Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a suspected ClickFix social engineering attack where a user is tricked into pasting malicious commands into Windows Terminal, leading to a PowerShell download, followed by the appearance of specific known malicious artifacts (LockScreenContentServer.exe, dui70.dll, or 1.bat) within 15 minutes on the same device.
This rule detects instances where the Faronics Deploy Agent process initiates the installation or download of ScreenConnect remote access software via PowerShell or the Windows Installer (msiexec.exe). This pattern is often indicative of authorized RMM deployment, but it is also a common tactic for adversaries to establish persistent remote access to endpoints.
Detects attempts to clear Windows event logs using built-in utilities like wevtutil.exe, PowerShell commands (Clear-EventLog, Remove-EventLog), or the detection of Event ID 1102 (Log cleared). This activity is commonly used by adversaries, including ransomware affiliates, to obfuscate their tracks during or after an attack.
Detects suspicious PowerShell process creation patterns often associated with malicious activity. The rule identifies PowerShell execution invoked by common parent processes (like Office applications or scripting engines) or using highly suspicious command-line arguments such as encoded commands, hidden windows, or common download and execution patterns (e.g., IEX, WebClient).
This rule detects potential unauthorized Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tool installation activities. It looks for common patterns used by adversaries to deploy RMM agents, including silent MSI installations from HTTPS URLs, batch/VBS scripts performing administrative privilege checks prior to silent execution, and PowerShell commands utilizing 'Start-Process' with elevated privileges to download and execute files from the internet.
Detects the use of PowerShell commands to modify file timestamps (CreationTime, LastWriteTime, LastAccessTime) on web application directories and configuration files, a technique often used by attackers to hide modifications made to webshells or malicious scripts.
Detects PowerShell execution that modifies the 'jquery.mousewheel-3.0.6.pack.js' file while simultaneously attempting to timestomp file metadata or utilizing specific obfuscation markers identified in webshell deployment patterns.
Detects a multi-stage activity where PowerShell is used to download a ZIP file, followed by the execution of a batch script (1.bat) that subsequently launches LockScreenContentServer.exe. This behavior is indicative of a DLL side-loading chain designed to execute malicious code via legitimate processes.
Detects the 'ClickFix' social engineering pattern where a user is instructed to copy and paste a malicious command into the Windows Run dialog. The rule triggers on PowerShell being launched from explorer.exe with 'ExecutionPolicy Bypass', utilizing 'irm' (Invoke-RestMethod) to download content, and saving it to the user's TEMP directory via 'Out-File' for subsequent execution.
Detects automated reconnaissance using WMI or PowerShell to perform broad queries for system environment, security products, network adapters, software, and hardware attributes. The detection focuses on clusters of distinct WMI reconnaissance categories occurring within a 15-minute window, which is often indicative of pre-C2 profiling by adversaries.
Detects the use of common PowerShell techniques designed to bypass the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI). These techniques involve manipulating internal PowerShell objects like AmsiUtils or amsiInitFailed, or using reflection to locate and modify AMSI memory structures to disable scanning.
Detects the OIC-lure Mustang Panda PlugX infection chain with tightened false-positive controls: requires the console-resize artifact (mode.com with digit,digit args) that precedes the download, requires PowerShell to be parented directly by explorer.exe (filtering out legitimate scheduled-task/management-agent automation that also chains curl+tar), requires curl to combine -L with -k/-s (insecure/silent) flags, narrows all correlation windows to 2 minutes, and excludes shell/utility processes from the final execution match.
Detects the abuse of the CMSTPLUA COM object, a known technique for UAC bypass, to execute a hidden and non-profile PowerShell process. This behavior is associated with malicious activity chains like RemotePanel or BoundSiphon that aim to achieve elevated execution.
Detects the use of 'findstr' or PowerShell to query sensitive configuration files (such as web.config or applicationHost.config) for credential-related keywords like 'connectionString', 'AccountKey', or 'machineKey'. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to harvest credentials or sensitive configuration data stored in cleartext on the filesystem.
Detects a multi-stage activity where PowerShell is used to download a ZIP file, followed by the execution of a batch script (1.bat) that subsequently launches LockScreenContentServer.exe. This behavior is indicative of a DLL side-loading chain designed to execute malicious code via legitimate processes.
Detects the 'ClickFix' social engineering pattern where a user is tricked into opening a terminal (Windows Terminal, PowerShell, or PowerShell ISE) and pasting a command. The rule specifically alerts on commands originating from explorer.exe that invoke web download utilities to fetch .zip archives, which are commonly associated with the Lorem Ipsum Loader initial access infection chain.
This rule detects a sequence of events characteristic of the x47.c persistence pattern. It monitors for the creation of persistence mechanisms via Windows Registry Run keys or scheduled tasks, followed by the addition of Windows Defender exclusions using PowerShell within a 30-minute window on the same device.
Detects automated reconnaissance using WMI or PowerShell to perform broad queries for system environment, security products, network adapters, software, and hardware attributes. The detection focuses on clusters of distinct WMI reconnaissance categories occurring within a 15-minute window, which is often indicative of pre-C2 profiling by adversaries.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with encoded command arguments (e.g., -enc, -EncodedCommand) combined with common web-request cmdlets or download-cradle patterns (e.g., IEX, Net.WebClient, Invoke-WebRequest). This pattern is frequently used by adversaries to execute obfuscated remote payloads in memory.
Detects periodic, beacon-like network activity targeting public platforms such as Steam community profiles or Telegram (api.telegram.org / t.me) originating from suspicious processes (script interpreters, unsigned binaries). This behavior is characteristic of LummaC2 and similar malware families using public web services as dead-drop resolvers for C2 fallback communication.
This rule detects the suspicious archival of browser credential files (e.g., Login Data, Cookies, wallet.dat) or the transmission of data to common command-and-control (C2) services such as Telegram, Discord, or raw IP addresses using common system tools like PowerShell, curl, or certutil.
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