Executive Summary
Between October 14 and 26, 2026, a threat actor identified as "n0n" exploited compromised IAM credentials from a Qubole platform AWS account (805246085872) to breach dozens of downstream customer environments. The attacker leveraged pre-existing, often dormant, cross-account IAM trust relationships to gain access without needing to exploit a direct vulnerability in AWS services. This campaign highlights a systemic risk in cloud supply chains where abandoned third-party integrations retain high-privilege access.
Technically, the actor utilized two specific Qubole IAM users to perform `sts:AssumeRole` calls, consistently using the session name prefix `quiam-`. Once inside a tenant, the attacker followed a scripted playbook of resource enumeration, harvesting secrets from AWS Secrets Manager and Lambda environment variables, and validating stolen credentials using TruffleHog. The secondary theft of Microsoft Entra ID and Okta credentials from these stores potentially extends the breach's reach beyond AWS into broader identity providers.
This incident is critical for organizations that have ever integrated Qubole into their cloud infrastructure. While financial giants like JPMorgan Chase and Visa were named on the n0n leak site, evidence suggests the data originated from shared marketing vendors rather than direct enterprise breaches. Nevertheless, the urgency to audit and rotate cloud secrets remains high to prevent further lateral movement.