Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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The analytic detects the use of PowerShell commands to copy the SAM, SYSTEM, or SECURITY hives, which are critical for credential theft. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to capture and analyze the full command executed. This activity is significant as it indicates an attempt to exfiltrate sensitive registry hives for offline password cracking. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to credentials, enabling further compromise of the system and potential lateral movement within the network.
The analytic detects the use of the Enable-PSRemoting cmdlet, which allows PowerShell remoting on a local or remote computer. This detection leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode 4104) to identify when this cmdlet is executed. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it can indicate an attacker enabling remote command execution capabilities on a compromised system. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to take control of the system remotely, execute commands, and potentially pivot to other systems within the network, leading to further compromise and lateral movement.
This analytic detects the usage of PowerShell to delete its command history file, which may indicate an attempt to evade detection by removing evidence of executed commands. PowerShell stores command history in ConsoleHost_history.txt under the user’s profile directory. Adversaries or malicious scripts may delete this file using Remove-Item, del, or similar commands. This detection focuses on file deletion events targeting the history file, correlating them with recent PowerShell activity. While legitimate users may occasionally clear history, frequent or automated deletions should be investigated for potential defense evasion or post-exploitation cleanup activities.
The following analytic detects the import of Windows PowerShell Applocker cmdlets, specifically identifying the use of "Import-Module Applocker" and "Set-AppLockerPolicy" with an XML policy. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode 4104) to capture and analyze script block text. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to enforce restrictive Applocker policies, potentially used by malware like Azorult to disable antivirus products. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to bypass security controls, leading to further system compromise and persistence.
This analytic detects the execution of PowerView PowerShell cmdlets `Get-ObjectAcl` or `Get-DomainObjectAcl`, which are used to enumerate Access Control List (ACL) permissions for Active Directory objects. It leverages Event ID 4104 from PowerShell Script Block Logging to identify this activity. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an attempt to discover weak permissions in Active Directory, potentially leading to privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, attackers could exploit these permissions to gain unauthorized access or escalate their privileges within the network.
This analytic detects suspicious PowerShell script execution involving the cryptography namespace via EventCode 4104. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging to identify scripts using cryptographic functions, excluding common hashes like SHA and MD5. This activity is significant as it is often associated with malware that decrypts or decodes additional malicious payloads. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute further code, escalate privileges, or establish persistence within the environment. Analysts should investigate the parent process, decrypted data, network connections, and the user executing the script.
This analytic detects suspicious PowerShell commands that attempt to delete the Windows Defender directory. It specifically looks for PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode 4104) entries containing "rmdir" and targeting paths related to "\Microsoft\Windows Defender". Such activity is critical as it suggests an adversary is trying to disable or corrupt Windows Defender, which is a key security component. If successful, this could allow an attacker to bypass endpoint protection and facilitate further malicious activities without detection.
The analytic detects attempts to tamper with AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) using PowerShell reflection. It specifically looks for PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) entries that contain `system.management.automation.amsi`. This activity is a strong indicator of an adversary trying to bypass AMSI, a critical security feature designed to detect and block malicious scripts. A successful bypass could allow malicious code to execute undetected, potentially leading to system compromise and data exfiltration.
The analytic detects the execution of the `Get-DomainController` commandlet using PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This commandlet is part of PowerView, a tool often used for domain enumeration. The detection leverages script block text to identify this specific activity. Monitoring this behavior is crucial as it may indicate an adversary or Red Team performing reconnaissance to map out domain controllers. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to further domain enumeration, potentially exposing sensitive information and aiding in lateral movement within the network.
The following analytic detects the addition of a DLL to the Windows Global Assembly Cache (GAC) using PowerShell. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging to identify commands containing "system.enterpriseservices.internal.publish". This activity is significant because adding a DLL to the GAC allows it to be shared across multiple applications, potentially enabling an adversary to execute malicious code system-wide. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to widespread code execution, privilege escalation, and persistent access across the operating system, posing a severe security risk.
