Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
53 detections
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Detects when AppLocker "Audit only" enforcement mode reports that an Application, DLL, Script, MSI, or Packaged-App would have been blocked if AppLocker "Enforce rules" enforcement mode was enabled.
The following analytic detects attempts to bypass application restrictions by identifying Windows AppLocker policy violations. It leverages Windows AppLocker event logs, specifically EventCodes 8007, 8004, 8022, 8025, 8029, and 8040, to pinpoint blocked actions. This activity is significant for a SOC as it highlights potential unauthorized application executions, which could indicate malicious intent or policy circumvention. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to execute unauthorized applications, potentially leading to further system compromise or data exfiltration.
The following analytic utilizes Windows AppLocker event logs to identify attempts to bypass application restrictions. AppLocker is a feature that allows administrators to specify which applications are permitted to run on a system. This analytic is designed to identify attempts to bypass these restrictions, which could be indicative of an attacker attempting to escalate privileges. The analytic uses EventCodes 8007, 8004, 8022, 8025, 8029, and 8040 to identify these attempts. The analytic will identify the host, full file path, and target user associated with the bypass attempt. These EventCodes are related to block events and focus on 5 attempts or more.
Identifies attackers renaming the ClickOnce executable (dfsvc.exe) to bypass basic AppLocker path rules. This rule specifically looks for instances where the original file name is 'dfsvc.exe' but the current file name is different, indicating a rename.
Detects an appx package deployment that was blocked by AppLocker policy.
Detects when AppLocker prevents the execution of an Application, DLL, Script, MSI, or Packaged-App from running.
The following analytic detects the use of default or publicly known named pipes associated with Cobalt Strike. It leverages Sysmon EventID 17 and 18 to identify specific named pipes commonly used by Cobalt Strike's Artifact Kit and Malleable C2 Profiles. This activity is significant because Cobalt Strike is a popular tool for adversaries to conduct post-exploitation tasks, and identifying its named pipes can reveal potential malicious activity. If confirmed malicious, this could indicate an active Cobalt Strike beacon, leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.
This analytic detects suspicious data transfer activities involving the use of the `split` syscall with the `-b` option, which specifies the size of each output file. This technique can be used by attackers to evade detection by breaking large files into smaller parts, bypassing size-based security controls, and facilitating covert exfiltration of sensitive data. By monitoring for unusual or unauthorized use of the `split` syscall with a specified block size, this analytic helps identify potential data exfiltration attempts.
This analytic identifies the bulk creation of ransomware notes (e.g., .txt, .html, .hta files) on an infected machine. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 11 to detect multiple instances of these file types being created within a short time frame (10 seconds). A detection is triggered if 15 or more unique readme paths are observed. This activity is a strong indicator of an active ransomware attack, where the attacker is notifying the victim of the encryption. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to widespread data encryption, rendering critical files inaccessible and potentially causing significant operational disruption.
The following analytic detects suspicious attempts to find credentials stored in password stores, indicating a potential attacker's effort to access sensitive login information. Password stores are critical repositories that contain valuable credentials, and unauthorized access to them can lead to significant security breaches. By monitoring for unusual or unauthorized activities related to password store access, this analytic helps identify potential credential theft attempts, allowing security teams to respond promptly and prevent unauthorized access to critical systems and data.
The following analytic detects the creation of files in the Windows %startup% folder, a common persistence technique. It leverages the Endpoint.Filesystem data model to identify file creation events in this specific directory. This activity is significant because adversaries often use the startup folder to ensure their malicious code executes automatically upon system boot or user logon. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain persistence on the host, potentially leading to further system compromise and unauthorized access to sensitive information.
The following analytic identifies the creation of executables or scripts in suspicious file paths on Windows systems. It leverages the Endpoint.Filesystem data model to detect files with specific extensions (e.g., .exe, .dll, .ps1) created in uncommon directories (e.g., \windows\fonts\, \users\public\). This activity is significant as adversaries often use these paths to evade detection and maintain persistence. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute unauthorized code, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment, posing a significant security threat.
Detects the creation of the "PSScriptPolicyTest" PowerShell script by an uncommon process. This file is usually generated by Microsoft Powershell to test against Applocker. Adversaries may create this file to test AppLocker policies or to bypass them.
