Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the use of PowerShell to add an exclusion to Microsoft Defender. The detection looks for common obfuscation flags (Hidden, NonI, NoP, Bypass) in the command line and targets the MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore executable or DLL for exclusion, which is a common persistence or evasion technique. It excludes parent processes known for administrative activity to reduce noise.
Detects the execution of PowerShell via explorer.exe (typically initiated through the Windows Run dialog) where the command line references a WebDAV UNC path (containing DavWWWRoot). This behavior is characteristic of 'ClickFix' social engineering attacks, where users are coerced into copying and pasting commands into the Run dialog that trigger remote script execution.
Detects potential malicious PowerShell activity involving suspicious file paths in 'C:\Users\Public\' and the use of 'UPLOAD' command strings, which may indicate the staging and execution of payloads.
Detects the use of PowerShell script blocks that attempt to bypass or disable Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) or Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) by interacting with internal .NET objects or DLLs, a common technique in phishing-delivered payloads.
Detects command-line execution patterns that exhibit hallmark traits of LLM-generated code, such as overly verbose and explanatory comments, appearing alongside common obfuscation or decoding primitives (e.g., base64, iex, eval). This combination suggests the use of AI to assist in creating decoy logic or burying malicious payloads within legitimate-appearing scripts to evade detection.
Detects potential multimodal prompt injection attacks where an AI agent process ingests a file (PDF, image, etc.) from a browser or mail client and subsequently performs suspicious downstream activity, such as spawning a shell with execution primitives or making network connections to rare, non-reputable external domains. Covers T1204, T1059, T1105
Detects the use of PowerShell processes that employ command-line encoding (e.g., -enc, -EncodedCommand) in conjunction with download-related cmdlets (e.g., DownloadString, IEX, Invoke-WebRequest), or instances of PowerShell spawned as a child process of another PowerShell process. This pattern is indicative of a loader or stage-one script fetching additional malicious payloads.
Detects the use of PowerShell cmdlets (Add-MpPreference or Set-MpPreference) to modify Microsoft Defender exclusions (paths, processes, or extensions). This behavior is often associated with adversaries attempting to evade security detection by excluding malicious files or processes from being scanned by Microsoft Defender.
Detects a sequence of events where a potential multimedia lure (PDF, image, or media file) is created or downloaded via a web browser or communication client, followed by an AI agent (e.g., ChatGPT, Claude) accessing the file, and subsequently initiating a shell execution process (PowerShell, CMD, etc.) involving suspicious command-line patterns or references to the original file. This behavior is indicative of an AI-assisted prompt injection attack where malicious content is processed and executed through agent tooling.
Detects a sequence of events where a potential multimedia lure (PDF, image, or media file) is created or downloaded via a web browser or communication client, followed by an AI agent (e.g., ChatGPT, Claude) accessing the file, and subsequently initiating a shell execution process (PowerShell, CMD, etc.) involving suspicious command-line patterns or references to the original file. This behavior is indicative of an AI-assisted prompt injection attack where malicious content is processed and executed through agent tooling.
Detects a sequence of events where a potential multimedia lure (PDF, image, or media file) is created or downloaded via a web browser or communication client, followed by an AI agent (e.g., ChatGPT, Claude) accessing the file, and subsequently initiating a shell execution process (PowerShell, CMD, etc.) involving suspicious command-line patterns or references to the original file. This behavior is indicative of an AI-assisted prompt injection attack where malicious content is processed and executed through agent tooling.
This rule detects instances where the Faronics Deploy Agent process initiates the installation or download of ScreenConnect remote access software via PowerShell or the Windows Installer (msiexec.exe). This pattern is often indicative of authorized RMM deployment, but it is also a common tactic for adversaries to establish persistent remote access to endpoints.
This rule detects instances where the Faronics Deploy Agent process initiates the installation or download of ScreenConnect remote access software via PowerShell or the Windows Installer (msiexec.exe). This pattern is often indicative of authorized RMM deployment, but it is also a common tactic for adversaries to establish persistent remote access to endpoints.
Detects lateral movement activities associated with The Gentlemen ransomware group. The rule monitors for the execution of PowerShell scripts named 'deploy_gpo.ps1' from the %TEMP% directory, PowerShell interactions with the NETLOGON share for malware distribution, creation of ScheduledTasks.xml via PowerShell (a common GPO manipulation technique), and the subsequent enforcement of policy changes using 'gpupdate /force' invoked by scripting engines.
Detects ClickFix-style social engineering attacks where a user is tricked into manually executing a PowerShell command. The command typically utilizes Invoke-RestMethod to fetch a remote payload and Invoke-Expression to execute it in memory, bypassing execution policies. This behavior is commonly associated with campaigns like SmartApeSG and DeepLoad.
Detects the execution of PowerShell scripts 'first.ps1' and 'main1.ps1', which are components of a known credential phishing toolset. This tool displays a fake Windows Update dialog to trick users into providing their credentials, which are then exfiltrated via SMB, DNS, or HTTP.
This rule detects the use of PowerShell cmdlets often associated with enumerating COM object registrations, specifically targeting 'InProcServer32' registry keys. Such enumeration is a common reconnaissance step for identifying 'dangling' COM objects—registrations that point to missing or non-existent files—which can be exploited to achieve DLL Hijacking or persistence via COM hijacking.
Detects the use of PowerShell to modify Microsoft Defender settings to add an exclusion path within the AppData directory. This behavior is often associated with malware or threat actors attempting to whitelist malicious payloads to evade security scanning.
Detects PowerShell execution that combines screen capturing capabilities (System.Drawing.Bitmap, Windows.Forms) with network communication (System.Net.WebClient) directed towards known C2 domains (medianewsonline.com) using specific exfiltration parameters (OKey, Who).
Detects suspicious PowerShell command lines that load a .dat file, decode its Base64 content, and execute it in-memory. This behavior is indicative of the 'TASK#STOMP' loader pattern, where malicious code is hidden in external files and invoked directly into memory to bypass traditional file-based security controls.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe or PowerShell that reference specific task names associated with potentially suspicious activity or persistence (e.g., PlutonAgentScheduler, EnterpriseMgmtServicesScheduler). The rule specifically looks for tasks being placed or modified within 'microsoft' or 'pluton' directories or paths, which may indicate an attempt to masquerade as legitimate system services.
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