Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule monitors for suspicious activity related to Microsoft Exchange server exploitation and persistence techniques. It detects three distinct behaviors: the creation of web shell files (.aspx, .ashx, .asmx) within Exchange directories (OWA/ECP), the spawning of shell processes (cmd, powershell) by the w3wp.exe web server process, and DLL sideloading occurring through identified signed binaries (dfsvc.exe, rasautou.exe) outside of standard system directories.
Detects an inbound policy-themed PDF attachment whose extracted URLs lead to a sign-in, authentication, review, or acknowledgement workflow outside the organisation. This rule specifically looks for PDF attachments in emails where the subject contains terms like 'code of conduct', 'policy', 'compliance', or 'handbook', and the extracted URLs within the PDF contain keywords such as 'login', 'signin', 'auth', 'review', or 'acknowledge'.
Detects web shell deployment and subsequent execution activities associated with the StrikeShark threat. The detection covers two primary behaviors: 1) IIS worker processes (w3wp.exe or UMWorkerProcess.exe) spawning suspicious child processes (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, etc.) indicating shell command execution, and 2) IIS worker processes creating potential web shell files (.aspx, .ashx, .asmx, .svc) within sensitive web root directories, including Exchange and SharePoint paths.
Detects internal phishing emails with subject lines mimicking IT service notifications, such as from ServiceNow. This is a tactic used by the Jingle Thief group (also tracked as Atlas Lion and STORM-0539) for lateral movement within a compromised organization.
Detects an inbound policy-themed PDF attachment whose extracted URLs lead to a sign-in, authentication, review, or acknowledgement workflow outside the organisation. This rule specifically looks for PDF attachments in emails where the subject contains terms like 'code of conduct', 'policy', 'compliance', or 'handbook', and the extracted URLs within the PDF contain keywords such as 'login', 'signin', 'auth', 'review', or 'acknowledge'.
This rule detects potential mass emailing or spam activity by identifying instances where a single email account sends more than 100 emails within a one-minute window. This behavior is often characteristic of compromised accounts performing phishing campaigns or bulk unauthorized communication.
This rule detects suspicious emails exhibiting patterns associated with 'authentication laundering' by identifying the combination of legitimate scheduling or redirection links (e.g., Calendly, Google Redirect) with potentially malicious indicators such as zip file links, suspicious .cfd domains, or impersonation of booking management services. It calculates a laundering score based on these features and the health of email authentication signals (SPF/DKIM).
Detects a newly replayed session issuing mailbox searches for invoice, payment, password, security, or confidential terms. This rule is designed to identify suspicious activity indicative of session hijacking or credential compromise, where an attacker uses a replayed session to search for sensitive information within a mailbox or SharePoint.
This rule monitors for incoming emails that pass DKIM authentication but fail DMARC verification, specifically where the signing domain is associated with Google Apps (gappssmtp.com). This pattern is often indicative of email spoofing, where an attacker sends mail from a legitimate provider's infrastructure but fails the domain alignment requirements of DMARC.
Detects incoming emails that claim to be from a 'Monitoring' display name associated with the gasparinutrition.com domain or specific accounting sender address, which may indicate a spearphishing or impersonation attempt.
Identifies anomalous requests to Microsoft TURN relays, potentially requesting anonymous visitor tokens. This rule looks for a high volume of network connections to 'turn.teams.microsoft.com' or 'relay.teams.microsoft.com' from processes other than the legitimate Microsoft Teams application, indicating potential abuse of the Teams infrastructure for malicious traffic tunneling.
Detects a PDF, SVG, HTML, or presentation attachment containing a QR code or extracted URL that leads into an enterprise authentication workflow. This rule is designed to identify phishing attempts where adversaries embed QR codes or malicious URLs within common document types to direct users to fake enterprise login pages for credential harvesting.
Detects a mail forwarding or redirect rule created from a session that recently exhibited token replay or unusual client changes. This rule specifically looks for operations related to Inbox Rules in Exchange or Office 365 audit logs that contain keywords indicating forwarding or redirection.
Detects internal phishing emails with subject lines mimicking IT service notifications, such as from ServiceNow. This is a tactic used by the Jingle Thief group (also tracked as Atlas Lion and STORM-0539) for lateral movement within a compromised organization.
Detects phishing emails that impersonate Scotiabank using the 'From' display name, while originating from a non-scotiabank.com domain. The rule identifies emails that bypass SPF and DMARC checks and originate from GoDaddy-hosted email services, as indicated by the 'X-SECURESERVER-ACCT' header, suggesting the use of a compromised small-business account.
This rule monitors for suspicious activity related to Microsoft Exchange servers and potential DLL side-loading. It detects the creation of web shell files (.aspx, .ashx, .asmx) in Exchange-related directories, the execution of command shells (cmd, powershell) by the IIS worker process (w3wp.exe) within Exchange, and the side-loading of DLLs by specific signed binaries (dfsvc.exe, rasautou.exe) from non-standard directories.
Inbox Rule Notification Suppression
Cortex XDR
Detects the creation or modification of inbox rules designed to hide security and MFA notifications by deleting, marking as read, or moving them to hidden folders. This technique is commonly used post-compromise to suppress alerts about rogue device enrollment, sign-ins, or password changes, preventing the victim from discovering an account takeover. It is a frequent Business Email Compromise (BEC) and Account Takeover (ATO) persistence technique.
This rule detects potentially malicious invoice-themed emails by monitoring email gateway telemetry for a combination of failing email authentication checks (DKIM, SPF, DMARC) and domain mismatches, which are indicative of spoofing attempts.
Tracks AAD/Exchange logs showing mail routed through an external tenant specifically to bypass internal domain spoofing filters via trusted connectors. This rule identifies emails where the sender's domain matches the internal company domain, but the email was routed through an external Office 365 connector and did not originate from a trusted internal IP address, indicating a potential cross-tenant spoofing attempt.
Detects the creation or modification of an inbox rule in Microsoft 365 where the rule's name consists entirely of special characters. This behavior can be indicative of an adversary attempting to evade detection by obscuring malicious inbox rules.
Detects the explicit execution of the 'gh-token-monitor.sh' script, which is indicative of active credential harvesting on the endpoint. This script is designed to monitor and potentially exfiltrate GitHub tokens.
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