Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects web traffic indicating client-side injection loading JavaScript from the known malicious domain hello-mywordl.info, which is associated with a WordPress malware campaign.
Detects outbound web requests or GitHub API interactions containing the specific description string "Miasma: The Spreading Blight". This string is used as a signature by the Miasma malware (a Shai-Hulud variant involved in the @redhat-cloud-services npm supply chain attack) when creating malicious GitHub repositories to exfiltrate stolen credentials.
Detects network connections or web requests to the specific malicious GitHub repository paths used to host the 5th and 6th stage payloads of the Miasma malware (a Shai-Hulud variant).
This rule detects unusual network connection patterns characterized by a high volume of connections to a remote IP address within a 5-minute window, combined with anomalous connection durations. Specifically, it flags scenarios where there are more than 1000 connections and either the 95th percentile of connection durations is very short (less than 50ms) or the 5th percentile of connection durations is very long (greater than 30000ms). These patterns can indicate activities such as network scanning, denial-of-service attempts, or command and control communication.
This rule detects exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2026-0300 in Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS. It identifies suspicious network connections to User-ID Authentication Portal ports (6081, 6082) from external IP addresses, excluding RFC1918 and loopback ranges. Additionally, it looks for a specific anomalous User-Agent string associated with the CL-STA-1132 threat actor, which has been observed during exploitation of this vulnerability.
Detects DNS requests or network connections to the typosquatted domain and hardcoded IP associated with the DAEMON Tools supply chain attack, as well as additional network relations tied to the installer.
Detects truncated 'whostmgrsession' cookies missing the comma delimiter, which is a necessary step for attackers to inject cleartext CRLF payloads into cPanel session files and bypass authentication. This rule specifically looks for the 'whostmgrsession' cookie in web or proxy logs where the cookie value matches a regex pattern indicating the absence of the expected comma delimiter, a characteristic of the CVE-2026-41940 exploitation.
Detects the generation of pre-authentication session cookies via intentionally failed login attempts to the `login_only` endpoint. This detects the initial staging phase of the CVE-2026-41940 exploit chain.
Detects DNS lookups and outbound network connections to known PhantomRaven command and control (C2) infrastructure, including specific domains and IP addresses. The rule also specifically identifies potential data exfiltration attempts to the '/mozbra.php' endpoint.
Detects the Node.js process making external DNS requests to api64.ipify.org, a behavior used by the PhantomRaven payload to discover the host's public IP address.
Detects DNS queries or network connections to known PhantomRaven Wave 5 command-and-control infrastructure (domains and IP addresses). This rule identifies communication with specific malicious domains and IP addresses associated with the PhantomRaven campaign, indicating potential compromise or attempted communication with adversary infrastructure.
CVE-2026-0300 Scanner Tool User-Agent
Cortex XDR
Detects the use of the CVE-2026-0300 scanner tool by its distinct User-Agent string attempting to identify vulnerable PAN-OS Captive Portals.
Detects the initial staging phase of the CVE-2026-41940 exploit chain, where an attacker intentionally generates a pre-authentication session file on the target server via failed POST requests to the login_only endpoint.
KQL Query
Detects process executions containing SSH tunneling or port forwarding parameters correlated with outbound network connections to external public IPs. This may indicate protocol tunneling for evasion or data exfiltration.
This rule detects outbound network connections from endpoints to specific, potentially suspicious, IPv4 address ranges (162.220.234.0/24 and 162.220.232.0/24). Such connections could indicate command and control (C2) activity, data exfiltration, or communication with malicious infrastructure.
For network requests to the GitHub API containing specific staging and fallback markers (LongLiveTheResistanceAgainstMachines or beautifulcastle) used by TeamPCP in the Bitwarden CLI campaign to retrieve C2 instructions.
Detects HTTP requests containing the custom 'X-Hacked-By' header with the value 'Nexus Team . Exploited By Erratic', which is associated with the Nexus Team's exploitation of CVE-2024-3721 against TBK DVR devices. This rule specifically looks for the unique header pattern used by this threat actor.
This rule detects network connections (both inbound and outbound) on TCP/UDP port 18789, excluding connections initiated by processes from well-known publishers like Microsoft, Apple, and Google. This port is not commonly used by legitimate applications and could indicate the presence of custom malware, command and control (C2) communication, or other unauthorized network activity.
This rule detects external brute-force attempts against firewall authentication mechanisms. It triggers when 15 or more failed login attempts from a single external IP address occur within a 15-minute window. The rule specifically filters for 'USER_LOGIN' events with a 'BLOCK' or 'FAIL' security result and excludes internal RFC1918 IP addresses to focus on external threats.
Detects DNS requests to the known DinDoor and CastleLoader C2 domain serialmenot[.]com, which is a multi-tenant infrastructure used by Iranian APT actors.
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