Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects PowerShell processes attempting to retrieve or execute remote .rtf resources via web requests. It specifically looks for `powershell.exe` or `pwsh.exe` in the process path combined with command-line arguments indicating `Invoke-WebRequest`, `iwr`, `DownloadString`, `Invoke-Expression`, or `iex` targeting a URL ending in `.rtf`.
Udm Affair Build Vds
YARA-L
This rule detects the execution of `cmd.exe`, `powershell.exe`, or `pwsh.exe` when their command line arguments contain either "affair-build.bat" or commands to stop or start the Virtual Disk service (VDS) using `net` or `sc.exe`. This activity is indicative of a cleanup or persistence script sequence that interacts with the Virtual Disk service.
Hunting rule: correlate with additional signals before alerting. Detects recursive collection of office documents into a single archive, common pre-exfil staging.
Detects the execution of nested, hidden, and bypassed PowerShell sessions spawned by cmd.exe, typically launched from a Startup LNK file. This behavior is associated with the SHADOW-EARTH-066 campaign, which uses specific command-line arguments for evasion and loads payloads from C:\ProgramData\ using Invoke-Expression or iex.
Detects the execution of the initial fingerprinting PowerShell script utilized by the PhantomRelay RAT. PhantomRelay is a custom Remote Access Trojan associated with the Russia-nexus threat group GREYVIBE. The script gathers system information such as computer name, username, and PID, using a hardcoded User-Agent string before connecting to the C2 server.
Detects the execution of the LegionRelay client script, a PowerShell RAT utilized by the Russia-nexus threat group GREYVIBE. LegionRelay communicates with its command-and-control server via REST API methods and relies on operator-staged scripts for post-compromise activity. The detection matches on specific REST API paths and PowerShell artifacts found within the script block.
Detects PowerShell script block contents indicating the manual bypassing of SSL certificate validation. This defense evasion technique is notably used by the Gamaredon GammaLoad third stage (which executes via an encoded command) to ensure successful connection to potentially untrusted or self-signed C2 infrastructure.
Detects PowerShell commands attempting to add Windows Defender exclusion paths for directories associated with the 10FXRAT malware. This rule specifically looks for the use of 'Add-MpPreference' with '-ExclusionPath' in the command line, combined with the presence of 'AppNetSvc' or 'WinDiagTrack', which are known directories used by 10FXRAT for staging and persistence.
Detects the execution of PowerShell scripts containing strings associated with the DAYLIGHT obfuscator. This obfuscator is utilized by the Russia-nexus threat group GREYVIBE to hide post-compromise payloads and PhantomRelay implants.
Detects PowerShell script execution utilizing WMI event subscription (Register-WmiEvent) explicitly targeting the creation of logical disks with DriveType 2 (USB drives). This technique is known to be used by the GammaSteel threat group to monitor and potentially steal data from physical media.
Detects PowerShell script logic associated with GammaSteel's fileless registry staging encryption, specifically the use of the DPAPI cmdlet ConvertTo-SecureString alongside the HKCU:\Printers path. This technique binds the encryption to the active user session to hinder forensic analysis.
Detects the initiation of a FileSystemWatcher object in PowerShell configured to monitor the 'Changed' event. This technique is used by GammaSteel to actively monitor user operations in real time and steal documents the moment they are modified.
Detects the initiation of a FileSystemWatcher object in PowerShell configured to monitor the 'Changed' event. This technique is used by GammaSteel for real-time document surveillance to steal files the moment they are modified.
Detects PowerShell script execution utilizing WMI event subscription (Register-WmiEvent) explicitly targeting the creation of logical disks with DriveType 2 (USB drives), a technique GammaSteel uses to steal data from physical media.
Detects the clearing or configuration tampering of EventLog using utilities such as "wevtutil", "powershell" and "wmic".
This technique were seen used by threat actors and ransomware strains in order to evade defenses.
This technique were seen used by threat actors and ransomware strains in order to evade defenses.
Detects the initial script execution phase of the Red Lamassu JFMBackdoor infection chain, specifically PowerShell downloading components into the TEMP directory. This rule looks for PowerShell execution that uses common download commandlets (Invoke-WebRequest, iwr, wget, Net.WebClient) to save specific Red Lamassu payload filenames (FLTLIB.dll, scr.mui, flt.bin, fltMC.exe) into a temporary directory.
Detects PowerShell script logic associated with GammaSteel's fileless registry staging encryption, specifically the use of ConvertTo-SecureString alongside the HKCU:\Printers path. This technique is used by Gamaredon to bind payload encryption to the active user session and hinder forensic analysis.
Detects PowerShell executions associated with Gamaredon's GammaSteel persistence mechanism, which reconstructs a payload path from the HKCU:\Printers registry key and executes it using [scriptblock]::Create. This technique indicates an attempt to maintain access by leveraging registry keys for autostart execution and dynamic script execution.
Detects PowerShell script blocks containing WMI queries (Get-WmiObject or SELECT statements) targeting specific Win32 classes commonly used for system reconnaissance.
Detects PowerShell script block telemetry (Event ID 4104) containing P/Invoke declarations targeting advapi32.dll's CredEnumerate function or related Credential Manager APIs (CredRead, CredWrite). This technique bypasses standard cmdlets that may be monitored or restricted, providing direct API access to stored Windows credentials including RDP sessions, web service credentials, and enterprise application tokens. Generalizes well beyond specific campaigns to most PowerShell credential-theft families.
Detects PowerShell scripts attempting to overwrite the amsiContext buffer using Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal.WriteInt32 to disable AMSI scanning.
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