Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects instances where dllhost.exe, which typically hosts COM objects, spawns suspicious child processes such as command shells, scripting interpreters, or reconnaissance tools. This behavior is highly indicative of COM object hijacking, process injection, or DCOM lateral movement with hands-on-keyboard activity.
This rule detects when Microsoft Office applications (Word, Excel, PowerPoint) create INI files within the `C:\ProgramData\` directory. This behavior can be indicative of malicious activity, such as macro-enabled documents dropping configuration files or payloads, or other forms of malware attempting to establish persistence or store data in a less scrutinized location.
This rule detects activity associated with the TeamPCP Telnyx PyPI backdoor, specifically targeting versions 4.87.1 and 4.87.2 of the 'telnyx' package. It identifies two main indicators: first, process command lines that show the installation of these specific malicious versions via 'pip' or 'python -m pip'; second, network connections to a known command and control (C2) IP address (83.142.209.203) or specific C2 URLs involving '.wav' files, which are known to be used for steganography in this campaign. A match indicates a high confidence of potential compromise and warrants immediate investigation to confirm the affected host and user, assess the legitimacy of the activity, and review for follow-on malicious actions.
KQL Query
This rule detects when Microsoft Office applications (Word, Excel, PowerPoint) create INI files within the `C:\ProgramData\` directory. This behavior can be indicative of malicious activity, such as macro-enabled documents dropping configuration files or payloads, or other forms of malware attempting to establish persistence or store data in a less scrutinized location.
Detects modifications to the Boot Configuration Data (BCD) using bcdedit.exe that could indicate an attempt to disable recovery options, enable safe boot with networking, or ignore boot failures. This activity can be indicative of persistence mechanisms, bootkit installation, or attempts to hinder system recovery.
This rule detects instances where 'dllhost.exe' is spawned by a parent process other than 'services.exe' or 'svchost.exe'. Dllhost.exe is typically used to host COM+ applications and should almost exclusively be initiated by these legitimate system processes. An unusual parent could indicate COM object hijacking, lateral movement, or process injection attempts.
This rule detects a suspicious sequence of events indicative of the Albabat malware. It looks for instances where a device performs WMI-based reconnaissance (querying CPU, csproduct, OS, or NIC information) followed by or preceded by network communication with either a GitHub repository containing 'billdev' or a Supabase instance. The time window for these events is set to 30 minutes, suggesting a contextual link between the reconnaissance and subsequent network activity.
This rule detects network connections and DNS resolution requests to known typosquatted domains used by the TeamPCP threat actor for command and control (C2) and data exfiltration. These domains are associated with a compromised Trivy scanner. Detection indicates successful execution of the compromised scanner and attempted exfiltration.
Detects the creation of a file named "msbuild.exe" within the Windows Startup folder. This behavior matches the persistence and masquerading techniques used by the TeamPCP threat actor following the compromise of the telnyx PyPI package.
This rule detects the creation of specific files associated with the TeamPCP malware's systemd persistence mechanism. It looks for the creation of '/.config/sysmon/sysmon.py' or '/.config/systemd/user/sysmon.service' which are used to maintain access and download further stages via C2 even if the original vulnerable litellm process terminates.
Detects the Faux-Elevate UAC bypass technique where auto-elevated binaries (fodhelper.exe, eventvwr.exe) are abused to launch suspicious child processes like PowerShell or cmd.exe. The detection logic further correlates this with registry modifications related to UAC bypass (specifically 'Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command') and subsequent outbound network activity to retrieve payloads, indicating a full chain of execution and C2 communication.
Detects Python processes executing the 'attrib +h' command. This behavior was observed in the malicious telnyx PyPI package, which uses it to hide its execution lock file on Windows systems and avoid detection.
This rule detects suspicious network connections to api.telegram.org from processes masquerading as legitimate Windows executables (MicDriver.exe, Winappx.exe, MsCache.exe, RuntimeSSH.exe, smqdservice.exe). It also identifies files with MD5 hashes matching known Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) from an external list. This combination suggests potential malware activity, possibly involving Telegram for command and control or data exfiltration, combined with process masquerading for evasion.
Detects PowerShell processes executing commands that combine `Invoke-Expression` (iex) and `Invoke-RestMethod` (irm) with an HTTP or HTTPS URL. This combination is often used by adversaries to download and execute malicious scripts or payloads directly from the internet, without writing them to disk. The rule includes exclusions for known legitimate installers like the UV installer launched by trusted processes.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests containing the specific custom header 'X-Filename: tpcp.tar.gz' used by the TeamPCP credential harvester for data exfiltration. This rule targets a highly specific Indicator of Compromise (IOC) associated with the TeamPCP threat.
This rule detects various activities associated with the Charon ransomware, including DLL sideloading, ransomware deployment, payload reading, ransom note creation, shadow copy deletion, and service creation for persistence. It leverages specific filenames, process behaviors, and registry modifications to identify the threat.
Detects attempts by non-Azure Arc agent processes to access '.key' files within the Azure Arc Tokens directory. This activity could indicate an attempt to exploit CVE-2026-26117 or other credential access techniques targeting Azure Arc service principal tokens.
This rule detects network connections and DNS resolution requests to known typosquatted domains used by the TeamPCP threat actor for command and control (C2) and data exfiltration. These domains are associated with a compromised Trivy scanner. Detection indicates successful execution of the compromised scanner and attempted exfiltration.
Detects the creation or manipulation of the specific archive file (tpcp.tar.gz) used by TeamPCP to bundle stolen credentials. This rule monitors command line activity, cloud process execution, and file system events for references to 'tpcp.tar.gz'.
This rule detects processes executing from the `/tmp/pglog` path or with the filename `pglog` within `/tmp/`, which is a known technique used by the TeamPCP threat actor to masquerade malicious binaries as legitimate PostgreSQL processes for post-exploitation activity.
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