Michael Fajkus
@MilesDysonCompletionist
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27 detections
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Threat hunting query designed to identify suspicious FortiGate SSL-VPN and administrative authentication activity that may indicate credential abuse following the FortiBleed 2026 credential exposure campaign.
This hunt focuses on post-exposure behavior rather than vulnerability exploitation and combines multiple hunting hypotheses, including:
- Previously unseen user/IP combinations
- Multiple users authenticating from the same source IP
- Single users authenticating from multiple source IPs
- Rapid country changes resembling impossible-travel scenarios
- Administrative account creation or modification
- Firewall and VPN configuration changes
- Potential tunneling or proxy activity associated with post-compromise operations
The objective is to identify unauthorized access resulting from exposed FortiGate administrator credentials or SSL-VPN credentials.
This query is intended as a hunting starting point and should be adapted to local FortiGate log formats, parser mappings, enrichment sources and operational requirements.
This hunt focuses on post-exposure behavior rather than vulnerability exploitation and combines multiple hunting hypotheses, including:
- Previously unseen user/IP combinations
- Multiple users authenticating from the same source IP
- Single users authenticating from multiple source IPs
- Rapid country changes resembling impossible-travel scenarios
- Administrative account creation or modification
- Firewall and VPN configuration changes
- Potential tunneling or proxy activity associated with post-compromise operations
The objective is to identify unauthorized access resulting from exposed FortiGate administrator credentials or SSL-VPN credentials.
This query is intended as a hunting starting point and should be adapted to local FortiGate log formats, parser mappings, enrichment sources and operational requirements.
Detects potential abuse of LOLBAS techniques (e.g., WerFaultSecure.exe, rundll32.exe, comsvcs.dll) associated with EDR-Freeze attacks. These attacks suspend EDR or AV processes by exploiting Windows Error Reporting to create a race condition, leaving the system unmonitored.
The rule triggers when a known LOLBAS executable is run and the device stops reporting telemetry, with no legitimate shutdown or logoff activity recorded, suggesting the endpoint security agent may have been suspended.
The rule triggers when a known LOLBAS executable is run and the device stops reporting telemetry, with no legitimate shutdown or logoff activity recorded, suggesting the endpoint security agent may have been suspended.
Detects multiple Event ID 4648 logon attempts using the same target account but from different source accounts within a short time window. This behavior may indicate lateral movement, credential stuffing, or misuse of shared credentials. By correlating explicit credential use across users, it helps identify possible compromise or abuse of privileged accounts.
Detects repeated denied UAC elevation attempts (UAC "prompt storms") initiated by the same process within a short time frame.
This detection is based entirely on Microsoft Defender for Endpoint (MDE) telemetry from DeviceProcessEvents and is useful in environments where traditional SecurityEvent logs (e.g. Event ID 4688) are unavailable or not ingested.
It identifies patterns where a process consistently triggers `consent.exe` (the UAC prompt), but no elevated child process follows — indicating the prompt was denied or ignored.
This is particularly useful for detecting UAC bombing attacks, where a malicious process tries to overwhelm the user with repeated elevation prompts to bypass security friction.
This detection is based entirely on Microsoft Defender for Endpoint (MDE) telemetry from DeviceProcessEvents and is useful in environments where traditional SecurityEvent logs (e.g. Event ID 4688) are unavailable or not ingested.
It identifies patterns where a process consistently triggers `consent.exe` (the UAC prompt), but no elevated child process follows — indicating the prompt was denied or ignored.
This is particularly useful for detecting UAC bombing attacks, where a malicious process tries to overwhelm the user with repeated elevation prompts to bypass security friction.
Detects multiple denied or failed multi-factor authentication (MFA) prompts for a single user within a short time window. This pattern is commonly associated with MFA fatigue or push bombing attacks, where an attacker attempts to trick the user into approving an MFA request by spamming prompts repeatedly.
This detection uses Azure AD sign-in logs and does not require asset inventory or conditional access policies to be effective.
