Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects backup service processes writing server-side scripts into web-accessible directories, indicating potential web shell deployment after application compromise.
Sweeps endpoint telemetry for known IOCs from the trojanized anthropic.claude-code (Open-VSX v2.1.313) SSH backdoor: C2 IP 134.209.82.225, beacon URL, extension.js and tunnel key SHA-256 hashes, and ifconfig.me lookups from VS Code-family/extension-host processes. Results are summarized per device and IOC.
Detects credential harvesting tooling and activity targeting PaperCut configuration and log files by identifying specific parser script executions, searches for PaperCut credential key patterns in process command lines, and the creation of related harvest artifacts.
Detects behavioral indicators of shell-driven cryptocurrency miner staging where a hidden .trace file or binary is created, executed, or referenced via command-line arguments within go2rtc or shared memory directories (/config/, /opt/go2rtc/, /etc/go2rtc/, /.config/go2rtc/, /dev/shm/), alongside indicators of mining pools or software such as XMRig.
Detects the execution of the public Horizon3.ai PoC exploit for CVE-2026-106173 (FortiSIEM gRPC path traversal RCE) utilizing python interpreters with specific command-line arguments indicative of the exploit tool.
Detects a burst of newly created Python or Shell scripts on a host running the Zammad ticketing system, which can indicate post-exploitation activity or automated staging.
Detects potential remote code execution against Xinference or Xoscar pool processes, identified by an inbound network connection accepted by a Python-based worker followed shortly by the spawning of a shell process (sh, bash, dash) by the same process.
Detects an Xoscar or Xinference Python actor pool process spawning a Unix shell child process with suspicious command-line flags (such as reverse shell indicators, downloads, or base64 decoding), potentially indicative of cloudpickle deserialization remote code execution (CVE-2026-49950).
Detects web server processes (Apache httpd, apache2, php-cgi, php-fpm) spawning a Unix shell (sh, bash, dash) that executes a wget or curl command piped directly into the shell for execution, indicative of potential remote code execution or web shell activity.
Detects potential tampering of Apache HTTP Server configuration files (httpd.conf) involving PHP engine or script handlers, followed closely by an Apache service reload (HUP signal) on the same device within a 10-minute window.
Detects HTTP requests containing serialized PHP objects in the Cookie header matching patterns associated with Zend Framework or Laminas gadget chains, characteristic of PHP object deserialization exploitation (e.g., PHPGGC style).
Identifies deployments of Gotenberg vulnerable to CVE-2026-42589 across multiple Microsoft Defender telemetry sources including TVM inventory, vulnerabilities, container images, listening services, and binaries on disk.
Detects sandbox or training hosts performing DNS resolution followed shortly by outbound connections to public IP addresses on ports 80 or 443, which may indicate a firewall misconfiguration or unauthorized egress from isolated environments.
Detects the execution of administrative commands and scripting interpreters spawned by the VMware Tools daemon (vmtoolsd), which may indicate an adversary leveraging ESXi guest operations for remote code execution.
Detects the creation of cook.pth or cook.py in Python site-packages or dist-packages directories by package managers or interpreters, followed by a Python interpreter execution on the same device within one hour. This pattern matches the malicious supply chain behavior observed in compromised LiteLLM versions (e.g., 1.107.0) utilizing .pth auto-import chains for persistence and execution.
Detects modification or creation of .htaccess files within WordPress directory structures followed within 24 hours by the creation or modification of .cache files in the same directory. This behavioral pattern is often indicative of web shell deployment or persistence installation via compromised web applications.
Detects abnormal PHP execution volume storms, process crashes handled by crash reporters (such as werfault.exe, apport, systemd-coredump), or application error events related to PHP, which may indicate denial of service attacks, exploitation attempts, or severe application instability.
Detects abnormal PHP execution volume storms, process crashes handled by crash reporters (such as werfault.exe, apport, systemd-coredump), or application error events related to PHP, which may indicate denial of service attacks, exploitation attempts, or severe application instability.
Detects web server processes writing PHP files into sensitive WordPress directories (such as mu-plugins or rank-math-pro/includes) shortly after deleting them within a 1-hour window. This behavior often indicates the rebuilding or updating of a webshell or backdoor for persistence.
Exposure-assessment hunt for endpoints running OpenCode and contacting OpenCode Console or AI provider APIs, to prioritise API key rotation after the October 2026 OpenCode breach.
Detects potential data exfiltration and credential hunting where an endpoint downloads a database backup using presigned URLs or cloud storage signatures within 6 hours of searching local files for API keys or private keys.
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