Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
714 detections
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Detects execution of code using indirect syscalls or ntdll unhooking techniques, often associated with the PIVOTPIPE loader/RAT. The rule monitors for EDR indicators of evasion such as syscall stub execution, direct/indirect Nt* system call invocation, or call stacks originating outside of ntdll.dll, intended to bypass userland security hooks.
Detects the execution of known PIVOTPIPE RAT binary files based on their SHA256 hashes or file names. PIVOTPIPE RAT is capable of token manipulation and impersonation techniques (e.g., ImpersonateLoggedOnUser, DuplicateTokenEx) to perform privileged operations or escalate security context.
Detects the launch or execution of common remote access tools such as AnyDesk, TeamViewer, Quick Assist, or Microsoft Remote Assistance (msra.exe) on an endpoint, excluding instances where these tools act as the parent process. This rule serves as one component of a broader detection chain for potentially unauthorized remote access.
This rule detects the execution or presence of specific Go or Terraform modules known to be malicious or associated with suspicious dependency retrieval. It monitors command-line activity from terraform.exe/go.exe attempting to download/run from these paths, as well as file system events involving these specific folder paths and filenames.
This rule detects the execution or presence of specific Go or Terraform modules known to be malicious or associated with suspicious dependency retrieval. It monitors command-line activity from terraform.exe/go.exe attempting to download/run from these paths, as well as file system events involving these specific folder paths and filenames.
This rule detects the execution or presence of specific Go or Terraform modules known to be malicious or associated with suspicious dependency retrieval. It monitors command-line activity from terraform.exe/go.exe attempting to download/run from these paths, as well as file system events involving these specific folder paths and filenames.
This rule detects the execution or presence of specific Go or Terraform modules known to be malicious or associated with suspicious dependency retrieval. It monitors command-line activity from terraform.exe/go.exe attempting to download/run from these paths, as well as file system events involving these specific folder paths and filenames.
This rule detects instances where the Terraform CLI tool connects to suspected lookalike domains associated with supply chain compromise attempts (e.g., hashicorp-aws[.]com or hashicorp-terraform[.]io) during common initialization or application workflows. It correlates process execution with network connection logs and optionally validates the presence of a related .terraform.lock.hcl file associated with the malicious origin.
This rule detects instances where the Terraform CLI tool connects to suspected lookalike domains associated with supply chain compromise attempts (e.g., hashicorp-aws[.]com or hashicorp-terraform[.]io) during common initialization or application workflows. It correlates process execution with network connection logs and optionally validates the presence of a related .terraform.lock.hcl file associated with the malicious origin.
This rule detects mass file modification, creation, or renaming activity involving files with the '.krsid' extension. The threshold is set to monitor for more than 20 occurrences, which is indicative of potential ransomware encryption activity, while explicitly excluding common system, temporary, and development paths, and filtering out processes explicitly performing shadow copy deletion.
Detects rapid execution of multiple native Windows discovery commands (whoami, ipconfig, hostname, tasklist) within a short window, which is often indicative of an adversary performing environment reconnaissance post-compromise.
Detects process command lines containing LLM tool-calling syntax (e.g., 'tool_call', 'function_call') in conjunction with keywords associated with offensive security capabilities (e.g., 'exploit', 'mimikatz', 'exfiltrate'). This pattern is consistent with the behavior of malicious LLM-based agents attempting to autonomously invoke and execute offensive tasks.
This rule detects the presence of ZigCryptoStealer malware deployed via a NativeAOT-compiled Windows executable. The detection relies on identifying specific hardcoded infrastructure strings, such as a BNB Smart Chain RPC endpoint and a specific contract address used to resolve C2 domains. It also looks for common sideloading hosts associated with the malware's delivery.
Detects evidence of the PIVOTPIPE .NET loader attempting to disable AMSI scanning. The detection focuses on activity related to patching the 'AmsiScanBuffer' function within 'amsi.dll', specifically identifying the use of the hex signature '80070057' or direct references to the function name, which is an indicator of an AMSI bypass attempt performed to facilitate malicious code execution.
This rule detects unauthorized processes attempting to access 'Login Data' files associated with Google Chrome or Microsoft Edge web browsers. Legitimate browser processes are excluded, so any external process attempting to read these files is potentially malicious, indicating an attempt to dump stored browser credentials.
Detects the execution of rnpkeys.exe dropped by an MSI installer (msiexec.exe) from the C:\ProgramData\keyroll directory. The rule specifically monitors for side-loading of the rnp.dll or tdwp.dll libraries by rnpkeys.exe, a technique associated with the Sauron loader.
This rule detects potentially malicious child processes (cmd.exe or powershell.exe) spawned by PaperCut application processes (pc-app.exe, PCClient.exe, or java.exe), which may indicate exploitation attempts such as RCE following an authentication bypass.
Detects the execution of a renamed Microsoft CoreCLR Debugger (vsdbg.exe) from a directory outside of standard Visual Studio installation paths. This behavior is indicative of DLL side-loading, where a malicious vsdbg.dll is planted alongside the renamed vsdbg.exe, a technique observed in malware loader chains like Rapuncel/BoryptGrab.
Detects instances where PowerShell is executed with an explorer.exe parent process, but the actual creating process differs from explorer.exe. This behavior is indicative of parent PID (PPID) spoofing, a technique often used to evade detection or masquerade the execution source by abusing the PROC_THREAD_ATTRIBUTE_PARENT_PROCESS flag in the Windows API.
Detects the execution of DahuaConsole processes that are spawned by or associated with the scannerdahua utility. This pattern is often associated with discovery or exploitation activities targeting Dahua devices.
This rule detects attempts by a process (specifically targeting PowerShell or .NET loaders) to tamper with Windows Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) components in memory. It correlates EDR or Sysmon events (process access, module loads) targeting 'amsi.dll' or involving specific AMSI API strings like 'AmsiScanBuffer' or 'AmsiInitFailed' with potential malicious loader activity.
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