Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
40,407 detections
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Detects a behavioral chain where a script interpreter (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, wscript.exe) launches curl.exe with specific download parameters to fetch an MSI file into the temporary directory, followed closely by msiexec.exe performing an administrative installation (/a) of the downloaded package.
Detects the ScreenConnect host client (ScreenConnect.WindowsClient.exe) spawning command or scripting interpreters (cmd, PowerShell, wscript) or Notepad++ to execute guest-pushed files located within the user's Temp folder.
IOC sweep for the Optimizely supply chain attack distributing Coruna/DarkSword, covering Defender XDR tables only (DeviceNetworkEvents, DeviceEvents and DeviceFileEvents). Matches remote URLs and hosts, DNS query responses, and IOC IPs against the attacker domains and IPs, and matches file SHA256 hashes against the known malicious samples. Companion to the Sentinel lake/auxiliary tables query, which covers CommonSecurityLog and DnsEvents. Keeps a 14-day lookback in the query body.
IOC sweep for the Optimizely supply chain attack distributing Coruna/DarkSword, covering Sentinel lake/auxiliary tables only (CommonSecurityLog and DnsEvents). Matches firewall/proxy URLs and destination hosts, DNS query names, and IOC IPs against the attacker domains and IPs, using boundary-safe domain matching. Companion to the Defender tables query, which covers Defender network, DNS and file events and the file hashes. The query has no time filter in its body: set the time picker or API timespan to 14 days.
This rule performs an IOC sweep across multiple telemetry sources (DeviceNetworkEvents, DeviceEvents, DeviceFileEvents, CommonSecurityLog, DnsEvents) to detect network connections, DNS queries, and file activity associated with the Optimizely supply chain attack distributing Coruna/DarkSword malware.
This rule detects activities associated with the BITTER threat group (TA397) campaign involving PapRAT and WmRAT implants. It correlates multiple data sources including process events, network connections, DNS queries, and file activities to identify specific indicators of compromise (IOCs), high-fidelity TTPs such as FTP script execution, obfuscated command lines, scheduled task persistence, C2 communications, and multi-stage chain correlation on Windows devices.
Detects a remote source IP address generating a high volume of failed Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) logon attempts across multiple Windows hosts, followed by a successful RDP logon from the same source IP.
Detects credential theft tooling such as Mimikatz or CookieKatz and memory access against sensitive processes like lsass.exe, chrome.exe, or msedge.exe by non-browser and non-system processes, correlated per device with process memory dumps or tool command-line indicators.
Detects PowerShell launching a temporary script named with a specific pattern (k<32 hex>.ps1) using execution flags such as -NoProfile, -ExecutionPolicy Bypass, and -WindowStyle Hidden. It correlates this execution with the creation of the script in the same folder and its subsequent deletion.
Detects a chain of credential theft activities including DCSync/DRSUAPI requests, SAM/SYSTEM registry hive dumps via reg.exe, and the execution of credential theft tools such as Mimikatz or SharpDPAPI within a 1-hour time window.
Detects new script files (.bat, .cmd, .ps1, .vbs, .js) created or modified in Netlogon or SYSVOL shares that have not been seen in the prior 30 days at the same path, excluding known administrator accounts, processes, and approved folders.
Detects a sequence of events where msiexec.exe is used to unpack a payload into %LOCALAPPDATA%\wclient_<8hex> via the /a flag, followed within 15 minutes by administrative or secondary logon manipulation commands such as enabling the seclogon service or using runas with a low trust level.
The following analytic detects the use of `bitsadmin.exe` to schedule a BITS job for persistence on an endpoint. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific command-line parameters such as `create`, `addfile`, and `resume`. This activity is significant because BITS jobs can be used by attackers to maintain persistence, download malicious payloads, or exfiltrate data. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to persist in the environment, execute arbitrary code, or transfer sensitive information, necessitating further investigation and potential remediation.
This analytic detects non-browser processes accessing files in local browser cache directories using Windows Security EventCode 4663.
A script or utility reading Firefox, Chrome, Edge, Brave, or Chromium cache entries may be extracting web-delivered content for staging or execution.
A script or utility reading Firefox, Chrome, Edge, Brave, or Chromium cache entries may be extracting web-delivered content for staging or execution.
Detects potential staging activity associated with the BITTER group's PapRAT malware, specifically looking for specific patterns such as piping log files into the command shell or executing reconnaissance commands staged to a PDF file before uploading via curl.
Detects a sequence where PowerShell downloads AnyDesk.exe and subsequently the same device executes AnyDesk.exe with the --install and --silent parameters within a 1-hour window.
Detects high-volume MSSQL password guessing attempts by analyzing repeated failed login events (Event ID 18456) for 'sa' or 'admin' accounts from a single client. It builds a 7-day historical baseline per client and alerts when login failures in a 10-minute bin exceed a minimum threshold and surpass 3x the client's historical average and historical maximum.
Detects instances where the SQL Server process (sqlservr.exe) spawns the Windows command shell (cmd.exe) using xp_cmdshell, which subsequently executes or launches payloads originating from the C:\Users\Public\ directory.
Detects Microsoft SQL Server (sqlservr.exe) spawning administrative or script utility processes (such as cmd.exe, powershell.exe, schtasks.exe) that stage executables in C:\Users\Public\ and/or create recurring scheduled tasks, indicative of database exploitation and command execution (xp_cmdshell).
Detects the creation of a scheduled task using schtasks.exe that mimics the Microsoft Edge Update naming convention, executing dllhost.exe from a non-standard directory outside of System32 or SysWOW64 at recurring minute intervals.
IOC sweep for the Optimizely supply chain attack distributing Coruna/DarkSword, covering Defender XDR tables only (DeviceNetworkEvents, DeviceEvents and DeviceFileEvents). Matches remote URLs and hosts, DNS query responses, and IOC IPs against the attacker domains and IPs, and matches file SHA256 hashes against the known malicious samples. Companion to the Sentinel lake/auxiliary tables query, which covers CommonSecurityLog and DnsEvents. Keeps a 14-day lookback in the query body.
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