Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects suspicious enumeration of Azure Blob, File, Table, Queue, or DFS storage accounts by internal users. It identifies devices making network connections to public Azure storage URLs using potentially suspicious processes (e.g., PowerShell, Python, AzCopy, curl, wget, WinSCP, FileZilla, Storage Explorer). The rule then analyzes the distinct storage accounts accessed and uses a Jaccard index to identify unusual naming conventions among the accessed storage accounts, potentially indicating an insider attempting to discover or exfiltrate data from unfamiliar storage resources.
Detects network connections or DNS queries to domains and IP addresses identified as payload delivery and C2 infrastructure for a JWrapper/SimpleHelp RAT campaign. Monitoring these indicators can help detect initial compromise or ongoing C2 communication.
Detects suspicious network connections to 'outlook-one.vercel.app' or 'api.telegram.org' when initiated by common web browsers (msedge.exe, chrome.exe, firefox.exe) or Outlook (outlook.exe). This pattern can indicate phishing attempts, credential harvesting, or data exfiltration via Telegram bots.
Detects a specific obfuscated PowerShell command-line pattern used by the LunarApplication malware to execute scripts from the %TEMP% directory while bypassing execution policies. This rule looks for PowerShell processes with specific flags to bypass execution policy and accept piped input, combined with distinctive randomized script extensions (.yiz.ps1 or .unx.ps1) typically used by this malware.
This query detects multiple patterns of post-exploitation activity related to SolarWinds WebHelpDesk (WHD) vulnerabilities. It first identifies devices where suspicious commands are executed from the WHD directory, and then retrieves all related suspicious activities from those devices. The detection logic includes identifying suspicious child processes spawned by the WHD java service, suspicious command execution from the WHD directory, and suspicious child processes of ToolsIQ.exe, a component known to be abused in WHD exploits.
Detects the Microsoft Edge WebView2 process (msedgewebview2.exe) being spawned by suspicious parent processes that typically do not use embedded web content, such as PowerShell, CMD, or common lolbins. This activity is a key indicator of the 'AI-Proxy' technique where malware uses WebView2 to programmatically interact with AI web interfaces for C2.
Detects a BeyondTrust (Bomgar) process spawning shell or system administration child processes. This activity is highly indicative of OS command injection, potentially related to the exploitation of CVE-2026-1731.
This rule detects network connections to domains identified as malicious redirectors or landing pages used in a spam campaign that exploited Atlassian Jira. The domains are associated with phishing or malware distribution efforts.
This rule detects network communication with known command and control (C2) infrastructure associated with the OysterLoader malware. It identifies C2 activity by looking for connections to specific domains and IP addresses, as well as requests to particular API paths within the RemoteUrl field.
Detects the execution of icacls.exe to grant 'Full Control' permissions to the 'Everyone' group for the 'C:\ProgramData\SimpleHelp' directory. This tactic is used by the SimpleHelp RAT to ensure it can operate without permission restrictions and facilitate persistence.
Detects the creation of specific .sys files in the C:\Windows\System32\drivers\ directory. These filenames are used by the BADIIS malware installer to stage malicious DLLs before they are moved to other locations for execution.
Detects file activity associated with the LunarApplication malware, either by the known installer hash or by creation of files/directories within its installation path. This rule combines a high-fidelity hash with a specific folder path.
Detects the creation of JSON files within the '%LOCALAPPDATA%\Arkanix_lol\' directory. This folder is used by the Arkanix Stealer to stage stolen data before exfiltration, making this activity a strong indicator of infection.
This rule detects the execution of processes associated with a JWrapper-packaged SimpleHelp Remote Access Trojan (RAT). The execution from the specific 'ProgramData\JWrapper-Remote Access' directory is a strong indicator of the malicious activity described in the Cofense report. The rule specifically looks for 'Remote AccessWinLauncher.exe', 'windowslauncher.exe', and 'winpty-agent64.exe' being executed from 'C:\ProgramData\JWrapper-Remote Access'.
Detects potential exploitation attempts against a buffer overflow vulnerability (CVE-2026-2329) in Grandstream VoIP phones. This rule identifies web requests targeting the vulnerable API endpoint '/cgi-bin/api.values.get' with an overly long query string (>64 bytes) or the use of multiple colons (>=3) which could indicate a ROP chain attempt. The detection is based on DeviceNetworkEvents from Microsoft Defender for Endpoint.
