Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the execution of PowerShell commands that bypass execution policies to specifically disable or suspend BitLocker protection. This behavior is often associated with ransomware or malicious actors attempting to circumvent full-disk encryption to facilitate data manipulation or destruction.
This rule monitors for suspicious activity linked to files or processes within the Windows temporary directory. It identifies three distinct malicious patterns: (1) sensitive privilege usage (e.g., SeDebugPrivilege) by processes running from temp; (2) presence of known malicious file names associated with a specific campaign (vile_*.ico, vile_*.lnk, etc.); and (3) PowerShell execution of a specific decryptor shortcut file from the temp directory.
Detects instances of node.exe spawning wmic.exe or powershell.exe to perform security software discovery. The malware uses WMI queries or registry enumeration to identify common security agents (e.g., CrowdStrike, SentinelOne, Defender) likely to determine if it is running in a monitored environment.
This rule detects potential sandbox evasion or environment analysis by identifying multiple disparate system checks (hardware, memory, processor, analysis tool, or uptime checks) performed within a short timeframe by common script interpreters like PowerShell or WScript/CScript.
This rule detects PowerShell activity where commands are used to perform reconnaissance (e.g., whoami, ipconfig, or network group enumeration) and the output is exfiltrated or sent via a POST request to a specific external IP address (202.182.102.5).
Detects network activity associated with Gamaredon threat group backdoors (PteroVDoor and PteroPSDoor) exfiltrating data to S3-compatible cloud storage providers. The rule identifies suspicious outbound network requests to specific domains ('wasabisys.com', 'i3storage.com') originating from processes that are not common browsers or trusted software, or by command-line execution of PowerShell, curl, or wget.
Detects execution patterns associated with the Gamaredon group's spearphishing chains, specifically where PowerShell is invoked by common document or scripting applications (Winword, Excel, mshta, etc.) containing typical downloader flags (IEX, EncodedCommand). Additionally, it monitors for network connections from PowerShell to known dead-drop resolvers (e.g., telegra.ph, cloudflare workers) used by PteroOdd/Kazuar loaders.
Detects the presence of specific keywords within PowerShell Script Block logs (EventCode 4104) that are characteristic of Anti-Malware Scan Interface (AMSI) bypass techniques. These include attempts to manipulate the AMSI context, reflectively load assemblies to modify memory, or force scan failures.
This rule detects potential tunnel creation using PowerShell. It identifies network connections from PowerShell processes to common SSH (22) or Tor (9001, 9050) ports, as well as PowerShell script block activity involving socket connections directed at .onion domains, SSH keys, or authorized keys files, which may indicate remote access tunneling or command-and-control communication.
This rule detects the use of system utilities (wevtutil.exe, auditpol.exe, PowerShell) to interact with, query, or check status of security event logs and auditing configurations. While these tools are standard for administration, their usage by non-system accounts can indicate an adversary attempting to understand, monitor, or manipulate system audit policies and event log configurations as part of a reconnaissance or defense evasion strategy.
Detects the use of administrative tools like wmic.exe, powershell.exe, or pwsh.exe to invoke WMI event subscription components such as ActiveScriptEventConsumer, CommandLineEventConsumer, or FilterToConsumerBinding. This behavior is a common technique for establishing persistence or elevating privileges by executing malicious code when specific system events occur.
Detects modifications to Windows Registry Run keys that are initiated by processes related to the Windows Package Manager (winget), specifically ConfigurationRemotingServer.exe or WindowsPackageManagerServer.exe, or by PowerShell scripts spawned by these processes. This behavior may indicate an attempt to establish persistence.
This rule detects suspicious process execution chains associated with known Kimsuky campaign activity and NUKESPED malware. It identifies the execution of the NUKESPED secondary payload 'zlrenu8.exe' and a specific sandbox-evading JSE loader chain where WScript or CScript spawns hidden PowerShell instances using 'certutil' to decode files stored in the ProgramData directory.
Detects the Kimsuky NUKESPED JSE loader anti-analysis pattern. The rule monitors for wscript.exe executing a JSE file, followed by a delayed PowerShell execution containing hidden window flags, decoding or non-interactive flags, and references to ProgramData, which is consistent with sandbox evasion and NUKESPED payload staging.
Detects the execution of WMI queries or hidden PowerShell commands initiated by JScript/VBScript interpreters (wscript.exe/cscript.exe), a behavior characteristic of Kimsuky's NUKESPED loader for performing anti-analysis and sandbox evasion.
Detects Add-AppxPackage -Register against a manifest on a UNC path. Legitimate loose-file registration during development points at local paths; a UNC InstalledLocation is the core of UNCanny - it hands the SYSTEM Windows Store InstallService a LoadLibraryW on an attacker-controlled UNC via plugin resolution.
Detects attempts to bypass the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) in PowerShell processes. The rule looks for known bypass strings, memory patching via Marshal, reflection-based disabling of AmsiUtils, or base64-encoded AMSI patch targets.
Detects execution of PowerShell processes (powershell.exe, pwsh.exe) containing command-line arguments indicative of Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) bypass attempts. This includes known bypass strings, reflection-based patching of memory internals (AmsiUtils, GetDelegateForFunctionPointer), and base64-encoded fragments of common bypass techniques.
This rule detects attempts to delete Volume Shadow Copies (VSS) using native Windows utilities such as vssadmin.exe, wmic.exe, or PowerShell. Attackers often perform this action during the impact phase to prevent file recovery after ransomware deployment or other data destruction activities.
Detects the creation or configuration of Windows services using sc.exe or PowerShell where the binary path points to suspicious, writable directories (Temp, AppData, or ProgramData). This behavior is often associated with persistence mechanisms where adversaries place malicious binaries in user-writable locations to execute with higher privileges.
Detects attempts to clear Windows event logs using the native command-line utility 'wevtutil' or PowerShell cmdlets 'Clear-EventLog' and 'Remove-EventLog'. Adversaries often perform this action to remove evidence of their activities from security, system, and application logs. The rule includes exclusions for common administrative, backup, and security-related processes to minimize false positives.
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