Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the execution of a PowerShell script named 'cap.ps1' using common obfuscation and evasion flags including '-windowstyle hidden' and '-executionpolicy bypass'. This pattern is frequently used by adversaries to execute malicious scripts while minimizing user visibility and bypassing standard security policy restrictions.
Detects PowerShell scripts that contain custom bit-reversal and XOR decoding routines used to deobfuscate an embedded byte blob, followed by the reflective loading of that blob into memory as a .NET assembly using [Reflection.Assembly]::Load. This behavior is associated with loaders like cap.ps1 used to deploy RATs such as AsyncRAT.
Detects the execution of PowerShell scripts attempting an in-memory AMSI bypass by patching the AMSI scan content handler. The rule identifies suspicious combinations of .NET reflection and memory protection APIs (such as RuntimeHelpers.PrepareMethod, VirtualProtect, and Marshal.Copy) commonly utilized to overwrite AMSI function pointers or return values during runtime.
Detects attempts to bypass the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) by nulling the pAppName pointer in memory using Marshal.WriteInt64. This technique forces AmsiScanBuffer and AmsiNotifyOperation to return E_INVALIDARG, causing them to fail open and skip security inspection.
Detects instances where explorer.exe launches a PowerShell process originating from an LNK file, which then performs a remote download of a Node.js runtime and JavaScript implant (TonRAT) to standard Windows temporary or application data directories. This activity is indicative of the TonRAT campaign targeting hospitality front-desk systems.
Detects the use of PowerShell to modify Microsoft Defender preferences, specifically attempting to disable security features like Realtime Monitoring, IOAV protection, or Behavior Monitoring.
Detects the use of PowerShell to modify Microsoft Defender preferences, specifically attempting to disable security features like Realtime Monitoring, IOAV protection, or Behavior Monitoring.
This rule detects the use of system utilities (wevtutil.exe, auditpol.exe, PowerShell) to interact with, query, or check status of security event logs and auditing configurations. While these tools are standard for administration, their usage by non-system accounts can indicate an adversary attempting to understand, monitor, or manipulate system audit policies and event log configurations as part of a reconnaissance or defense evasion strategy.
This rule detects the use of system utilities (wevtutil.exe, auditpol.exe, PowerShell) to interact with, query, or check status of security event logs and auditing configurations. While these tools are standard for administration, their usage by non-system accounts can indicate an adversary attempting to understand, monitor, or manipulate system audit policies and event log configurations as part of a reconnaissance or defense evasion strategy.
Detects execution of common network reconnaissance tools such as nmap, masscan, and zmap, or PowerShell commands that utilize Test-NetConnection for automated port sweeping across a defined range.
Detects the execution of PowerShell commands intended to disable or bypass the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI). This is achieved by referencing internal AMSI methods such as 'AmsiUtils', 'amsiInitFailed', or 'amsi.dll' within command line arguments, typically used to neutralize endpoint security scanning during malicious script execution.
Detects attempts to clear Windows event logs using the native 'wevtutil.exe' utility or the PowerShell 'Clear-EventLog' command. This behavior is often associated with adversaries attempting to remove evidence of their actions from a compromised system.
Detects attempts to clear Windows event logs using the native 'wevtutil.exe' utility or the PowerShell 'Clear-EventLog' command. This behavior is often associated with adversaries attempting to remove evidence of their actions from a compromised system.
Detects attempts to bypass the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) by monitoring for specific keywords associated with memory patching or tampering within the command lines of PowerShell, .NET-based binaries (dotnet.exe, csc.exe, msbuild.exe), and related processes. The rule specifically looks for strings like 'AmsiUtils', 'amsiInitFailed', and base64-encoded equivalents often used by offensive security tools to neutralize AMSI scanning capabilities.
This rule detects the execution of PowerShell or pwsh.exe with an encoded command. Adversaries often use encoded commands to obfuscate their malicious scripts and evade detection. The rule specifically looks for the '-EncodedCommand' or '-enc' parameter followed by a base64-encoded string of at least 20 characters.
Detects the deletion of volume shadow copies using standard Windows utilities such as vssadmin.exe, wmic.exe, or PowerShell. This behavior is a common indicator of ransomware activity aimed at preventing system recovery.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with an encoded command flag (e.g., -EncodedCommand, -e, -ec) where the command string exceeds 200 characters. This pattern is commonly used to obfuscate malicious PowerShell scripts, payloads, or downloader cradles.
Detects the use of BITSAdmin or PowerShell 'Start-BitsTransfer' to initiate file transfers, specifically targeting non-Microsoft signed processes. Adversaries often abuse the Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) to download malicious payloads or exfiltrate data, as it is a legitimate Windows service that operates in the background.
Detects the use of PowerShell commands that leverage 'Invoke-Expression' (IEX) in conjunction with 'Net.WebClient' or 'DownloadString' methods to download and execute code directly from the internet into memory.
This rule detects attempts to tamper with Windows Defender services (WinDefend, SecurityHealthService, wscsvc) by stopping or disabling them. It covers actions performed via 'sc.exe' commands, 'Set-Service' PowerShell cmdlets, and direct modification of registry keys related to these services. The rule specifically filters out legitimate system and TrustedInstaller processes when detecting registry modifications to reduce false positives.
Detects the use of PowerShell commands that modify file system metadata (e.g., CreationTime, LastWriteTime, LastAccessTime). This technique, often referred to as 'timestomping', is used by adversaries to manipulate file timestamps to evade detection or hide activity.
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