Detects the dynamic creation of a scheduled task where cmd.exe first writes an XML task definition file to disk, which is then immediately used by schtasks.exe to create the task. This is a characteristic behavior of the APT28 "Operation MacroMaze" campaign.
Detects the creation of a Windows service followed by the use of "sc.exe sdset" to apply a highly restrictive security descriptor. This specific TTP is used by the REF4033 group (UAT-8099) to harden their malicious 'WalletServiceInfo' service, making it difficult for administrators to stop or delete.
This rule detects the execution of 'notepad.exe' specifically when it is launched from the WindowsApps directory (excluding version '11.2510') and its command line arguments include the string '.md'. This combination suggests an attempt to open or process Markdown files using a specific, potentially non-standard, version of Notepad. This could indicate unusual user activity, a misconfigured application, or potentially malicious activity involving Markdown files, such as data exfiltration or execution of embedded content.
This rule detects various activities associated with the 'CrashFix' variant of the 'Clickfix' malware, which deploys a Python-based Remote Access Trojan (RAT). The detection logic covers several stages of the attack:
1. **Browser Extension Installation**: Identifies the creation of a specific malicious Chrome extension file (.crx) with a unique identifier.
2. **Command and Control (C2) Traffic**: Monitors network connections to known malicious URLs and IP addresses associated with the malware's C2 infrastructure.
3. **Malicious Hashes**: Detects the execution of processes with specific SHA256 hashes known to belong to the CrashFix malware.
4. **LOLBIN Abuse**: Identifies the use of living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBINs) like 'finger.exe' and 'ct.exe' in suspicious command-line combinations, potentially for discovery or execution.
5. **Malicious IP Communication**: Looks for network connections initiated by 'ct.exe' with the 'confirm' argument, indicating communication with potentially malicious remote IPs.
6. **Python TTPs**: Detects Python execution patterns, specifically 'pythonw.exe' running 'modes.py' and making outbound network connections to non-local IPs, indicative of the Python RAT.
7. **Persistence via Registry Run Key**: Monitors for registry modifications related to 'pythonw.exe modes.py', suggesting persistence mechanisms.
8. **Persistence via Scheduled Task**: Identifies the creation of scheduled tasks that execute 'run.exe' and 'udp.pyw', another persistence method.
1. **Browser Extension Installation**: Identifies the creation of a specific malicious Chrome extension file (.crx) with a unique identifier.
2. **Command and Control (C2) Traffic**: Monitors network connections to known malicious URLs and IP addresses associated with the malware's C2 infrastructure.
3. **Malicious Hashes**: Detects the execution of processes with specific SHA256 hashes known to belong to the CrashFix malware.
4. **LOLBIN Abuse**: Identifies the use of living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBINs) like 'finger.exe' and 'ct.exe' in suspicious command-line combinations, potentially for discovery or execution.
5. **Malicious IP Communication**: Looks for network connections initiated by 'ct.exe' with the 'confirm' argument, indicating communication with potentially malicious remote IPs.
6. **Python TTPs**: Detects Python execution patterns, specifically 'pythonw.exe' running 'modes.py' and making outbound network connections to non-local IPs, indicative of the Python RAT.
7. **Persistence via Registry Run Key**: Monitors for registry modifications related to 'pythonw.exe modes.py', suggesting persistence mechanisms.
8. **Persistence via Scheduled Task**: Identifies the creation of scheduled tasks that execute 'run.exe' and 'udp.pyw', another persistence method.
Detects the creation or execution of files, often in C:\ProgramData, with a file description of 'SimpleHelp Remote Access Client' but using non-standard or renamed filenames. This is indicative of threat actors deploying the SimpleHelp RMM tool for persistence, as observed in campaigns exploiting CVE-2026-1731 in BeyondTrust.
Detects files being written to USB-mounted removable drives. The rule enriches these alerts with USB device identifiers such as VID_PID, InstancePathId, and SerialNumberId, gathered from fleet-wide Plug and Play (PnP) events. This enrichment allows security analysts to cross-reference the detected USB devices against an organization's approved device exclusion list, potentially managed by solutions like Microsoft Intune, to differentiate legitimate data transfers from potential data exfiltration attempts.
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