Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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The following analytic detects the creation of an NTFS alternate data stream (ADS) accessed over a local administrative share targeting the loopback address (127.0.0.1).
It leverages Windows Security Event Logs with EventCode 5145 to identify this activity.
Legitimate local processes access files directly rather than through a local SMB share.
This behavior is a hallmark of the ShieldBreak exploit, which abuses a symbolic link swap through a loopback share to redirect a privileged, Defender-driven write into an alternate data stream on a system-owned file, ultimately landing attacker content in C:\Windows\System32.
If confirmed malicious, this activity indicates an in-progress local privilege escalation attempt and should be investigated immediately.
It leverages Windows Security Event Logs with EventCode 5145 to identify this activity.
Legitimate local processes access files directly rather than through a local SMB share.
This behavior is a hallmark of the ShieldBreak exploit, which abuses a symbolic link swap through a loopback share to redirect a privileged, Defender-driven write into an alternate data stream on a system-owned file, ultimately landing attacker content in C:\Windows\System32.
If confirmed malicious, this activity indicates an in-progress local privilege escalation attempt and should be investigated immediately.
Detects anomalous lateral movement behavior where a user account authenticates via NTLM (Logon Type 3) to at least three different hosts within a 10-minute window and subsequently accesses administrative network shares (ADMIN$ or C$) on one or more of those target systems.
Detects the use of administrative utilities (psexec.exe, wmic.exe, powershell.exe, cmd.exe) initiating network connections over common remote management ports (135, 139, 445, 3389, 5985, 5986) to internal destinations. This behavior is indicative of lateral movement activity, particularly when initiated from a host that has recently engaged in credential harvesting or infostealer-related activity. The rule excludes common, expected sources to minimize noise.
Detects network traffic patterns characteristic of the EternalBlue (MS17-010) exploit targeting the SMBv1 protocol. Specifically, it monitors for a malformed SESSION_SETUP request containing an unusually large payload, which is indicative of an attempt to trigger a buffer overflow in the SMB service.
Detects the creation of suspicious Windows services associated with remote execution tools like PsExec, PAExec, or custom tools that leverage SMB administrative shares (ADMIN$, IPC$). The rule correlates the service creation event (Event ID 7045, 4697) with preceding network connection attempts to SMB shares, and subsequent service termination or state change events within a short timeframe, which is a pattern characteristic of remote lateral movement and command execution.
Detects the creation of a remote service (Event ID 7045 or 4697) on a Windows host shortly after a remote SMB logon. The detection specifically looks for service binary paths associated with well-known lateral movement tools like PsExec (PSEXESVC), the ADMIN$ network share, or randomized executable names within the Windows Temp directory, which are common artifacts left by tools such as Impacket psexec.py and CrackMapExec.
Detects potential lateral movement and persistence activities by identifying suspicious Windows service installations via event ID 7045. The rule flags services with suspicious names or paths (e.g., Temp folders, Public directory) and correlates them with incoming SMB connections (port 445) or services spawned directly by services.exe from suspicious locations, aggregated by host and remote IP.
Detects the creation of suspicious services that are preceded by an administrative SMB share (ADMIN$) connection and a network logon event (Type 3) from the same source. This pattern is commonly used by lateral movement tools (like PsExec) to execute payloads remotely by installing a service, accessing the administrative share to drop the binary, and executing the service.
Detects anomalous network traffic patterns characteristic of the PetitPotam exploit, specifically targeting the MS-EFSRPC interface on Windows SMB pipes. This behavior is used to force a remote system to initiate authentication to a specified target, facilitating NTLM relay attacks.
Detects NTLM authentication attempts targeting administrative network shares (ADMIN$ or C$) over the SMB protocol. This behavior is a common indicator of lateral movement techniques such as Pass-the-Hash, where an adversary uses captured NTLM hashes to authenticate to remote systems.
Detects sequential suspicious SMB activity characteristic of PsExec lateral movement: connection to ADMIN$ or C$ administrative shares, followed by the upload of an executable or batch file to the share, and subsequently the usage of SVCCTL (CreateServiceW/StartServiceW) to execute the uploaded binary.
This rule detects potential lateral movement by identifying a system that initiates SMB connections (port 445) to 5 or more unique destinations, correlated with a Windows Service installation event (Event ID 7045) on the host. This behavior is indicative of an adversary or automated tool using SMB to copy and execute binaries as a service on multiple remote systems.
Detects two distinct behaviors indicative of potential credential theft or lateral movement: DCSync-style Active Directory replication requests identified via Event ID 4662 with specific replication GUIDs, and high-volume SMB traffic originating from Domain Controllers or DC-adjacent hosts, which may indicate unauthorized data access or credential dumping activities.
Detects instances where the WMI Provider Host (wmiprvse.exe) spawns suspicious child processes such as cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or rundll32.exe, which are correlated with inbound network connections on ports 135 (RPC/DCOM) or 445 (SMB). This behavior is characteristic of lateral movement techniques used by tools like Impacket's wmiexec.
Detects a potential mass-encryption event by identifying a single host rapidly renaming or rewriting a large volume of files across multiple SMB network shares within a short timeframe, where the renamed files consistently adopt a single file extension.
Detects lateral movement via SMB by identifying multiple connections to Windows admin shares (ADMIN$ or C$) followed within a 10-minute window by the creation of a remote service, often indicative of techniques like PsExec. This pattern detects suspicious fan-out behavior where a single source host interacts with multiple targets.
Detects two distinct behaviors indicative of potential credential theft or lateral movement: DCSync-style Active Directory replication requests identified via Event ID 4662 with specific replication GUIDs, and high-volume SMB traffic originating from Domain Controllers or DC-adjacent hosts, which may indicate unauthorized data access or credential dumping activities.
Detects two distinct behaviors indicative of potential credential theft or lateral movement: DCSync-style Active Directory replication requests identified via Event ID 4662 with specific replication GUIDs, and high-volume SMB traffic originating from Domain Controllers or DC-adjacent hosts, which may indicate unauthorized data access or credential dumping activities.
Detects two distinct behaviors indicative of potential credential theft or lateral movement: DCSync-style Active Directory replication requests identified via Event ID 4662 with specific replication GUIDs, and high-volume SMB traffic originating from Domain Controllers or DC-adjacent hosts, which may indicate unauthorized data access or credential dumping activities.
Detects two distinct behaviors indicative of potential credential theft or lateral movement: DCSync-style Active Directory replication requests identified via Event ID 4662 with specific replication GUIDs, and high-volume SMB traffic originating from Domain Controllers or DC-adjacent hosts, which may indicate unauthorized data access or credential dumping activities.
Detects the use of the Windows 'net.exe' utility to establish an IPC$ null session or an authenticated connection to the IPC$ share. These techniques are often used by attackers to perform remote service discovery, interact with remote shares, or facilitate lateral movement within a network.
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