Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects PowerShell scripts that utilize compression and decompression techniques, specifically looking for 'new-object', 'text.encoding]::ascii', 'system.io.compression.deflatestream', 'system.io.streamreader', and 'readtoend' in the payload. This pattern is indicative of obfuscated PowerShell often used by tools like Invoke-Obfuscation to hide malicious code.
Detects obfuscated PowerShell commands that utilize 'clip.exe' to interact with the clipboard, often as part of an obfuscation technique like those used by Invoke-Obfuscation. The rule specifically looks for patterns where 'echo' is piped to 'clip' and then followed by terms related to 'Clipboard' or 'invoke' with potential character obfuscation.
Detects obfuscated PowerShell execution leveraging MSHTA. This technique is often used for defense evasion by adversaries to execute malicious scripts without directly invoking PowerShell. The rule specifically looks for a combination of keywords indicative of this method, including 'set', '&&', 'mshta', 'vbscript:createobject', '.run', and '(window.close)' within the PowerShell module payload.
Detects code fragments commonly found in small and obfuscated PowerShell scripts designed to bypass Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI). The rule specifically looks for the combination of '[Ref].Assembly.GetType', 'SetValue($null,$true)', and 'NonPublic,Static' within PowerShell script block text, which are indicative of reflection-based AMSI bypass techniques.
This rule detects the usage of the 'Add-WindowsCapability' PowerShell cmdlet, specifically looking for attempts to add Windows capabilities. It explicitly targets the addition of 'OpenSSH' related capabilities (both 'OpenSSH.Server' and 'OpenSSH.Client'). This activity could indicate an adversary attempting to install tools for remote access or other malicious purposes.
This rule detects the use of `System.DirectoryServices.AccountManagement` within PowerShell script block logs. This .NET namespace is commonly used to programmatically manage Active Directory security principals such as users, computers, and groups. Adversaries may use this method to create new domain accounts, modify existing ones, or manipulate group memberships to establish persistence or elevate privileges within an Active Directory environment.
Detects PowerShell scripts that enumerate installed hotfixes by querying 'Win32_QuickFixEngineering' and looking for 'HotFixID'. This activity is often performed by attackers during the discovery phase to gather system information.
Detects obfuscated PowerShell scripts that utilize 'clip.exe' to interact with the clipboard, potentially for defense evasion or data manipulation. The rule specifically looks for the pattern 'echo.*clip.*&&.*(Clipboard|i`?n`?v`?o`?k`?)' within PowerShell script block text, indicating an attempt to pipe output to clip.exe and then interact with the clipboard or invoke further commands.
This rule detects the use of PowerShell to instantiate the MsXml2.XmlHttp COM object. Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution, and the MsXml2.XmlHttp COM object can be used for network communication, such as downloading additional payloads or exfiltrating data. This technique is often used by malware or attackers to perform actions like C2 communication or data transfer.
Detects attempts to write data into NTFS Alternate Data Streams (ADS) using PowerShell cmdlets like `Set-Content` or `Add-Content` in conjunction with the `-Stream` parameter. This technique can be used by adversaries to hide malicious data or executables on a system.
This rule detects the use of 'PromptForCredential' within PowerShell script block logs. This function is used to display a dialog box that prompts the user for credentials, which can be abused by adversaries to harvest user credentials. Detection relies on PowerShell Script Block Logging being enabled.
Detects the use of the PSAttack PowerShell hack tool by looking for the specific string 'PS ATTACK!!!' within PowerShell script block logs. This tool is often used for post-exploitation activities.
This rule detects PowerShell commands that attempt to discover sensitive files by looking for common file extensions associated with credentials or password managers (e.g., .pass, .kdbx, .kdb). It specifically targets commands like 'ls', 'get-childitem', or 'gci' combined with the '-recurse' parameter, indicating a recursive search for these sensitive file types.
Detects PowerShell script blocks that manipulate security descriptors using specific WMI classes and properties (win32_Trustee, win32_Ace, .AccessMask, .AceType, .SetSecurityDescriptor) in conjunction with specific LSA registry paths (Lsa\JD, Lsa\Skew1, Lsa\Data, Lsa\GBG). This combination is indicative of potential persistence mechanisms, as seen in projects like DAMP, which aim to backdoor systems by modifying security settings to maintain access or elevate privileges.
Detects PowerShell scripts that create TCP listeners and accept client connections, which is indicative of tunneling activity. The rule specifically looks for the use of '[System.Net.HttpWebRequest]', 'System.Net.Sockets.TcpListener', and 'AcceptTcpClient' within the script block text.
This rule detects PowerShell script execution where the 'WindowStyle Hidden' option is used. Adversaries often use this technique to conceal malicious activity from users by preventing the PowerShell window from being visible. The rule specifically looks for the combination of 'powershell', 'WindowStyle', and 'Hidden' within the script block text. A filter is applied to exclude legitimate Amazon WorkSpaces configuration scripts that use this option.
Detects usage of the Get-ADUser cmdlet to collect user information and output it to a file. This activity is often associated with reconnaissance phases where attackers enumerate Active Directory users for further targeting.
Detects the use of PowerShell's 'Import-Module' cmdlet to load the 'Microsoft.ActiveDirectory.Management.dll'. This DLL is part of the Active Directory module and is frequently used by attackers for Active Directory enumeration, especially in environments where RSAT (Remote Server Administration Tools) might not be installed or administrative privileges are not initially present.
Detects attempts to capture audio using PowerShell cmdlets, specifically looking for commands related to the 'WindowsAudioDevice-Powershell-Cmdlet' module or similar audio device manipulation cmdlets. This activity could indicate an adversary attempting to record sensitive conversations or gather information from the compromised system's environment.
This rule detects the execution of PowerShell commands that utilize base64 encoded 'IEX' (Invoke-Expression) cmdlets. Adversaries often encode malicious PowerShell scripts in base64 to evade detection and obfuscate their intentions. The rule specifically looks for patterns indicative of base64 encoded 'IEX' calls, including variations with 'New-Object' and different casing, as well as UTF-16 LE encoded versions of common 'IEX' patterns.
Detects calls to "SyncInvoke" that is part of the "CL_Invocation.ps1" script to proxy execution using "System.Diagnostics.Process". This technique can be used to bypass application control and execute malicious code.
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