Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

2,146 detections

This rule detects network connections to Azure infrastructure (azurewebsites.net) that utilize specific API paths associated with the MiniJunk C2 framework. The paths include '/api/app/check', '/api/app/update', and '/api/app/comment', which are indicative of command and control beaconing activity.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
003
Detects successful outbound network connections to common botnet-associated remote ports (6667, 6697, 8006, 27374, 27375). The rule aggregates these connections by device to identify endpoints communicating with multiple distinct remote IP addresses, a behavior often indicative of botnet participation or command and control activity.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
Bharat Cyber Guardians
4 months ago
000
Detects anomalous device network activity involving 5G-specific protocol ports (e.g., GTP-U, SIP). The rule aggregates unique port usage per device over 1-hour intervals to identify potential network reconnaissance, scanning, or unauthorized control plane communication.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
Bharat Cyber Guardians
4 months ago
000
This rule detects network connections from internal devices to identified APT Command and Control (C2) IP address ranges over common ports (8080, 443, 21, 22, 23, 25, 445). This traffic pattern is indicative of unauthorized external communication commonly associated with malware or adversary activity.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
Bharat Cyber Guardians
4 months ago
000
Detects unusual connections from IT subnets to known OT/ICS protocol ports (Modbus:502, DNP3:20000, EtherNet/IP:44818, S7Comm:102, OPC UA:4840, IEC 60870-5-104:2404, BACnet/IP:18245) within private IP ranges. This rule specifically looks for a high volume of connections (more than 5) from a single source IP to different destination IPs on these OT ports, excluding traffic from Rockwell devices, which might indicate lateral movement or reconnaissance by threat actors like TheGentlemen, who have historically targeted OT environments.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
005
Identifies HTTP requests containing the custom 'X-Antibot-Token' header used by the EvilTokens phishing kit to validate interactions and evade automated scanners. This header is highly specific to the EvilTokens PhaaS and its presence indicates malicious activity.
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Bryant Smith@flowstate
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Detections.ai Community
5 months ago
3017
Detects access to underground markets selling initial access to compromised networks
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Darshan Thummar@Mighty
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
006
This rule detects DNS queries to known malicious domains associated with various APT groups and ransomware families. The domains are hardcoded indicators of compromise (IOCs) and their resolution suggests potential compromise or communication with adversary infrastructure.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
004
This rule detects network connections to FTP servers (port 21) where the remote URL contains keywords associated with NetWare or Novell, along with suspicious whitespace patterns. This could indicate an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability related to whitespace handling in NetWare FTP servers, potentially the 'Squidbleed' vulnerability.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
Bharat Cyber Guardians
4 months ago
000
This rule identifies HTTP requests containing specific URL affiliate tracking parameters associated with the "Borrowed Trust" SEO poisoning campaign. The campaign utilizes these parameters to monetize its activities, often redirecting users to gambling sites. Detection is based on the presence of known affiliate codes in `RemoteUrl` from `DeviceNetworkEvents` or `RequestURL` from `CommonSecurityLog` (proxy/firewall logs).
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Ethan Andrews@eandrews
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Federal Signal Detections
5 months ago
5011
Detects injection of malicious scripts into legitimate websites for watering hole attacks
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Darshan Thummar@Mighty
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Detections.ai Community
5 months ago
006
This rule detects DNS queries to known malicious domains associated with various APT groups and ransomware families. The domains are hardcoded indicators of compromise (IOCs) and their resolution suggests potential compromise or communication with adversary infrastructure.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
Bharat Cyber Guardians
4 months ago
103
Detects audio capture and exfiltration via RTP media streams
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Darshan Thummar@Mighty
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Detections.ai Community
5 months ago
007
Detects use of forged web credentials for unauthorized application access
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Darshan Thummar@Mighty
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Detections.ai Community
5 months ago
207
Detects phishing links with credential harvesting redirects
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Darshan Thummar@Mighty
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
003
Detects phishing links with credential harvesting redirects
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Darshan Thummar@Mighty
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
003
This rule detects successful exploitation attempts against the Ivanti Sentry vulnerability CVE-2026-10520, which is a pre-authentication OS command injection. It specifically looks for HTTP 200 OK responses to requests targeting the vulnerable configuration endpoint '/mics/api/v2/sentry/mics-config/handleMessage'. A 200 OK status indicates that the request was successfully processed, suggesting a potential successful command injection.
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Ethan Andrews@eandrews
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Federal Signal Detections
5 months ago
1016
Detects upload of backdoored container images to internal registries
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Darshan Thummar@Mighty
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Detections.ai Community
5 months ago
005
Detects TCP SYN flood denial of service attacks targeting internal hosts
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Darshan Thummar@Mighty
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Detections.ai Community
5 months ago
005
Detects Shellshock bash CGI exploitation attempts
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Darshan Thummar@Mighty
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
002
This rule detects potential internal network scanning activity by identifying a single source IP address that communicates with 15 or more distinct internal destination IP addresses within a 5-minute time window. This behavior is often indicative of reconnaissance efforts by an attacker attempting to map out the internal network.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
Bharat Cyber Guardians
5 months ago
207
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