Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
2,146 detections
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Detects access to the claude.com open redirect endpoint pointing to external domains. Attackers can abuse this trusted domain to bypass ad validation and email filters to deliver malicious payloads, such as prompt injections.
Detects the presence of HTML tags within the URL query parameters of Claude chat application pre-fill URLs. Attackers can use this to embed invisible instructions (prompt injection) that the AI processes but the user does not see in the chat interface.
Detects DNS queries to Solana RPC endpoints associated with GlassWorm/ForceMemo blockchain-based C2. The malware queries up to 9 Solana RPC endpoints to retrieve C2 instructions from on-chain transaction memos. A Python process resolving any of these domains is anomalous outside of cryptocurrency development environments.
Detects network traffic matching the specific URI structure used by LeakNet for command-and-control beaconing. This behavior has been consistently observed across multiple LeakNet incidents following initial access.
This rule detects network connections or email URLs that contain domains associated with the 'ShinyHunters' threat group's infrastructure. The rule specifically looks for a predefined list of domains known to be used by ShinyHunters for phishing or other malicious activities. It correlates email URL information with device network events to identify potential compromise attempts.
This rule detects network connections to a predefined list of known Microstealer malicious domains. These domains are often associated with malware command and control (C2) infrastructure, phishing, or other malicious activities. Monitoring connections to such domains can help identify compromised systems or active malware infections.
Correlates phishing email delivery with subsequent communication to attacker-controlled domains.
Detects HTTP/HTTPS traffic where the User-Agent string is explicitly set to 'MicroStealer/1.0', which is used by the malware when communicating with Discord webhooks or its C2.
Detects command and control (C2) communication to a specific Telegram Bot API endpoint hardcoded in the LampoRAT malware. This activity is associated with the Boggy Serpens (MuddyWater) threat actor.
Detects C2 communication from Boggy Serpens (MuddyWater) backdoors like Nuso and BlackBeard, which use non-standard HTTP status codes (201, 202, 418) to receive commands from known C2 servers.
Detects potential data exfiltration by the BlackBeard backdoor, associated with Boggy Serpens (MuddyWater). The malware abuses the HTTP 'Expires' header in client requests to exfiltrate encrypted system data to its command and control server. The 'Expires' header is a standard response header, so its presence in a request is highly anomalous.
Detects web requests for specific JavaScript file names that are part of the DarkSword iOS exploit chain. The presence of these requests strongly suggests a device is being targeted with the exploit kit.
Detects the C2 communication of the Slopoly PowerShell backdoor, used by the Hive0163 group. It looks for specific HTTP POST requests containing a JSON body with characteristic keys.
This rule detects network traffic containing specific User-Agent strings used by the BurrowShell implant and the Rust-based keylogger to masquerade as legitimate Windows Update or browser traffic. These User-Agent strings are 'Windows-Update-Agent/10.0.10011.Client-Protocol/2.50' and 'Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; SecureNet/1.2)'.
This rule detects network connections to or from known suspicious IP addresses and requests to known suspicious domains. These indicators are often associated with command and control (C2) activity, malware distribution, or other malicious infrastructure.
Detects DNS queries for domains associated with an active adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing campaign targeting AWS credentials.
Detects the beaconing activity of the HeaconLoad Golang downloader, a component of the BoryptGrab campaign. This malware sends HTTP POST requests containing system information to the "/healthcheck" endpoint on port 8088.
This rule is based on a phishing method that abuses normal sign-in links instead of relying on an obviously fake website at the start. The trick works by sending a person to a real sign-in service with settings that force an error and then pass the browser along to the attacker’s page. The rule stays narrow by looking for both the hidden sign-in setting and the clearly bad scope value together. That matters because silent sign-in by itself can appear in normal environments, but the bad scope value changes the story and makes the pattern much more suspicious. In plain language, this rule is trying to spot a link that pretends to be a normal sign-in step but is really being used as a doorway to a phishing or malware page after the trusted service does the redirect. Keeping both parts together helps the rule stay tied to the abusive redirect trick instead of ordinary sign-in traffic.
Detects the "EtherHiding" technique used by the FakeGit campaign. The malware queries a Polygon Mainnet smart contract via a public RPC node to resolve its current C2 server address. This rule looks for network connections to known blockchain RPC providers containing the specific function selectors used by the malware's V1 and V2 contracts.
Detects a high volume of network connections from a browser process to a high port on the local host (127.0.0.1 or ::1). This pattern can indicate a malicious website attempting to brute-force credentials for a local service, such as the OpenClaw AI agent, by abusing the browser's permission to establish WebSocket connections to localhost. The vulnerable service may not rate-limit these local connections, allowing for rapid password guessing.
Detects network connections to the primary C2 IP and port (103.106.67.63:1244) used across all modules of the StegaBin infostealer toolkit. This specific IP and port combination is highly indicative of StegaBin activity.
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