Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
70 detections
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Detects a Slack workflow being published. Workflows run automation inside the
workspace — they can post, collect responses, and reach external endpoints via
webhooks — which makes a malicious one a credential-harvesting form or an
exfiltration channel that looks like an internal tool.
Onboarding: SLACK is ingested via Slack native connector (Bloo extractor 833).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/integrations/slack
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=slack-workflow where sourcename='SLACK' and action='PUBLISHED'
| groupby user, workflow
workspace — they can post, collect responses, and reach external endpoints via
webhooks — which makes a malicious one a credential-harvesting form or an
exfiltration channel that looks like an internal tool.
Onboarding: SLACK is ingested via Slack native connector (Bloo extractor 833).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/integrations/slack
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=slack-workflow where sourcename='SLACK' and action='PUBLISHED'
| groupby user, workflow
Detects a Slack role change conferring administrative rights. A workspace admin can
read private content, export conversation history, add applications and change
retention — so this is a meaningful privilege grant in a system that holds a great
deal of candid organisational information.
Onboarding: SLACK is ingested via Slack native connector (Bloo extractor 833).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/integrations/slack
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='SLACK' and action='ROLE_ADDED'
| groupby user, targetuser, role, workspace
read private content, export conversation history, add applications and change
retention — so this is a meaningful privilege grant in a system that holds a great
deal of candid organisational information.
Onboarding: SLACK is ingested via Slack native connector (Bloo extractor 833).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/integrations/slack
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='SLACK' and action='ROLE_ADDED'
| groupby user, targetuser, role, workspace
Detects a burst of user deactivations in a Slack workspace. Mass deactivation locks
colleagues out of the channel an organisation uses to coordinate its own incident
response, which is both disruptive in itself and a way of blinding the responders
while something else proceeds.
Onboarding: SLACK is ingested via Slack native connector (Bloo extractor 833).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/integrations/slack
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='SLACK' and action='USER_DEACTIVATED'
| duration 1h
| groupby user
| select user, distinct_count(targetuser)
| having distinct_count_col1 > 5
colleagues out of the channel an organisation uses to coordinate its own incident
response, which is both disruptive in itself and a way of blinding the responders
while something else proceeds.
Onboarding: SLACK is ingested via Slack native connector (Bloo extractor 833).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/integrations/slack
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='SLACK' and action='USER_DEACTIVATED'
| duration 1h
| groupby user
| select user, distinct_count(targetuser)
| having distinct_count_col1 > 5
Detects an account joining the workspace. Slack Connect and guest access let outside
identities into an internal communication space, and an unexpected join is how an
attacker gains a listening position without touching the network perimeter at all.
Check the account type: a guest or external identity joining a channel carrying
operational or security discussion is worth immediate confirmation with the inviter.
Onboarding: SLACK is ingested via Slack native connector (Bloo extractor 833).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/integrations/slack
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='SLACK' and action='USER_JOINED_WORKSPACE'
| groupby user, targetuser, accounttype, workspace
identities into an internal communication space, and an unexpected join is how an
attacker gains a listening position without touching the network perimeter at all.
Check the account type: a guest or external identity joining a channel carrying
operational or security discussion is worth immediate confirmation with the inviter.
Onboarding: SLACK is ingested via Slack native connector (Bloo extractor 833).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/integrations/slack
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='SLACK' and action='USER_JOINED_WORKSPACE'
| groupby user, targetuser, accounttype, workspace
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where Kubernetes API resources (namespaces, secrets, configmaps, pods, or nodes) are enumerated, followed by a search query against the Slack API, indicative of a potential reconnaissance phase or sandbox escape attempt.
This rule detects potential adversarial reconnaissance activities targeting AI agents via multiple communication channels (e.g., email, collaboration tools). It identifies patterns where a sender transmits messages containing common 'jailbreak' or 'instruction-override' phrases (e.g., 'ignore previous instructions', 'bypass approval') across at least three distinct channels within a 24-hour window, indicating a concerted effort to manipulate or probe agent logic.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity where an identity performs enumeration of Kubernetes secrets or configmaps and subsequently performs a search action within Slack from the same IP address within a one-hour window. This behavioral pattern is indicative of post-breakout reconnaissance, where a compromised identity or token is used to exfiltrate sensitive cloud configuration data and then perform internal reconnaissance in SaaS collaboration tools to identify further targets or credentials.
