Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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The analytic detects the execution of the `Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy` PowerShell cmdlet, which is used to retrieve the password policy in a Windows domain. This detection leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the specific command execution. Monitoring this activity is significant as it can indicate an attempt to gather domain policy information, which is often a precursor to further malicious actions. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to understand password policies, aiding in password attacks or further domain enumeration.
The analytic detects the execution of the `Get-DomainUser` cmdlet using PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This cmdlet is part of PowerView, a tool often used for domain enumeration. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it may indicate an adversary's attempt to gather information about domain users, which is a common step in Active Directory Discovery. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to further reconnaissance and potential exploitation of domain resources.
The analytic detects the use of the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator in PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to query Active Directory for domain organizational units. This activity indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries to gain situational awareness of the domain structure, which could lead to further exploitation, such as privilege escalation or lateral movement within the network.
The following analytic detects a suspicious registry modification aimed at disabling Windows hotkeys for native applications. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, focusing on specific registry paths and values indicative of this behavior. This activity is significant as it can impair an analyst's ability to use essential tools like Task Manager and Command Prompt, hindering incident response efforts. If confirmed malicious, this technique can allow an attacker to maintain persistence and evade detection, complicating the remediation process.
The analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry that disable SmartScreen protection. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to registry paths associated with SmartScreen settings. This activity is significant because SmartScreen provides an early warning system against phishing and malware. Disabling it can indicate malicious intent, often seen in Remote Access Trojans (RATs) to evade detection while downloading additional payloads. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow attackers to bypass security measures, increasing the risk of successful phishing attacks and malware infections.
The following analytic detects the execution of the `Get-AdUser` PowerShell cmdlet, which is used to enumerate all domain users. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify instances where this command is executed with a filter. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt by adversaries or Red Teams to gather information about domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to further reconnaissance and potential exploitation of user accounts within the domain.
This analytic detects the execution of suspicious PowerShell commands associated with Meterpreter modules, such as "MSF.Powershell" and "MSF.Powershell.Meterpreter". It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to capture and analyze the full command sent to PowerShell. This activity is significant as it indicates potential post-exploitation actions, including credential dumping and persistence mechanisms. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain extensive control over the compromised system, escalate privileges, and maintain long-term access, posing a severe threat to the environment.
The analytic detects the execution of the `Find-InterestingDomainAcl` cmdlet, which is part of the PowerView toolkit. This cmdlet is used to identify misconfigured or unusual Access Control Lists (ACLs) within a domain. Adversaries may use this to find privilege escalation opportunities or weak security configurations in Active Directory, potentially leading to unauthorized access or further exploitation.
The following analytic identifies instances where three or more distinct registry modification events associated with MITRE ATT&CK Technique T1112 are detected. It leverages data from the Risk data model in Splunk, focusing on registry-related sources and MITRE technique annotations. This activity is significant because multiple registry modifications can indicate an attempt to persist, hide malicious configurations, or erase forensic evidence. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to maintain persistent access, execute malicious code, and evade detection, posing a severe threat to the integrity and security of the affected host.
The following analytic detects suspicious modifications to the Windows registry keys related to file compression color and information tips. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the "ShowCompColor" and "ShowInfoTip" values under the "Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Advanced" path. This activity is significant as it was observed in the Hermetic Wiper malware, indicating potential malicious intent to alter file attributes and user interface elements. If confirmed malicious, this could signify an attempt to manipulate file visibility and deceive users, potentially aiding in further malicious activities.
This analytic detects Microsoft Office applications dropping or creating executables or scripts on a Windows OS. It leverages process creation and file system events from the Endpoint data model to identify Office applications like Word or Excel generating files with extensions such as ".exe", ".dll", or ".ps1". This behavior is significant as it is often associated with spear-phishing attacks where malicious files are dropped to compromise the host. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to code execution, privilege escalation, or persistent access, posing a severe threat to the environment.
The analytic detects the use of the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator in PowerShell to query Active Directory for root domain linked policies. This activity is identified by leveraging PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) and looking for specific keywords like `[adsisearcher]`, `SearchRooT`, and `gplink`. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an attempt by adversaries or Red Teams to gain situational awareness and perform Active Directory Discovery, potentially aiding in further exploitation or lateral movement within the network.
This analytic detects the execution of a COM CLSID through PowerShell. It specifically looks for PowerShell script block logs (EventCode 4104) containing the string "*CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromCLSID*". This activity is significant because adversaries and malware, such as Conti ransomware, commonly use COM object creation via PowerShell for purposes like privilege escalation or bypassing User Account Control (UAC). Successful exploitation of this technique could lead to elevated privileges or persistence within the environment, posing a significant security risk.
The following analytic detects the execution of VBScript using the wscript.exe application. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and command-line telemetry. This activity is significant because wscript.exe is typically not used to execute VBScript, which is usually associated with cscript.exe. This deviation can indicate an attempt to evade traditional process monitoring and antivirus defenses. If confirmed malicious, this technique could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.
The analytic detects the execution of the `Get-DomainOU` cmdlet, which is part of the PowerView toolkit. This cmdlet is used for Windows domain enumeration, specifically to gather information about organizational units within Active Directory. Adversaries may use this to map the domain structure, aiding in further exploitation, lateral movement, or privilege escalation. The detection leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104).
The analytic detects the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` cmdlet with the `DS_User` class parameter via PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). It identifies attempts to query all domain users using WMI. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary or Red Team operation attempting to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to further reconnaissance, enabling attackers to map out the network and identify potential targets for privilege escalation or lateral movement.
This analytic detects attempts to modify or add a Component Object Model (COM) entry to the InProcServer32 path within the registry using PowerShell. It leverages PowerShell ScriptBlock Logging (EventCode 4104) to identify suspicious script blocks that target the InProcServer32 registry path. This activity is significant because modifying COM objects can be used for persistence or privilege escalation by attackers. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code or maintain persistent access to the compromised system, posing a severe security risk.
Detects the execution of PowerShell scripts that use the 'Start-NetEventSession' cmdlet to initiate network event and packet capture. This activity can be leveraged by adversaries to sniff network traffic, potentially capturing sensitive information like user credentials, especially when transmitted over unencrypted protocols. This technique is often used for information gathering during an operation.
Detects when a PowerShell script uses the 'New-NetFirewallRule' cmdlet to create a new firewall rule with an 'Allow' action. This activity can indicate an adversary attempting to bypass host-based firewalls to enable command and control, lateral movement, or data exfiltration.
Detects the use of the 'Get-ADComputer' cmdlet with specific parameters or LDAP filters to identify systems configured for unconstrained delegation. This activity is often performed by adversaries during the reconnaissance phase to find targets for Kerberos-based attacks like credential theft.
Detects the execution of AADInternals PowerShell cmdlets. AADInternals is a tool used for administering Azure AD and Office 365, which can be abused by threat actors for various attacks including reconnaissance, credential access, and impact within Azure AD or Office 365 environments. The rule specifically looks for the unique "-AADInt" string prefix in cmdlet names.
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