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'This query looks for Microsoft Defender Antivirus detections with the family names used by KNOTWEED'
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Solorigate supply chain attack. Please note that these attacks are currently known as the Nobelium campaign.
Microsoft detects the 2020 SolarWinds supply chain attack implant and its other components as part of a campaign by the Nobelium activity group. Nobelium is the threat actor behind the attack against SolarWinds, which was previously referred to as Solorigate.
Nobelium silently added malicious code to legitimate software updates for Orion, which is IT monitoring software provided by SolarWinds. In this way, malicious dynamic link libraries (DLLs) were distributed to SolarWinds customers.
The following query detects events when Nobelium received a DNS response after launching a lookup request to known command-and-control infrastructure.
More Nobelium-related queries can be found listed under the See also section of this document.
References:
https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/12/18/analyzing-solorigate-the-compromised-dll-file-that-started-a-sophisticated-cyberattack-and-how-microsoft-defender-helps-protect/
Microsoft detects the 2020 SolarWinds supply chain attack implant and its other components as part of a campaign by the Nobelium activity group. Nobelium is the threat actor behind the attack against SolarWinds, which was previously referred to as Solorigate.
Nobelium silently added malicious code to legitimate software updates for Orion, which is IT monitoring software provided by SolarWinds. In this way, malicious dynamic link libraries (DLLs) were distributed to SolarWinds customers.
The following query detects events when Nobelium received a DNS response after launching a lookup request to known command-and-control infrastructure.
More Nobelium-related queries can be found listed under the See also section of this document.
References:
https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/12/18/analyzing-solorigate-the-compromised-dll-file-that-started-a-sophisticated-cyberattack-and-how-microsoft-defender-helps-protect/
Original Sigma Rule: https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/blob/master/rules/apt/apt_apt29_thinktanks.yml.
Questions via Twitter: @janvonkirchheim.
Questions via Twitter: @janvonkirchheim.
Original Sigma Rule: https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/blob/master/rules/apt/apt_sofacy_zebrocy.yml.
Questions via Twitter: @janvonkirchheim.
Questions via Twitter: @janvonkirchheim.
This query is looking for rarely seen processes which are launched as a service.
Author: Jouni Mikkola
More info: https://threathunt.blog/rare-process-launch-as-a-service/
Author: Jouni Mikkola
More info: https://threathunt.blog/rare-process-launch-as-a-service/
Total Controlled Folder Access events.
These queries check telemetry from the Exploit Guard rule: Rule: Block Office applications from creating child processes.
(Rule ID d4f940ab-401b-4efc-aadc-ad5f3c50688a).
Read more about it here: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-exploit-guard/attack-surface-reduction-exploit-guard.
Oftentimes organizations enable this rule in audit mode and check the results before setting block mode.
You can use query #2 to measure the rule impact on your network in audit mode before turning it to block mode.
Query #1 is used after setting it to block mode - to analyze the block stats.
Tags: #ASR.
Query #1: block stats.
(Rule ID d4f940ab-401b-4efc-aadc-ad5f3c50688a).
Read more about it here: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-exploit-guard/attack-surface-reduction-exploit-guard.
Oftentimes organizations enable this rule in audit mode and check the results before setting block mode.
You can use query #2 to measure the rule impact on your network in audit mode before turning it to block mode.
Query #1 is used after setting it to block mode - to analyze the block stats.
Tags: #ASR.
Query #1: block stats.
Finding attackers hiding malware in the recycle bin.
Read more here: https://azure.microsoft.com/blog/how-azure-security-center-helps-reveal-a-cyberattack/.
Tags: #execution #SuspiciousPath.
Read more here: https://azure.microsoft.com/blog/how-azure-security-center-helps-reveal-a-cyberattack/.
Tags: #execution #SuspiciousPath.
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Ursnif (Gozi) continues to evolve.
Windows Management Instrumentation, or WMI, is a legitimate Microsoft framework used to obtain management data and perform administrative tasks on remote devices. However, attackers can also use WMI to gather information about a target or hijack control of a device. The MITRE ATT&CK framework includes WMI among its list of common enterprise attack techniques.
The following query detects when Microsoft Office software spawns an instance of the WMI command-line utility, wmic.exe.
References:
https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/win32/wmisdk/about-wmi
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/
Windows Management Instrumentation, or WMI, is a legitimate Microsoft framework used to obtain management data and perform administrative tasks on remote devices. However, attackers can also use WMI to gather information about a target or hijack control of a device. The MITRE ATT&CK framework includes WMI among its list of common enterprise attack techniques.
The following query detects when Microsoft Office software spawns an instance of the WMI command-line utility, wmic.exe.
References:
https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/win32/wmisdk/about-wmi
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/
This query provides insights on users who clicked on a suspicious URL
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