Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
2,146 detections
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Detects HTTP POST requests with multipart form data containing PHP session identifiers and PHP session upload progress parameters, indicative of an exploit attempt against a PHP application vulnerability (CVE-2026-109619).
Detects endpoint network connections and correlates multi-stage communications associated with the ClickFix browser cache smuggling campaign, including initial payload retrieval and secondary stage/C2 communication across devices.
Detects multiple distinct source IPs sending forged 'pitboss PPE' authentication failure messages to NetScaler authentication endpoints within a short timeframe, associated with a fetch-based FreeBSD payload download (kw2-freebsd-x64-s11).
Detects endpoint, network, and security log activity matching known indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with PEERSTITCH / CL-STA-0954, including specific file hashes, IP addresses, and URLs.
Detects potential vulnerability scanning, enumeration, or bulk data extraction against Request Tracker (RT) web paths by monitoring high request volumes, distinct URI counts, or large response byte sizes within CommonSecurityLog data.
Detects potential SQL injection (SQLi) attempts targeting web applications by identifying multiple requests matching specific SQLi regex patterns combined with encoding or internal reference markers within web access logs.
The following analytic detects network traffic associated with known remote access software applications, such as AnyDesk, GoToMyPC, LogMeIn, and TeamViewer.
It leverages Palo Alto traffic logs mapped to the Network_Traffic data model in Splunk. This activity is significant because adversaries often use remote access tools to maintain unauthorized access to compromised environments.
If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to control systems remotely, exfiltrate data, or deploy additional malware, posing a severe threat to the organization's security.
It leverages Palo Alto traffic logs mapped to the Network_Traffic data model in Splunk. This activity is significant because adversaries often use remote access tools to maintain unauthorized access to compromised environments.
If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to control systems remotely, exfiltrate data, or deploy additional malware, posing a severe threat to the organization's security.
Detects potential abuse of WordPress application passwords by correlating an authorization mint request (authorize-application.php) from an administrator's browser with a subsequent REST API page creation request to the same destination server from a different source IP address within a short time window.
Detects connections held open far longer than normal. Interactive command and
control, tunnelling and remote access tooling all maintain long sessions, whereas
ordinary application traffic is short-lived and bursty.
Duration is available directly in the connection record, which makes this far
cheaper to evaluate than reconstructing sessions from flow data.
Onboarding: NTA is ingested via Network Traffic Analysis (Bloo extractor 717).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/integrations
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=nta-connection where sourcename='NTA'
and action='CONNECTION_ESTABLISHED'
| duration 24h
| groupby srcip, dstip, dstport, app, duration
control, tunnelling and remote access tooling all maintain long sessions, whereas
ordinary application traffic is short-lived and bursty.
Duration is available directly in the connection record, which makes this far
cheaper to evaluate than reconstructing sessions from flow data.
Onboarding: NTA is ingested via Network Traffic Analysis (Bloo extractor 717).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/integrations
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=nta-connection where sourcename='NTA'
and action='CONNECTION_ESTABLISHED'
| duration 24h
| groupby srcip, dstip, dstport, app, duration
Detects suspicious DNS queries to external service interaction domains often used for out-of-band interactions after successful RCE
Detects endpoint, network, and security log activity matching known indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with PEERSTITCH / CL-STA-0954, including specific file hashes, IP addresses, and URLs.
Detects HTTP requests to the PeopleSoft PSEMHUB servlet using alternate
encodings such as the percent-encoded path %50SEMHUB. ShinyHunters/UNC6240 mass-exploit
Oracle PeopleSoft CVE-2026-35273 against internet-facing systems and encode the path to
defeat literal WAF signatures for /PSEMHUB/ (T1190, T1027).
encodings such as the percent-encoded path %50SEMHUB. ShinyHunters/UNC6240 mass-exploit
Oracle PeopleSoft CVE-2026-35273 against internet-facing systems and encode the path to
defeat literal WAF signatures for /PSEMHUB/ (T1190, T1027).
Detects potential data exfiltration to popular public paste-sites and code-sharing services (such as Pastebin, Paste.ee, Hastebin, Ghostbin, ControlC, Dpaste, Rentry.co, Privatebin) using HTTP POST or PUT requests based on upload frequency and volume thresholds.
Detects endpoint, network, and security log activity matching known indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with PEERSTITCH / CL-STA-0954, including specific file hashes, IP addresses, and URLs.
Detects endpoint, network, and security log activity matching known indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with PEERSTITCH / CL-STA-0954, including specific file hashes, IP addresses, and URLs.
Detects non-browser Python-based HTTP clients (such as python-requests, python-urllib, aiohttp, or httpx) targeting specific API endpoints (/user, /profile, /order, /upload) while exhibiting indicators of SQL injection or high-volume object ID enumeration.
The following analytic detects the execution of known remote access software within the environment.
It leverages network logs mapped to the Web data model, identifying specific URLs and user agents associated with remote access tools like AnyDesk, GoToMyPC, LogMeIn, and TeamViewer.
This activity is significant as adversaries often use these utilities to maintain unauthorized remote access. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to control systems remotely, exfiltrate data, or further compromise the network, posing a severe security risk.
It leverages network logs mapped to the Web data model, identifying specific URLs and user agents associated with remote access tools like AnyDesk, GoToMyPC, LogMeIn, and TeamViewer.
This activity is significant as adversaries often use these utilities to maintain unauthorized remote access. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to control systems remotely, exfiltrate data, or further compromise the network, posing a severe security risk.
Detects endpoint, network, and security log activity matching known indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with PEERSTITCH / CL-STA-0954, including specific file hashes, IP addresses, and URLs.
IOC sweep for ARTEX campaign indicators: C2 host, nine proxy IPs, xcai.pro and its subdomains, and the CLAUDE.md URL across Defender, CEF/firewall, DNS and Entra sign-in telemetry. Domains match on exact host or subdomain only, connection types are limited to real connection events, and sign-ins are limited to successes and credential failures.
Finds BeyondTrust Remote Support (Bomgar) appliances at version 26.2.3 or earlier that have a public IP address, indicating a potentially internet-facing vulnerable appliance (CVE-2026-102764). Index and field names are placeholders to adapt.
Detects non-browser Python-based HTTP clients (such as python-requests, python-urllib, aiohttp, or httpx) targeting specific API endpoints (/user, /profile, /order, /upload) while exhibiting indicators of SQL injection or high-volume object ID enumeration.
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