Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
1,907 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
719
486
238
182
142
Contributors
547
475
198
184
152
Categories
1,535
958
955
583
128
Platforms
1,890
19
10
7
5
Products / Services
10,665
9,773
6,705
4,421
3,749
1,907
MITRE Techniques
1,254
1,146
731
283
260
CVEs
7
3
2
2
2
IDS Classtypes
1
IDS Protocols
1
Detects the initiation of remote PowerShell sessions by identifying specific keywords in the `ContextInfo` field of PowerShell module logs. It looks for the presence of ' = ServerRemoteHost ' and 'wsmprovhost.exe', which are indicative of a remote PowerShell connection. A filter is applied to exclude legitimate PowerShell archive module activity.
This rule detects the execution of the 'Get-NetTCPConnection' PowerShell cmdlet. This cmdlet is used to retrieve information about TCP connections on a system. Adversaries may use this for system network connections discovery to understand the network environment of a compromised host.
This rule detects attempts to dump credentials from the Windows Credential Manager using PowerShell. It specifically looks for the use of known PowerShell functions or code patterns associated with credential dumping tools or techniques. This includes functions like 'Get-PasswordVaultCredentials' and 'Get-CredManCreds', as well as the instantiation of .NET objects related to 'Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault' or specific CSharpCodeProvider patterns often used in reflective loading or dynamic compilation for credential access.
Detects the usage of `[Reflection.Assembly]::load` functions within PowerShell script block logs. This method allows for dynamically loading assemblies into memory, which can be used by adversaries to execute malicious code without writing it to disk, thus evading traditional file-based detections.
This rule detects attempts to enumerate credentials from the Windows Credential Manager using PowerShell. It specifically looks for PowerShell script block text containing both 'vaultcmd' and '/listcreds:', combined with keywords like 'Windows Credentials' or 'Web Credentials'. This activity is indicative of an adversary trying to obtain stored user credentials.
This rule detects the execution of a PowerShell command that specifically enumerates browser bookmarks. It looks for the use of 'Get-ChildItem' with parameters '-Recurse', '-Path', '-Filter Bookmarks', '-ErrorAction SilentlyContinue', and '-Force'. This activity is indicative of an adversary attempting to discover information about the compromised host by collecting browser bookmark data, which can reveal personal information or details about internal network resources.
This rule detects the use of the 'Get-AdGroup' PowerShell cmdlet with the '-Filter' parameter to enumerate groups within Active Directory. This activity is often performed by attackers during the discovery phase to identify privileged groups and users.
This rule detects the execution of the Invoke-DNSExfiltrator PowerShell cmdlet, which is used for exfiltrating data over a DNS request covert channel. The detection specifically looks for the presence of the cmdlet name along with common parameters such as '-i', '-d', '-p', '-doh', and '-t', indicating an attempt to use the DNSExfiltrator tool.
Detects PowerShell script block logging (Event ID 4104) entries that indicate the use of Invoke-Obfuscation's COMPRESS obfuscation technique. This technique typically involves using 'new-object' with 'text.encoding::ascii' and 'system.io.compression.deflatestream' or 'system.io.streamreader' followed by 'readtoend' to decompress and execute obfuscated code.
This rule detects the execution of PowerShell commandlets and functions associated with the Nishang exploitation framework. Nishang is a collection of PowerShell scripts and functions that enable penetration testers to use PowerShell for offensive security tasks. The rule specifically looks for a comprehensive list of known Nishang commandlet names and arguments within PowerShell script block logs. Detection of these strings indicates potential malicious activity, including credential dumping, persistence mechanisms, exfiltration, and remote code execution.
Detects the execution of PowerShell cmdlets associated with PowerView, a reconnaissance tool within the PowerSploit framework. This rule specifically looks for a comprehensive list of PowerView cmdlets within PowerShell script block logs, indicating potential adversary activity related to discovery and information gathering in an Active Directory environment.
Detects the use of 'PSAsyncShell', an asynchronous TCP reverse shell written in PowerShell. The rule specifically looks for the string 'PSAsyncShell' within PowerShell script block logs, indicating the execution or presence of this specific tool.
This rule detects the execution of PowerShell scripts containing specific Base64 encoded shellcode signatures. The rule looks for the presence of 'OiCAAAAYInlM' or 'OiJAAAAYInlM' within the ScriptBlockText, which are known indicators of shellcode.
This rule detects the execution of specific PowerShell commandlets associated with the ShellIntel exploitation framework. These commandlets, such as 'Invoke-SMBAutoBrute', 'Invoke-GPOLinks', and 'Invoke-Potato', are commonly used for reconnaissance, privilege escalation, and lateral movement within a Windows environment. Detection relies on PowerShell Script Block Logging to capture the script text containing these commandlet names.
This rule detects PowerShell script block text that contains commands indicative of searching for credentials in files. Specifically, it looks for the combination of 'ls' (list directory contents), '-R' (recursive search), 'select-string' (finds text in strings and files), and '-Pattern' (specifies the text pattern to find). This combination suggests an adversary is recursively searching files for specific patterns, likely credentials.
Detects the use of PowerShell commands or .NET methods to identify the current logged-in user on a Windows system. This activity is often performed by adversaries during the discovery phase to understand the environment.
This rule detects the use of the PowerShell cmdlet 'Unblock-File' with the '-Path' parameter. This cmdlet is used to remove the Zone.Identifier alternate data stream from a file, which marks it as downloaded from the internet. Adversaries may use this to bypass security warnings and execution restrictions associated with files downloaded from untrusted sources, often as part of a defense evasion strategy.
This rule detects PowerShell script block text containing "Win32_PnPEntity". This WMI class is used to query information about Plug and Play devices, which can include peripheral devices. Adversaries may use this to gather information about attached peripheral devices and components connected to a computer system for discovery purposes.
This rule detects the usage of the 'ConvertTo-SecureString' cmdlet via the command line. This cmdlet is used to convert plain text into a secure string object, which can then be used to store sensitive information like passwords. While it has legitimate uses, its direct invocation from the command line is uncommon in typical user activity and can indicate suspicious behavior, potentially related to credential manipulation or obfuscation techniques by adversaries.
Detects calls to PowerShell cmdlets used to export certificates from the local certificate store. Threat actors have been observed abusing this technique to steal private keys from compromised machines, which can then be used for authentication or decryption.
Detects the creation of new Windows services using either the 'sc.exe' command-line utility or the PowerShell 'New-Service' cmdlet. The rule specifically looks for suspicious binary paths associated with the newly created service, including common scripting interpreters (powershell, wscript, cscript, cmd), system binaries (svchost, dllhost, rundll32), and suspicious user-writable directories (Public, Downloads, Desktop, Startup, Temp). This activity is often indicative of persistence or privilege escalation attempts by adversaries.
Page 83 of 91