Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
2,087 detections
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1
Detects the execution of the Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer (cmstp.exe) with command-line arguments that are commonly used to bypass User Account Control (UAC) and execute malicious INF files. This technique is leveraged by malware like Katz Stealer.
This detection rule identifies processes that call the 'GlobalMemoryStatusEx' Windows API. This behavior is a known sandbox evasion technique used by malware, including SLOW#TEMPEST, to check the system's physical memory size before executing a malicious payload. The rule is tuned to focus on unsigned processes or those running from non-standard locations and with low host prevalence.
Detects PowerShell being executed with the '-WindowStyle Hidden' flag from a Windows Scripting Host parent process (wscript.exe or cscript.exe). This is a common technique used by malware, such as Katz Stealer, to run malicious scripts stealthily after being dropped by JavaScript.
Detects the creation of specific text files in the AppData directory, which is a known behavior of the Katz Stealer malware after it successfully decrypts and dumps browser master keys.
This rule detects a specific DLL hash (3d3837eb69c3b072fdfc915468cbc8a83bb0db7babd5f7863bdf81213045023c) associated with the SLOW#TEMPEST campaign. This file is the loader DLL responsible for executing the malware's payload. The rule looks for this hash in both executed processes and files on disk.
This rule detects a specific DLL hash (3583cc881cb077f97422b9729075c9465f0f8f94647b746ee7fa049c4970a978) associated with the SLOW#TEMPEST campaign. This file is a DLL that contains an encrypted payload. The rule searches for this hash in both executed processes and files on disk.
The analytic detects the creation of a new scheduled task with the highest execution privileges via Schtasks.exe. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) logs to monitor for specific command-line parameters ('/rl' and 'highest') in schtasks.exe executions. This activity is significant as it is commonly used in AsyncRAT attacks for persistence and privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to maintain persistent access and execute tasks with elevated privileges, potentially leading to unauthorized system access and data breaches.
The following analytic identifies the execution of the Windows shutdown command via the command line interface. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because attackers may use the shutdown command to erase tracks, cause disruption, or ensure changes take effect after installing backdoors. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to system downtime, denial of service, or evasion of security tools, impacting the overall security posture of the network.
The following analytic detects the execution of the runas.exe process with administrator user options. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions and process details. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to gain elevated privileges, a common tactic in privilege escalation and lateral movement. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute commands with higher privileges, potentially leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the target host.
This rule detects suspicious PowerShell script execution that attempts to identify installed anti-virus products using WMI or PowerShell commands. It specifically looks for PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode 4104) entries containing keywords like "SELECT," "WMIC," "AntiVirusProduct," or "AntiSpywareProduct." This activity is often performed by malware and APT actors to map security applications for evasion purposes, potentially leading to the disabling or bypassing of security measures.
This analytic identifies the execution of `ping` commands with specific arguments that indicate an attempt to delay malicious code execution. It looks for `ping` commands containing `-n` (number of echo requests), `Nul` (redirecting output to NUL device), and redirection operators (`>`, `&>`). This technique is often used by adversaries to evade detection or sandbox analysis by introducing delays, making it harder to detect and analyze their activities.
The analytic identifies the execution of the Windows command line to reboot a host machine using "shutdown.exe" with specific parameters. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant as it is often associated with advanced persistent threats (APTs) and remote access trojans (RATs) like dcrat, which may use system reboots to disrupt operations, aid in system destruction, or inhibit recovery. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to system downtime, data loss, or hindered incident response efforts.
The analytic detects the use of 'schtasks.exe' to create a scheduled task on a remote system, indicating potential lateral movement or remote code execution. It leverages process data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific command-line arguments and flags. This activity is significant as it may signify an adversary's attempt to persist or execute code remotely. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain access, execute arbitrary commands, or further infiltrate the network, posing a severe security risk.
Detects unauthorized or suspicious USB device connections based on manufacturer, product, and device ID indicators.
Primary focus is on known identifiers associated with IP-KVM devices. The search utilizes the CrowdStrike event feed, specifically focuses on the following event types:
- DcUsbDeviceConnected
- DcUsbDeviceDisconnected
- DcUsbDeviceBlocked
The device identifiers are sourced from publicly available sources (primarily GitHub).
Primary focus is on known identifiers associated with IP-KVM devices. The search utilizes the CrowdStrike event feed, specifically focuses on the following event types:
- DcUsbDeviceConnected
- DcUsbDeviceDisconnected
- DcUsbDeviceBlocked
The device identifiers are sourced from publicly available sources (primarily GitHub).
This analytic processes and enriches alerts from CrowdStrike Falcon Event Stream, specifically `DetectionSummaryEvent` and `IdpDetectionSummaryEvent`. It normalizes fields such as user, destination, severity, and MITRE ATT&CK information. The rule dynamically generates drilldown links and constructs a descriptive title and message for each alert. It is designed to provide a standardized view of various CrowdStrike detections, including NGAV, Intel Detection, and Identity Protection alerts, ensuring proper risk scoring and analyst queue population.
Detects the creation of the Tor process from a specific directory using command line arguments indicative of controlling and logging ports.
KQL Query
The analytic identifies instances where the Windows Explorer process (explorer.exe) is executed with a URL in its command line. This behavior is uncommon and suspicious, as adversaries may abuse explorer.exe to open URLs with the default browser to download and execute malicious payloads. This detection leverages process execution logs from EDR agents.
The following analytic detects instances of DLLHost.exe running without command line arguments while establishing a network connection. This behavior is identified using Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process execution and network activity data. It is significant because DLLHost.exe typically runs with specific arguments, and its absence can indicate malicious activity, such as Cobalt Strike usage. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute code, move laterally, or exfiltrate data, posing a severe threat to the network's security.
This analytic identifies a suspicious process that is recursively deleting executable files on a compromised host. It leverages Sysmon Event Codes 23 (File Delete) and 26 (File Delete logged) to detect this activity by monitoring for a high volume of deletions or overwrites of files with extensions like .exe, .sys, and .dll within a short timeframe. This behavior is significant as it is commonly associated with destructive malware such as CaddyWiper, DoubleZero, and SwiftSlicer, which aim to make file recovery impossible. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to significant data loss and system instability, severely impacting business operations.
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