This analytic detects the configuration of TFTP services on Cisco IOS devices that could be used to exfiltrate sensitive configuration files. Threat actors like Static Tundra have been observed configuring TFTP servers to make device configuration files accessible for exfiltration after gaining initial access. The detection specifically looks for commands that expose critical configuration files such as startup-config, running-config, and other sensitive system information through TFTP. This activity is particularly concerning as it may represent an attempt to steal credentials, network topology information, and other sensitive data stored in device configurations.
The following analytic detects the creation or connection of anonymous pipes for inter-process communication (IPC) within a Windows environment. Anonymous pipes are commonly used by legitimate system processes, services, and applications to transfer data between related processes. However, adversaries frequently abuse anonymous pipes to facilitate stealthy process injection, command-and-control (C2) communication, credential theft, or privilege escalation. This detection monitors for unusual anonymous pipe activity, particularly involving non-system processes, unsigned executables, or unexpected parent-child process relationships. While legitimate use cases exist—such as Windows services, software installers, or security tools—unusual or high-frequency anonymous pipe activity should be investigated for potential malware, persistence mechanisms, or lateral movement techniques.
The analytic detects potentially suspicious modifications to Windows Audit Policy auditing options registry values. It focuses on changes to specific auditing option values ("CrashOnAuditFail", "FullPrivilegeAuditing", "AuditBaseObjects", "AuditBaseDirectories") within the "HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\" registry key. Such modifications could indicate a threat actor attempting to tamper with audit policy configurations, potentially disabling SACLs (System Access Control Lists) to bypass defenses and facilitate further malicious activities like machine compromise or lateral movement.
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, WDigest credential harvesting.
WDigest is a legacy authentication protocol dating from Windows XP. While still used on some corporate networks, this protocol can be manipulated by attackers to dump system credentials.
The Microsoft Security Response Center published an overview of KB2871997, which addresses WDigest use on older platforms. More recent versions of Windows can be protected with a holistic security approach that follows the principle of least privilege.
The following query returns any attempts to turn WDigest credential caching on through the registry.
References:
https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc778868(v=ws.10)?redirectedfrom=MSDN
https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2014/06/05/an-overview-of-kb2871997/
https://www.catalog.update.microsoft.com/Search.aspx?q=KB2871997
https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/plan/security-best-practices/implementing-least-privilege-administrative-models
WDigest is a legacy authentication protocol dating from Windows XP. While still used on some corporate networks, this protocol can be manipulated by attackers to dump system credentials.
The Microsoft Security Response Center published an overview of KB2871997, which addresses WDigest use on older platforms. More recent versions of Windows can be protected with a holistic security approach that follows the principle of least privilege.
The following query returns any attempts to turn WDigest credential caching on through the registry.
References:
https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc778868(v=ws.10)?redirectedfrom=MSDN
https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2014/06/05/an-overview-of-kb2871997/
https://www.catalog.update.microsoft.com/Search.aspx?q=KB2871997
https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/plan/security-best-practices/implementing-least-privilege-administrative-models
This query looks for signs of impacket dcomexec module.
Author: Jouni Mikkola
More info: https://threathunt.blog/impacket-part-2/
Author: Jouni Mikkola
More info: https://threathunt.blog/impacket-part-2/
Detect run not allowed files. Applocker is a very useful tool, especially on servers where unprivileged users have access. For example terminal servers. You need configure applocker and log collect to receive these events.
One of the challenges in making an AppLocker policy is knowing where applications
launch from. This query normalizes process launch paths through aliasing, then
counts the number of processes launched from that path, how many distinct machines it
was launched on, and how many distinct file names \ hashes these processes had. The
path is broken into subfolders to help simplify analysis.
launch from. This query normalizes process launch paths through aliasing, then
counts the number of processes launched from that path, how many distinct machines it
was launched on, and how many distinct file names \ hashes these processes had. The
path is broken into subfolders to help simplify analysis.
This analytic detects suspicious modifications to Unix shell configuration files, such as `.bashrc` or `.profile`, which may indicate an attempt to alter system behavior or gain unauthorized access. Unauthorized changes to these files can be used to execute malicious commands, escalate privileges, or hide malicious activities. By monitoring for unusual or unauthorized modifications to shell configuration files, this analytic helps identify potential security threats, allowing security teams to respond quickly and mitigate risks.
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