The analytic detects the execution of the `Get-DomainTrust` command, likely from PowerView, using PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This method captures the full command sent to PowerShell, allowing for detailed inspection. Identifying this activity is significant because it may indicate an attempt to gather domain trust information, which is often a precursor to lateral movement or privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this activity could enable an attacker to map trust relationships within the domain, potentially leading to further exploitation and compromise of additional systems.
This analytic detects the execution of the `Get-AdGroup` PowerShell cmdlet using PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This cmdlet is used to enumerate all domain groups, which adversaries may exploit for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it can indicate reconnaissance efforts within the network. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to further exploitation, such as privilege escalation or lateral movement, by providing attackers with detailed information about the domain's group structure.
The analytic detects a PowerShell script that enumerates camera devices on the targeted host. This detection leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging, specifically looking for commands querying Win32_PnPEntity for camera-related information. This activity is significant as it is commonly observed in DCRat malware, which collects camera data to send to its command-and-control server. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate an attempt to gather sensitive visual information from the host, potentially leading to privacy breaches or further exploitation.
The following analytic detects the execution of the `Get-WMIObject Win32_Group` command using PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This method captures the full command sent to PowerShell, allowing for detailed analysis. Identifying group information on an endpoint is not inherently malicious but can be suspicious based on context such as time, endpoint, and user. This activity is significant as it may indicate reconnaissance efforts by an attacker. If confirmed malicious, it could lead to further enumeration and potential lateral movement within the network.
The analytic detects the execution of the `Get-AdComputer` PowerShell commandlet using PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This detection leverages script block text to identify when this commandlet is run. The `Get-AdComputer` commandlet is significant as it can be used by adversaries to enumerate all domain computers, aiding in situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to map the network, identify targets, and plan further attacks, potentially leading to unauthorized access and data exfiltration.
This analytic detects the execution of the PowerView PowerShell cmdlet `Get-NetComputer` when it is used to query Active Directory for specific user account details such as "samaccountname," "accountexpires," "lastlogon," "lastlogoff," "pwdlastset," or "logoncount." It leverages Event ID 4104 from PowerShell Script Block Logging to identify this activity. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an attempt to gather user account information, which is often a precursor to further malicious actions like unauthorized access, privilege escalation, or lateral movement within the network.
The analytic detects the use of PowerShell's Invoke-RestMethod cmdlet to collect geolocation data from ipinfo.io or IP address information from api.ipify.org. This behavior leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging to identify scripts that gather external IP information and potential geolocation data. This activity is significant as it may indicate reconnaissance efforts, where threat actors are attempting to determine the geographical location or network details of a compromised system. While some legitimate software may use these services, this pattern is commonly observed in malware and post-exploitation toolkits like those used by Water Gamayun threat actors.
The analytic detects the execution of the PowerView PowerShell cmdlet Get-NetUser with the -PreauthNotRequire parameter, leveraging Event ID 4104. This method identifies attempts to query Active Directory user accounts that do not require Kerberos preauthentication. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it can indicate reconnaissance efforts by an attacker to identify potentially vulnerable accounts. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to further exploitation, such as unauthorized access or privilege escalation within the network.
This analytic detects the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet with the `DS_Group` parameter via PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This method leverages WMI to query all domain groups. Monitoring this activity is crucial as adversaries and Red Teams may use it for domain group enumeration, aiding in situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to map out the domain structure, potentially leading to further exploitation and privilege escalation within the network.
This analytic detects the enabling of PowerShell Web Access through PowerShell commands. It specifically looks for PowerShell script block logging (EventCode 4104) that indicates the execution of `Install-WindowsFeature` with the `WindowsPowerShellWebAccess` parameter, or the use of `Install-PswaWebApplication` or `Add-PswaAuthorizationRule`. Enabling PowerShell Web Access can allow remote execution of PowerShell commands, which attackers could leverage for unauthorized system access.
The analytic detects the execution of the `Invoke-WmiMethod` commandlet with parameters used to start a process on a remote endpoint via WMI, leveraging PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This method identifies specific script block text patterns associated with remote process instantiation. This activity is significant as it may indicate lateral movement or remote code execution attempts by adversaries. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code on remote systems, potentially leading to further compromise and persistence within the network.
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