This detection uses Azure AD sign-in logs and does not require asset inventory or conditional access policies to be effective.
Detects activity related to high-value (VIP) accounts, including:
- Azure AD account modifications
- Conditional Access policy changes affecting the user
- Role assignment changes
- Mailbox rule creation/modification
- Successful sign-ins
Useful for tracking executive account abuse, targeted attacks, or policy misconfigurations.
- Azure AD account modifications
- Conditional Access policy changes affecting the user
- Role assignment changes
- Mailbox rule creation/modification
- Successful sign-ins
Useful for tracking executive account abuse, targeted attacks, or policy misconfigurations.
Detects potential misuse of AI model APIs by correlating process creation, network activity, and non-standard AI service ports.
Covers Ollama, OpenAI, Azure OpenAI, Anthropic, Google Gemini, Mistral, Cohere, Copilot, OpenRouter, Together, and Perplexity.
Covers Ollama, OpenAI, Azure OpenAI, Anthropic, Google Gemini, Mistral, Cohere, Copilot, OpenRouter, Together, and Perplexity.
This detection identifies attempts to disable Microsoft Defender Antivirus or bypass its protection mechanisms such as Tamper Protection or Real-Time Protection.
It leverages signals from Microsoft Defender for Endpoint (via DeviceEvents) as well as Windows Security Events (e.g., Event ID 5001 and 5004), which are triggered when antivirus services are modified or stopped.
Such behavior is commonly associated with defense evasion techniques used by threat actors or unauthorized administrative actions and should be investigated immediately.
It leverages signals from Microsoft Defender for Endpoint (via DeviceEvents) as well as Windows Security Events (e.g., Event ID 5001 and 5004), which are triggered when antivirus services are modified or stopped.
Such behavior is commonly associated with defense evasion techniques used by threat actors or unauthorized administrative actions and should be investigated immediately.
Detects potential GTFOBins abuse on Linux systems where a root shell is spawned by a suspicious parent process (e.g., find, perl, vim, tar, etc.).
This rule relies on DeviceProcessEvents in Microsoft Defender XDR and is intended for environments where Auditd, Sysmon for Linux, or similar native logging is not available.
Note: This detection does not cover all GTFOBins. It focuses specifically on cases where:
- A root-owned shell is spawned
- The parent process is known to be capable of shell escape or privilege abuse
- The child command appears interactive or escape-like
It does not detect:
- Non-shell-based GTFOBin techniques (e.g., file exfiltration via scp, curl, etc.)
- GTFOBin usage that doesn't result in a new shell (e.g., privilege escalation via
misconfigured capabilities)
- Abuse of GTFOBins run under non-root accounts
The query includes logic to detect both high-signal exploitation patterns and suspicious shell spawns, while excluding common false positives (e.g., package post-install scripts and benign environment checks).
This rule relies on DeviceProcessEvents in Microsoft Defender XDR and is intended for environments where Auditd, Sysmon for Linux, or similar native logging is not available.
Note: This detection does not cover all GTFOBins. It focuses specifically on cases where:
- A root-owned shell is spawned
- The parent process is known to be capable of shell escape or privilege abuse
- The child command appears interactive or escape-like
It does not detect:
- Non-shell-based GTFOBin techniques (e.g., file exfiltration via scp, curl, etc.)
- GTFOBin usage that doesn't result in a new shell (e.g., privilege escalation via
misconfigured capabilities)
- Abuse of GTFOBins run under non-root accounts
The query includes logic to detect both high-signal exploitation patterns and suspicious shell spawns, while excluding common false positives (e.g., package post-install scripts and benign environment checks).
Detects suspicious downloads or fetches of common privilege-escalation tools such as winPEAS, linPEAS, PowerUp, Seatbelt, SharpUp, WinPwn, PrivescCheck, Sherlock, Watson, BeRoot, LinEnum, LSE/LES, Linux Exploit Suggester, pspy, or GTFObins. These tools are often used by adversaries after initial access to enumerate the environment and attempt local privilege escalation.
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