Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
289 detections
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Campaign converting compromised FortiGate firewalls into credential stealers
Threat hunting query designed to identify suspicious FortiGate SSL-VPN and administrative authentication activity that may indicate credential abuse following the FortiBleed 2026 credential exposure campaign.
This hunt focuses on post-exposure behavior rather than vulnerability exploitation and combines multiple hunting hypotheses, including:
- Previously unseen user/IP combinations
- Multiple users authenticating from the same source IP
- Single users authenticating from multiple source IPs
- Rapid country changes resembling impossible-travel scenarios
- Administrative account creation or modification
- Firewall and VPN configuration changes
- Potential tunneling or proxy activity associated with post-compromise operations
The objective is to identify unauthorized access resulting from exposed FortiGate administrator credentials or SSL-VPN credentials.
This query is intended as a hunting starting point and should be adapted to local FortiGate log formats, parser mappings, enrichment sources and operational requirements.
This hunt focuses on post-exposure behavior rather than vulnerability exploitation and combines multiple hunting hypotheses, including:
- Previously unseen user/IP combinations
- Multiple users authenticating from the same source IP
- Single users authenticating from multiple source IPs
- Rapid country changes resembling impossible-travel scenarios
- Administrative account creation or modification
- Firewall and VPN configuration changes
- Potential tunneling or proxy activity associated with post-compromise operations
The objective is to identify unauthorized access resulting from exposed FortiGate administrator credentials or SSL-VPN credentials.
This query is intended as a hunting starting point and should be adapted to local FortiGate log formats, parser mappings, enrichment sources and operational requirements.
Identifies network connections to known ShinyHunters IP addresses or domains associated with the recent Oracle PeopleSoft exploitation campaign. This rule monitors both endpoint network events and perimeter firewall/proxy logs for outbound communication to the specified malicious infrastructure.
Detects suspicious HTTP requests and API activity targeting Fortinet devices, specifically matching patterns associated with known vulnerabilities like CVE-2022-40684 and CVE-2024-21762. The rule monitors for unauthorized REST API calls, attempts to interact with sensitive administrative endpoints, and patterns indicating potential authentication bypass or remote code execution attempts on FortiGate, FortiOS, and FortiProxy appliances.
This rule detects attempts to extract credentials from FortiGate devices by targeting specific management API endpoints. It looks for HTTP GET requests to '/api/v2/cmdb/' followed by paths like 'system/admin', 'vpn.ssl.settings', or 'user/local', which are known to contain sensitive configuration or user data. This activity is associated with the 'FortiBleed' campaign and CVE-2026-24858.
Detects network communication associated with BeepRAT malware, specifically targeting hardcoded TCP connections to destination port 18848 and ICMP packets containing the string 'BEEP', which are used for C2 communication and keepalive signals.
Campaign converting compromised FortiGate firewalls into credential stealers
This rule identifies endpoints identified as EMS or FortiClient that exhibit an unusually high number of login events (greater than 20) or a high number of unique accounts logging in (greater than 10) within a specific timeframe. This behavior may indicate unauthorized access attempts, automated password spraying, or potential lateral movement activity directed at remote access infrastructure.
This rule detects network connections to phishing pages hosted on the workers.dev domain that are attempting to interact with EvilTokens device code API endpoints. These pages are known to implement developer hotkey prevention (F12 blocked, context menu disabled) to hinder in-browser analysis, indicating malicious intent.
This rule monitors network logs (from proxies and firewalls) for web traffic (HTTP GET requests) containing suspicious JavaScript code injection patterns in the request context or message fields. It specifically looks for common XSS indicators such as <script tags, eval(), document.write(), fromCharCode(), and atob().
Campaign converting compromised FortiGate firewalls into credential stealers
Campaign converting compromised FortiGate firewalls into credential stealers
Campaign converting compromised FortiGate firewalls into credential stealers
Campaign converting compromised FortiGate firewalls into credential stealers
Campaign converting compromised FortiGate firewalls into credential stealers
This rule detects anomalous spikes in inbound network connections to common edge device management ports (80, 443, 8080, 8443) by baselining the number of unique source IP addresses per destination over a 30-day window. It triggers an alert when the hourly count of unique source IPs deviates significantly (greater than 3 standard deviations) from the historical mean, which may indicate active network scanning or brute-force attempts.
Detects the execution of the 'diagnose sniffer packet' command on FortiOS devices. This command can be abused by malware, such as FortigateSniffer, to intercept authentication traffic, as observed in campaigns like FortiBleed.
This rule detects potential Log4Shell (CVE-2021-44228) exploitation attempts by identifying JNDI injection patterns in web request headers, process command lines, and syslog messages. It further identifies suspicious outbound network callbacks to known malicious infrastructure associated with these exploitation attempts.
Detects credential abuse patterns from FortiGate logs including administrative changes, tunneling activity, and anomalous source-IP behavior.
Detects suspicious access to browser credential stores (Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge, Mozilla Firefox, Brave) by non-browser processes within a short time frame (2 hours) after a FortiClient VPN logon event. This activity is consistent with information stealer malware, such as LummaC2, Phantom Stealer, Aurora Stealer, Luca Stealer, and Formbook, often observed in post-compromise phases of campaigns like FortiBleed.
This rule detects network connections to phishing pages hosted on the workers.dev domain that are attempting to interact with EvilTokens device code API endpoints. These pages are known to implement developer hotkey prevention (F12 blocked, context menu disabled) to hinder in-browser analysis, indicating malicious intent.
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