicious PowerShell commands used to import certificates into the LocalMachine\Root store. This behavior is often associated with adversaries attempting to establish persistence by installing rogue root certificates to intercept or decrypt encrypted traffic (Man-in-the-Middle) or to bypass security controls. The rule flags instances where certificate installation is invoked by specific suspicious parent processes, utilizes known malicious certificate thumbprints, or explicitly targets the Root store.
Detects two distinct malicious PowerShell behaviors: memory-resident script execution using Base64 and XOR obfuscation, and unauthorized modification of Windows Defender preferences to add exclusions.
This rule detects attempts to impair defensive mechanisms by creating or modifying Quality of Service (QoS) policies that specifically target Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) or Antivirus (AV) processes. Adversaries may use QoS policies to throttle network traffic for security products, hindering their ability to communicate with central management or cloud services, thus impairing their effectiveness. The rule looks for command-line arguments used to create or set QoS policies (`New-NetQosPolicy`, `Set-NetQosPolicy`) that include throttling parameters (`ThrottleRateActionBitsPerSecond`, `AppPathNameMatchCondition`) and target common EDR/AV process names. It also detects direct registry modifications to QoS policies (`\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\QOS`) that include EDR/AV process names.
Detects evidence of AsyncRAT infection involving process hollowing into RegAsm.exe. The rule monitors for suspicious PowerShell activity involving specific artifacts ('cap.ps1', 'ConsoleApp1') used to perform reflective assembly loading, attempts to add Windows Defender exclusions for RegAsm.exe, and subsequent suspicious outbound network connections from RegAsm.exe to known C2 infrastructure.
Detects suspicious PowerShell activity characteristic of the ScreenConnect AsyncRAT campaign, specifically the use of Add-MpPreference to add Windows Defender exclusions for RegAsm.exe and drive roots, and the modification of ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin to suppress UAC prompts. These actions facilitate process hollowing and malware execution with elevated privileges.
This rule detects attempts to modify Windows Defender exclusions using PowerShell cmdlets (Add-MpPreference, Set-MpPreference) or direct Registry manipulation. Adversaries often modify these exclusions to hide malicious files or directories from antivirus scanning, a technique used to impair defensive security tools.
Detects instances where PowerShell is spawned by cmd.exe and includes command-line arguments indicative of a reverse shell, such as network socket creation, hidden execution, or encoded commands. This pattern often follows suspicious parent processes or activities such as keystroke injection.
This rule detects a sequence of events where a host initiates a network connection on port 1313 (a common port associated with certain web-based C2 or exploitation frameworks) followed shortly by an outbound network connection initiated by PowerShell within a 5-minute window. This behavior is indicative of a post-exploitation phase where an initial entry point leverages a malicious script or shell to establish persistent communication.
Detects instances where the WinRAR archive utility spawns a PowerShell process with command-line arguments typically associated with obfuscated or fileless execution. The detection specifically flags PowerShell commands that employ techniques such as base64 encoding, execution policy bypass, hidden window styles, or commands containing indicators of in-memory process manipulation such as NtAllocateVirtualMemory or memory allocation constants.
Detects the use of PowerShell to read files from the C:\ProgramData directory using the -Raw parameter, followed by the execution of the content via Invoke-Expression (iex). This pattern is often used to execute obfuscated payloads stored in non-standard locations while bypassing basic execution constraints.
Detects bulk file access or modifications in sensitive directories (Desktop, Documents, Downloads) targeting credential and document files (ovpn, kdbx, jks, eml, docx, xlsx, pdf), or direct PowerShell access to OpenVPN configuration or KeePass database files. This behavior is indicative of data staging or exfiltration activities associated with the GIFTEDCROOK stealer.
Detects the use of PowerShell .NET reflection to access non-public static fields within the System.Management.Automation.AmsiUtils class. Attackers often target fields such as 'amsiInitFailed' or 's_amsiContext' to programmatically disable or bypass Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) inspection during script execution.
Detects execution of common network reconnaissance tools such as nmap, masscan, and zmap, or PowerShell commands that utilize Test-NetConnection for automated port sweeping across a defined range.
Detects the use of PowerShell to perform system reconnaissance commands and exfiltrate the collected data using HTTP POST requests (curl or Invoke-WebRequest). This behavior is often associated with post-compromise activity and is flagged with higher severity when initiated from an IIS worker process or when using encoded PowerShell arguments.
Detects the execution of known Millenium RAT masqueraded binaries (svchost.exe or MsEdgeUpdate.exe) from AppData directories, followed immediately by a PowerShell command to add the root drive C:\ to Windows Defender exclusions. This sequence indicates a malware stage where a RAT attempts to persist and avoid detection by modifying security tool configurations.
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