Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
2,146 detections
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Detects network communication associated with the Bluekit phishing framework and the use of the rrweb library to capture web sessions, including WebSocket upgrade attempts which may indicate unauthorized user activity monitoring or credential harvesting.
This rule detects potential browser fingerprinting activity or unauthorized WebRTC STUN requests, often associated with malicious landing pages, phishing, or automated detection evasion. It identifies the presence of specific browser API calls (RTCPeerConnection, navigator.deviceMemory, navigator.hardwareConcurrency) or suspicious use of STUN server ports (3478, 19302) on non-authorized domains.
Detects outbound network connections to a known malicious IP (83.142.209.214) associated with Lambsys cryptominer activity. The rule specifically monitors for HTTP POST requests to '/status.php' or '/setup_status.php' using the default 'Go-http-client/1.1' User-Agent, indicating a C2 beaconing pattern.
Detects high-volume credential stuffing attacks targeting the WordPress 'wp-login.php' endpoint. The rule monitors for multiple geographically distinct source IP addresses submitting HTTP POST requests to the login page within a 2-minute window. It specifically identifies traffic patterns associated with common infostealer-harvested credential campaigns (such as Vidar, Stealc, or DanaBot) by matching a specific User-Agent string associated with the campaign.
This rule detects activities associated with a specific malicious browser extension, including the presence of its files on disk, execution of browsers with the extension ID in the command line, and network connections to known malicious or typosquatted domains (perplexity-ai.online, extension.tilda.ws) used for C2 or exfiltration.
Detects DNS queries to known StegoAd command-and-control domains 'liveupdt.com' and 'dealctr.com'. These domains are used by the StegoAd campaign to deliver steganographic payloads and push malicious JavaScript to compromised browser extensions.
Detects outbound SSH connections from common applications using libssh2 to external, non-standard or untrusted servers, followed by an anomalously large inbound TCP data transfer before authentication completes. This behavior is indicative of exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2026-55200, where a malicious SSH server triggers a heap overflow in the client via a malformed packet.
This rule detects network activity associated with a known malicious domain 'facture-in.pages.dev' or suspicious HTTP response patterns often observed in phishing kits or web-based redirection, such as 'BOT BLOCKED', 'no_mouse', 'wrong_timezone', or specific language-localized error messages.
Detects attempts to generate SQL injection payloads by abusing Ollama servers, specifically targeting unauthenticated HTTP POST requests to /api/generate or /api/chat on port 11434. The rule looks for SQL injection indicators and VAPT framework specific strings within the request context, URI, or user agent.
This rule detects network connections on port 21 (FTP) where the remote URL contains keywords indicative of NetWare directory listings or related services (netware, NDS, bindery, ncf). This could indicate an attempt to discover or interact with NetWare services, potentially exploiting vulnerabilities like Squidbleed.
Detects anomalous device network activity involving 5G-specific protocol ports (e.g., GTP-U, SIP). The rule aggregates unique port usage per device over 1-hour intervals to identify potential network reconnaissance, scanning, or unauthorized control plane communication.
This rule detects network connections on port 21 (FTP) where the remote URL contains keywords indicative of NetWare directory listings or related services (netware, NDS, bindery, ncf). This could indicate an attempt to discover or interact with NetWare services, potentially exploiting vulnerabilities like Squidbleed.
This rule monitors Cisco Unified Communications Manager (UCM) environments for multiple stages of an attack chain, including potential Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attempts against administrative interfaces, suspicious file modifications by service accounts, indicators of privilege escalation, and anomalous outbound network connections from core Cisco processes.
Detects anomalous device network activity involving 5G-specific protocol ports (e.g., GTP-U, SIP). The rule aggregates unique port usage per device over 1-hour intervals to identify potential network reconnaissance, scanning, or unauthorized control plane communication.
Detects unauthenticated network connections to AutoGen Studio's Management Control Plane (MCP) WebSocket paths. AutoGen Studio's AuthMiddleware explicitly skips authentication for '/api/mcp/*' and '/api/ws/*' paths, typically on port 8081. This rule identifies attempts to access these paths without authentication, which could indicate reconnaissance or exploitation attempts against a misconfigured or vulnerable AutoGen Studio instance.
Detects signs of HTTP request smuggling attempts targeting nghttpx or similar proxies. The rule monitors for a specific poisoning precondition where an HTTP/1.1 Upgrade request contains both an 'Upgrade' header and a 'Content-Length' header, which can be leveraged to desynchronize the connection and smuggle subsequent requests (e.g., GET /poisoned).
This rule detects potentially unauthorized processes establishing network connections over port 8883 (MQTT/MQTTS) to major cloud IoT platforms (AWS IoT, Azure IoT Hub, GCP PubSub). It flags processes that are not common web browsers and calculates a suspicious score based on data volume, execution path (e.g., Temp or AppData), and the process name not matching known legitimate IoT software.
Detects HTTP traffic involving redirect chains from known Gmail URL shorteners (goo.gl, g.co, short.gy) that terminate at the identified credential-harvesting domain chongdaotang.net. This behavior is indicative of a phishing campaign designed to harvest user credentials through a multi-stage redirect.
Detects anomalous network traffic patterns characteristic of the Grandoreiro banking trojan, which tunnels Command and Control (C2) communications over STUN/WebRTC (UDP port 3478). The rule identifies processes that are not known web browsers or conferencing applications initiating these STUN connections, a technique used by the malware to blend with legitimate collaboration traffic.
Detects network connections to known malicious domains or IP addresses associated with Fortinet or Ivanti VPN phishing campaigns or command and control infrastructure. This rule identifies attempts to connect to fake VPN portals or communicate with adversary-controlled servers.
This rule detects network connections or DNS queries to known public tunneling services (e.g., Cloudflare Tunnel, localtunnel, bore, devtunnels) made by processes other than common web browsers. Attackers frequently use these services to bypass firewalls and establish unauthorized reverse shells or persistent C2 channels.
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