Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects JavaScript used to fingerprint browser and client configurations
This rule detects potential network port scanning activity by identifying a single source IP address attempting to connect to 10 or more distinct destination ports on a single destination IP address within a 5-minute window. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to discover open services on a target host.
This rule detects an unusually high number of network connection events originating from a single device to a remote IP address within a one-minute interval. This behavior can be indicative of various malicious activities, including network scanning, port scanning, or a denial-of-service (DoS) attempt. It could also signal a compromised host attempting to establish numerous connections for command and control, data exfiltration, or further reconnaissance.
Detects compromised websites being abused as C2 relay infrastructure
Detects DNS queries resolving privnote.com. This self-destructing message service is actively abused by threat actors like UNC3753 to transmit malicious installation links and commands to compromised users while bypassing traditional chat and email filtering.
Detects DNS over HTTPS (DoH) traffic originating directly from edge appliances (e.g., to 8.8.8.8 on port 443), which VerdantBamboo uses to obscure BRICKSTORM C2 resolution.
This rule detects network connections to suspicious domains or IP addresses associated with potentially compromised or malicious VPN infrastructure. Specifically, it looks for connections to 'vpn-fortinet.com', 'ivanti-vpn.org', 'forticlient-vpn.de', or the IP address '194.76.226.93'. These indicators may suggest attempts to establish command and control, exfiltrate data, or engage in other malicious activities via compromised VPN services.
Detects network requests associated with FallSpy, an Android spyware utilized by the Russia-nexus threat group GREYVIBE. FallSpy is deployed via fake persona lures and spoofed applications to harvest critical intelligence. While the original YARA rule targets file-based artifacts (e.g., class names like DataCollectorWork), this Sigma rule adapts the logic to focus on the highly reliable exfiltration URL parameters observable in proxy and web gateway logs.
This rule detects potential HTTP/2 Rapid Reset or similar denial-of-service (DoS) attacks by identifying an unusually high number of streams and total requests within a single HTTP/2 network connection over a one-minute interval. Such behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to exhaust server resources by rapidly opening and closing streams.
Detects the specific User-Agent string 'NSIS_InetLoad (Mozilla)' associated with the SessionGate multi-stage loader during its command and control (C2) check-ins. SessionGate is delivered via impersonated open-source tooling websites and gated TDS redirection chains.
This rule detects an unusually high number of network connection events originating from a single device to a remote IP address within a one-minute interval. This behavior can be indicative of various malicious activities, including network scanning, port scanning, or a denial-of-service (DoS) attempt. It could also signal a compromised host attempting to establish numerous connections for command and control, data exfiltration, or further reconnaissance.
This rule detects network connections originating from clients using a specific User-Agent string associated with the SessionGate malware. The User-Agent string 'NSIS_InetLoad' combined with 'Mozilla' is indicative of SessionGate C2 check-ins, leveraging the NSIS (Nullsoft Scriptable Install System) InetLoad plugin. The rule searches across common proxy and web logs for this pattern.
Detects web requests containing the specific user-agent or custom secret headers used by the Moika campaign beacon to retrieve its stage 2 payload.
Correlates phishing email delivery with subsequent communication to attacker-controlled domains.
This rule identifies potential network scanning or high-volume communication by detecting a large number of connections (50 or more) between a single source IP and a single destination IP within a 5-minute time window. It aggregates connection details such as total connections, sent bytes, and received bytes from the CommonSecurityLog.
KQL Query
This rule detects potential HTTP/2 Rapid Reset or similar denial-of-service (DoS) attacks by identifying an unusually high number of streams and total requests within a single HTTP/2 network connection over a one-minute interval. Such behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to exhaust server resources by rapidly opening and closing streams.
This rule detects a high number of distinct URLs and total network connections originating from a single remote IP address within a one-minute time window. This behavior can be indicative of various malicious activities such as data exfiltration, command and control (C2) communication, or network scanning. The threshold for distinct URLs is set to greater than 100 and total connections greater than 500.
Detects web requests containing the specific user-agent or custom secret headers used by the Moika campaign beacon to retrieve its stage 2 payload.
Detects HTTP requests containing specific URL query parameter combinations (`ia=` and `df=`) or POST bodies containing `a=iz&b=`, which are unique to the JS.MonoGlyphRAT check-in and beaconing protocol.
Detects outbound network connections from web server processes to steamcommunity.com, which is used by this malware to fetch steganographically encoded C2 payloads from profile comments.
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