Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects attempts to plant a DLL file in an application's 'Program Files' directory over SMB. This is a common technique used in DLL hijacking attacks, where a malicious DLL is placed in a location where a legitimate application will load it instead of the intended system DLL. The rule specifically looks for SMB traffic to port 445, containing '.dll' and '\Program Files\' in a case-insensitive manner, indicating a file transfer to a sensitive application directory.
This rule detects attempts to access cached domain credentials via the Windows Registry over the SMB protocol (port 445). It specifically looks for the string "SECURITY\Cache" within TCP traffic directed to the HOME_NET on port 445, indicating a potential credential access attempt.
This rule detects when a file is written to a remote Windows Startup folder via Server Message Block (SMB). The rule specifically looks for SMB traffic containing the string "Startup" and "\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\" (case-insensitive) in the flow to the server. This activity is often associated with persistence mechanisms where malware or an attacker attempts to execute code automatically upon system startup.
This rule detects attempts to discover Group Policy information remotely over Server Message Block (SMB). It specifically looks for network traffic on port 445 (SMB) containing the strings "SYSVOL" and "GroupPolicy" (case-insensitive) in the same flow, indicating a potential query for Group Policy objects.
This rule detects attempts to create a remote named pipe over SMB (Server Message Block) protocol. It specifically looks for TCP traffic directed to port 445 (SMB) on the home network, containing both the SMB signature (FF SMB) and the string "\pipe\" (case-insensitive), indicating an attempt to access or create a named pipe. This activity is often associated with inter-process communication, which can be leveraged by attackers for various purposes, including lateral movement, service execution, or privilege escalation.
This rule detects outbound Server Message Block (SMB) communications from internal devices to external (non-private) IP addresses. It specifically looks for connections on ports 137, 138, 139, and 445. The rule then aggregates these events over 10-minute intervals and flags devices that have more than 5 such SMB connections to distinct external IPs, indicating potential data exfiltration or unauthorized external communication.
Remote LSASS Memory Dump via SMB
Suricata
This rule detects attempts to remotely dump the LSASS process memory over SMB. It specifically looks for the string "lsass.exe" within TCP traffic destined for port 445 (SMB) on the home network. This activity is indicative of an attacker trying to extract credentials from a compromised system.
https://thehackernews.com/2026/04/microsoft-confirms-active-exploitation.html
https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-32631
This use case detects when shares are mapped via "net.exe" within command line. More specifically, hidden administrative shares that can be mapped and used to remote file copy malicious files and/or executables.
Detect Attempt PrintNightmare (CVE-2021-1675) Remote code execution in Windows Spooler Service
The following analytic detects the use of default or publicly known named pipes associated with Cobalt Strike. It leverages Sysmon EventID 17 and 18 to identify specific named pipes commonly used by Cobalt Strike's Artifact Kit and Malleable C2 Profiles. This activity is significant because Cobalt Strike is a popular tool for adversaries to conduct post-exploitation tasks, and identifying its named pipes can reveal potential malicious activity. If confirmed malicious, this could indicate an active Cobalt Strike beacon, leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.
Detects Server Message Block (SMB) server connections to administrative shares (IPC$, ADMIN$, C$) that are established without signing or encryption enabled. This activity could indicate potential lateral movement by an adversary exploiting insecure SMB configurations.
This analytic detects suspicious data transfer activities involving the use of the `split` syscall with the `-b` option, which specifies the size of each output file. This technique can be used by attackers to evade detection by breaking large files into smaller parts, bypassing size-based security controls, and facilitating covert exfiltration of sensitive data. By monitoring for unusual or unauthorized use of the `split` syscall with a specified block size, this analytic helps identify potential data exfiltration attempts.
This analytic identifies the bulk creation of ransomware notes (e.g., .txt, .html, .hta files) on an infected machine. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 11 to detect multiple instances of these file types being created within a short time frame (10 seconds). A detection is triggered if 15 or more unique readme paths are observed. This activity is a strong indicator of an active ransomware attack, where the attacker is notifying the victim of the encryption. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to widespread data encryption, rendering critical files inaccessible and potentially causing significant operational disruption.
The following analytic detects suspicious attempts to find credentials stored in password stores, indicating a potential attacker's effort to access sensitive login information. Password stores are critical repositories that contain valuable credentials, and unauthorized access to them can lead to significant security breaches. By monitoring for unusual or unauthorized activities related to password store access, this analytic helps identify potential credential theft attempts, allowing security teams to respond promptly and prevent unauthorized access to critical systems and data.
Detects (failed) outbound connection attempts to internet-facing SMB servers. This could be a sign of potential exploitation attempts of CVE-2023-23397, which is a critical elevation of privilege vulnerability in Microsoft Outlook. The vulnerability allows an attacker to send a specially crafted email that, when opened, causes the victim's system to connect to an attacker-controlled SMB share and leak the victim's NTLM hash. This rule specifically looks for SMB client connectivity events (Event IDs 30803, 30804, 30806) where the destination IP address is not a private or loopback address, indicating an attempt to connect to an external SMB server.
The following analytic detects the creation of files in the Windows %startup% folder, a common persistence technique. It leverages the Endpoint.Filesystem data model to identify file creation events in this specific directory. This activity is significant because adversaries often use the startup folder to ensure their malicious code executes automatically upon system boot or user logon. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain persistence on the host, potentially leading to further system compromise and unauthorized access to sensitive information.
The following analytic identifies the creation of executables or scripts in suspicious file paths on Windows systems. It leverages the Endpoint.Filesystem data model to detect files with specific extensions (e.g., .exe, .dll, .ps1) created in uncommon directories (e.g., \windows\fonts\, \users\public\). This activity is significant as adversaries often use these paths to evade detection and maintain persistence. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute unauthorized code, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment, posing a significant security threat.
NetworkSignatureInspected just means the network sensor saw and matched a signature (it inspected the packet) — it doesn’t mean the flow was blocked. That’s the problem.
If your machines are negotiating SMB or NTLM with unknown remote IPs, you’ve got a real risk on your hands: data leakage, credential relay, or worm-style propagation. SMB to the Internet is almost never legitimate; if you don’t recognize the remote IP, treat it as suspicious.
The KQL query includes multiple conditions to detect not only default connections on legacy (139) or modern (445) SMB ports, but also cases where SMB is running over non-standard ports (attempts to evade simple port-based detection). It also extracts the SMB negotiation state so you can spot repeated or incomplete negotiation attempts (useful to detect scanning, failed auths, or relay attempts).
If your machines are negotiating SMB or NTLM with unknown remote IPs, you’ve got a real risk on your hands: data leakage, credential relay, or worm-style propagation. SMB to the Internet is almost never legitimate; if you don’t recognize the remote IP, treat it as suspicious.
The KQL query includes multiple conditions to detect not only default connections on legacy (139) or modern (445) SMB ports, but also cases where SMB is running over non-standard ports (attempts to evade simple port-based detection). It also extracts the SMB negotiation state so you can spot repeated or incomplete negotiation attempts (useful to detect scanning, failed auths, or relay attempts).
This analytic detects the configuration of TFTP services on Cisco IOS devices that could be used to exfiltrate sensitive configuration files. Threat actors like Static Tundra have been observed configuring TFTP servers to make device configuration files accessible for exfiltration after gaining initial access. The detection specifically looks for commands that expose critical configuration files such as startup-config, running-config, and other sensitive system information through TFTP. This activity is particularly concerning as it may represent an attempt to steal credentials, network topology information, and other sensitive data stored in device configurations.
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