This rule detects potential adversarial reconnaissance activities targeting AI agents via multiple communication channels (e.g., email, collaboration tools). It identifies patterns where a sender transmits messages containing common 'jailbreak' or 'instruction-override' phrases (e.g., 'ignore previous instructions', 'bypass approval') across at least three distinct channels within a 24-hour window, indicating a concerted effort to manipulate or probe agent logic.
This rule detects potential adversarial reconnaissance activities targeting AI agents via multiple communication channels (e.g., email, collaboration tools). It identifies patterns where a sender transmits messages containing common 'jailbreak' or 'instruction-override' phrases (e.g., 'ignore previous instructions', 'bypass approval') across at least three distinct channels within a 24-hour window, indicating a concerted effort to manipulate or probe agent logic.
This rule detects potential adversarial reconnaissance activities targeting AI agents via multiple communication channels (e.g., email, collaboration tools). It identifies patterns where a sender transmits messages containing common 'jailbreak' or 'instruction-override' phrases (e.g., 'ignore previous instructions', 'bypass approval') across at least three distinct channels within a 24-hour window, indicating a concerted effort to manipulate or probe agent logic.
Detects evidence of indirect prompt injection (IPI) attempts within email and document content processed by enterprise AI assistants. The rule flags instruction-hijack phrases, hidden obfuscation characters (e.g., zero-width, white-on-white text), and encoded blocks specifically targeting AI model behavior.
This rule detects potential data exfiltration by monitoring for anomalous user behavior across integrated SaaS applications. It flags accounts that perform high-frequency read, search, or view activities across three or more monitored SaaS platforms (Confluence, Jira, Slack, Google Workspace, Microsoft 365, or Bitbucket) within a 5-minute window, followed immediately by an upload or post activity to an external, non-integrated domain.
This rule detects potential data exfiltration by monitoring for anomalous user behavior across integrated SaaS applications. It flags accounts that perform high-frequency read, search, or view activities across three or more monitored SaaS platforms (Confluence, Jira, Slack, Google Workspace, Microsoft 365, or Bitbucket) within a 5-minute window, followed immediately by an upload or post activity to an external, non-integrated domain.
Slack Anomalous Activity
Cortex XDR
This rule detects anomalous activity reported by Slack's internal anomaly detection system. This includes events such as impossible travel, new device access, suspicious IP changes, and other behavioral anomalies that Slack identifies. The rule extracts relevant user and context information for further investigation.
Detects phishing links delivered through Microsoft Teams or Slack messages
Detects when an actor searches Slack audit logs, which could indicate an attacker attempting to understand logging capabilities or evade detection. Also detects bulk session resets initiated by an administrator, which may be a response to an account takeover or an attacker attempting to evict legitimate users from their sessions.
This rule monitors for two distinct suspicious activities: 1) Inbound emails where the sender display name matches a list of executive titles, commonly indicative of Business Email Compromise (BEC) or executive impersonation attacks; 2) The creation of cloud service accounts with names mimicking administrative or IT support roles, which may indicate an adversary establishing persistent, privileged access.
Slack Anomalous Activity Detected
Cortex XDR
This rule detects anomalous activity reported by Slack's internal anomaly detection system. This includes events such as impossible travel, new device access, suspicious IP changes, and other behavioral anomalies that could indicate a compromised account or unauthorized access to a Slack workspace.
Slack Anomalous Activity Detected
Cortex XDR
This rule detects anomalous activity reported by Slack's internal anomaly detection system. This includes events such as impossible travel, new device access, suspicious IP changes, and other behavioral anomalies that could indicate a compromised account or unauthorized access to a Slack workspace.
Detects when an actor searches Slack audit logs, which could indicate an attacker attempting to understand logging capabilities or evade detection. Also detects bulk session resets initiated by an administrator, which may be a response to an account takeover or an attacker attempting to evict legitimate users from their sessions.
Detects new app installations, expansions of OAuth scopes, or the addition of collaborators to Slack applications. These activities can indicate an adversary attempting to gain persistent access, escalate privileges, or exfiltrate data from Slack by leveraging malicious or compromised applications.
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