Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
715 detections
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Detects post-exploitation activity targeting PaperCut servers, including shells spawned by the PaperCut Java process or the creation of malicious files (such as .class files in lib/ or .txt webshells in custom/web/) by the Java application.
Detects process execution of Node.js or Bun where inline scripts or command-line arguments utilize Brotli decompress functions from the zlib library.
Detects web or FTP server parent processes (such as apache2, httpd, nginx, php-fpm, or proftpd) spawning shell or utility processes (such as bash, sh, python, nc, curl, wget), which is consistent with webshell execution or post-exploitation activities.
Detects the execution of potential tunneling tools from temporary directories (/tmp, /dev/shm, /var/tmp) using characteristic CLI arguments such as --listen, --token, --obfs, and --ws-path, or the known binary name 'ingredi_ws'.
Detects the execution of potential tunneling tools from temporary directories (/tmp, /dev/shm, /var/tmp) using characteristic CLI arguments such as --listen, --token, --obfs, and --ws-path, or the known binary name 'ingredi_ws'.
Detects the execution of potential tunneling tools from temporary directories (/tmp, /dev/shm, /var/tmp) using characteristic CLI arguments such as --listen, --token, --obfs, and --ws-path, or the known binary name 'ingredi_ws'.
Detects the execution of potential tunneling tools from temporary directories (/tmp, /dev/shm, /var/tmp) using characteristic CLI arguments such as --listen, --token, --obfs, and --ws-path, or the known binary name 'ingredi_ws'.
Detects the usage of command-line flags in AI coding assistant CLIs (such as Claude Code, Amazon Q CLI, and others) that intentionally skip security permissions, bypass approvals, or disable sandbox protections. The rule identifies potential developer activity that may inadvertently reduce the security posture of the development environment.
Detects the execution of potential tunneling tools from temporary directories (/tmp, /dev/shm, /var/tmp) using characteristic CLI arguments such as --listen, --token, --obfs, and --ws-path, or the known binary name 'ingredi_ws'.
Detects anomalous process execution and loopback network activity associated with the Model Context Protocol (MCP) 'exec_in_session' method. This pattern indicates an adversary potentially abusing the AI coding assistant's MCP server capabilities to execute arbitrary commands as a C2 channel.
Detects the usage of command-line flags in AI coding assistant CLIs (such as Claude Code, Amazon Q CLI, and others) that intentionally skip security permissions, bypass approvals, or disable sandbox protections. The rule identifies potential developer activity that may inadvertently reduce the security posture of the development environment.
Detects msiexec.exe executing an MSI package named update_ms.msi
staged in ProgramData. Chaos ransomware disguises this installer's properties
and filename to impersonate a legitimate Windows Update package. On execution,
a custom action (CA_Run_EA2AEBC3) loads an embedded DLL (Bin_lib_EA2AEBC3,
lib.dll) directly into memory, deploying the msaRAT payload. This rule sees
the installer execution only; the in-memory module load is not observed here
and would need a separate PROCESS_MODULE_LOAD rule.
staged in ProgramData. Chaos ransomware disguises this installer's properties
and filename to impersonate a legitimate Windows Update package. On execution,
a custom action (CA_Run_EA2AEBC3) loads an embedded DLL (Bin_lib_EA2AEBC3,
lib.dll) directly into memory, deploying the msaRAT payload. This rule sees
the installer execution only; the in-memory module load is not observed here
and would need a separate PROCESS_MODULE_LOAD rule.
Detects curl.exe writing an MSI package into the ProgramData
directory. Chaos ransomware stages a trojanized installer this way, fetching
update_ms.msi from an attacker-controlled host over plain HTTP on port 443 so
the traffic reads as TLS to port-based inspection. The match is on the
behaviour rather than on that filename: curl is a signed in-box binary and has
no legitimate reason to drop an installer package into ProgramData.
directory. Chaos ransomware stages a trojanized installer this way, fetching
update_ms.msi from an attacker-controlled host over plain HTTP on port 443 so
the traffic reads as TLS to port-based inspection. The match is on the
behaviour rather than on that filename: curl is a signed in-box binary and has
no legitimate reason to drop an installer package into ProgramData.
Detects anomalous process execution and loopback network activity associated with the Model Context Protocol (MCP) 'exec_in_session' method. This pattern indicates an adversary potentially abusing the AI coding assistant's MCP server capabilities to execute arbitrary commands as a C2 channel.
The following analytic identifies modifications to registry keys commonly used for persistence mechanisms. It leverages data from endpoint detection sources like Sysmon or Carbon Black, focusing on specific registry paths known to initiate applications or services during system startup. This activity is significant as unauthorized changes to these keys can indicate attempts to maintain persistence or execute malicious actions upon system boot. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to achieve persistent access, execute arbitrary code, or maintain control over compromised systems, posing a severe threat to system integrity and security.
Detects anomalous process execution and loopback network activity associated with the Model Context Protocol (MCP) 'exec_in_session' method. This pattern indicates an adversary potentially abusing the AI coding assistant's MCP server capabilities to execute arbitrary commands as a C2 channel.
This rule detects the presence of specific SHA-256 file hashes associated with the 'VPN for X' malicious proxy extension family, which are known to be used to transform systems into nodes within a proxy network.
Detects when a user has either been assigned or removed from an Admin/Privileged role. Providing the analyst with the relevant event information for further investigation.
Detects anomalous process execution and loopback network activity associated with the Model Context Protocol (MCP) 'exec_in_session' method. This pattern indicates an adversary potentially abusing the AI coding assistant's MCP server capabilities to execute arbitrary commands as a C2 channel.
Detects anomalous process execution and loopback network activity associated with the Model Context Protocol (MCP) 'exec_in_session' method. This pattern indicates an adversary potentially abusing the AI coding assistant's MCP server capabilities to execute arbitrary commands as a C2 channel.
IOC hunt across DNS, network, and file-hash telemetry for the Ledger Google Ads phishing campaign. Vercel redirect domains are matched by exact hostname (DNS query name / parsed URL host) rather than substring, eliminating false positives from unrelated strings that merely contain a look-alike domain fragment. GCS bucket and Google Sites path IOCs remain substring-matched since the bucket IDs and page slugs are already highly specific.
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