Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule monitors the Microsoft IIS worker process (w3wp.exe) for the spawning of suspicious child processes often associated with web shell activity, such as command shells (cmd.exe, powershell.exe) or compiler/utility tools (csc.exe, cvtres.exe, rundll32.exe, regsvr32.exe). It further filters for command lines containing Exchange or OWA-related strings, and flags executions containing known web shell indicators (e.g., VIEWSTATE, GhostWebShell, reGeorg).
This rule detects potential web shell activity on Microsoft Exchange servers by identifying suspicious processes (like cmd.exe, powershell.exe) spawned by w3wp.exe (IIS worker process) that are associated with the creation or modification of common web shell file extensions (.aspx, .ashx, .asax) within critical Exchange server directories.
Detects the creation of suspicious DLL or ASPX files within Microsoft Exchange or IIS directories that are associated with the GhostContainer backdoor, commonly used by the NightEagle threat actor for maintaining persistence.
Detects potential exploitation attempts against Microsoft Exchange Server, specifically targeting the ECP (Exchange Control Panel) through VIEWSTATE parameter tampering related to CVE-2020-0688, and correlates this with suspicious behavior in the w3wp.exe process, such as unauthorized module loading (e.g., clr.dll, system.web.dll) and abnormal child process creation which may indicate the deployment of in-memory backdoors like GhostContainer.
Detects the deployment of the GhostContainer backdoor, which masquerades as an IIS server component loaded within w3wp.exe. The rule monitors for command-line arguments associated with web shells and known exploitation tools like reGeorg, indicating an attempt to maintain persistence following an Exchange server compromise.
This rule detects potential web shell creation on a Microsoft Exchange server by monitoring for suspicious child processes spawned by the IIS web server process (w3wp.exe) that correlate with the creation or modification of web-accessible script files (.aspx, .ashx, .asp, .dll) within the Exchange virtual directories (ecp, owa, aspnet_client). This pattern is consistent with common post-exploitation activities used by attackers to gain persistent access via web shells.
Detects anomalous child processes spawned by the Microsoft Exchange IIS worker process (w3wp.exe). This activity is often observed during post-exploitation phases of vulnerabilities like ProxyLogon (CVE-2021-26855), where attackers attempt to gain code execution by spawning command shells or administrative tools from the web server process.
Detects incoming HTTP requests to Microsoft Exchange servers that match patterns indicative of exploitation attempts for the ProxyLogon SSRF vulnerability (CVE-2021-26855). This includes detecting specific manipulation of the Autodiscover service and the injection of X-BEResource or X-AnonResource-Backend headers, which were commonly used during the initial access phase of this campaign.
This rule detects email or web proxy traffic containing a lure themed around 'Confluence', combined with a redirect or link to Telegram, and specifically containing Cyrillic character sets. This combination is often indicative of targeted phishing campaigns using social engineering lures to redirect users to external messaging platforms for further interaction or credential harvesting.
This rule detects high-volume usage (500+ events per hour) of Microsoft Exchange Online resources by accounts that lack an associated AccountObjectId but utilize a TokenObjectId. This pattern is indicative of service accounts or potentially compromised tokens performing bulk actions, such as mass email access or data collection within the Exchange environment.
Detects anomalous POST requests containing SharePoint 'MSOTlPn_' ToolPane markup directed at pages other than the expected 'ToolPane.aspx'. This pattern is characteristic of attempts to exploit the SPUtility.EnsureAuthentication bypass vulnerability, allowing attackers to access or execute operations on SharePoint pages without proper authentication.
This rule detects potential web shell creation on a Microsoft Exchange server by monitoring for suspicious child processes spawned by the IIS web server process (w3wp.exe) that correlate with the creation or modification of web-accessible script files (.aspx, .ashx, .asp, .dll) within the Exchange virtual directories (ecp, owa, aspnet_client). This pattern is consistent with common post-exploitation activities used by attackers to gain persistent access via web shells.
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) communication related to the GhostContainer malware. It inspects HTTP POST requests directed at Microsoft Outlook Web Access (OWA) paths containing a suspicious 'x-owa-urlpostdata' header. The presence of this specific header, followed by a base64-encoded string of significant length, indicates an attempt to deliver C2 commands or exfiltrate data through OWA infrastructure.
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) communication related to the GhostContainer malware. It inspects HTTP POST requests directed at Microsoft Outlook Web Access (OWA) paths containing a suspicious 'x-owa-urlpostdata' header. The presence of this specific header, followed by a base64-encoded string of significant length, indicates an attempt to deliver C2 commands or exfiltrate data through OWA infrastructure.
This rule detects HTTP requests directed at Microsoft Exchange Outlook Web Access (OWA) that contain suspicious 'fakePath' and 'fakePageName' parameters in the URI. These parameters are indicators of the 'GhostContainer' malware attempting to establish a socket forwarding proxy through the web server to facilitate command and control communications.
Detects potential tampering with Windows Event Logs or audit services by correlating manual service stops or log clearing events (EventIDs 1100, 1102, 104, 7036, 7040) with a sudden, significant decrease in total event volume on the same host. The rule accounts for planned maintenance and legitimate event log service restarts to reduce noise.
Detects the creation or modification of email inbox rules that perform actions such as forwarding, deleting, or moving messages combined with keywords often associated with financial fraud, business email compromise (BEC), or credential harvesting. Adversaries often use these rules to hide communications, redirect financial emails, or automate data exfiltration.
Detects phishing emails associated with the 'GhostCode' campaign, which uses an NDA or Supplier NDA Agreement pretext combined with WeTransfer links. The rule identifies suspicious emails by correlating the lure content with additional indicators such as specific lookalike sender domains, VoIP contact numbers, hardcoded ZIP passwords, or HTML attachments.
Detects potential web shell or malicious DLL deployment into Microsoft Exchange or IIS directories by the IIS worker process (w3wp.exe), as well as suspicious child process execution (such as command-line shells or credential discovery tools) spawned directly from IIS worker processes.
Detects the spawning of suspicious processes like cmd, powershell, or certutil by the Exchange Server's web worker process (w3wp.exe), which is a common indicator of post-exploitation activity following an initial web vulnerability exploitation, such as ProxyLogon.
Detects instances where common Windows web server processes (w3wp.exe or UMWorkerProcess.exe) initiate suspicious child processes (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, etc.) within a short duration of a file modification event involving known potentially malicious DLL files (winfsp-x64.dll or DukeQt.dll), characteristic of web shell exploitation or post-compromise activity on Exchange/IIS servers.
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