Brandon Rodriguez
@BMRodriguezTrusted contributor
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123 detections
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This rule detects network connections and DNS resolution requests to known typosquatted domains used by the TeamPCP threat actor for command and control (C2) and data exfiltration. These domains are associated with a compromised Trivy scanner. Detection indicates successful execution of the compromised scanner and attempted exfiltration.
This rule detects the creation of specific files associated with the TeamPCP malware's systemd persistence mechanism. It looks for the creation of '/.config/sysmon/sysmon.py' or '/.config/systemd/user/sysmon.service' which are used to maintain access and download further stages via C2 even if the original vulnerable litellm process terminates.
Detects attempts to discover GitHub runner processes (Runner.Worker or Runner.Listener) using process enumeration tools like pgrep, ps, or grep. Adversaries may use this technique to locate processes carrying secrets on compromised CI/CD runners.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests containing the specific custom header 'X-Filename: tpcp.tar.gz' used by the TeamPCP credential harvester for data exfiltration. This rule targets a highly specific Indicator of Compromise (IOC) associated with the TeamPCP threat.
Detects the specific OpenSSL command line arguments used by TeamPCP to encrypt stolen credentials before exfiltration. This rule looks for executions of 'openssl' with AES-256 encryption flags ('enc -aes-256-cbc' or 'enc -aes-256') and the use of a file to pass the encryption password ('-pass file:').
Detects the creation of highly privileged Kubernetes pods in the 'kube-system' namespace matching the naming convention 'node-setup-*', indicative of TeamPCP lateral movement techniques. These pods request elevated privileges such as 'hostPID', 'hostNetwork', and 'privileged'.
This rule detects network connections and DNS resolution requests to known typosquatted domains used by the TeamPCP threat actor for command and control (C2) and data exfiltration. These domains are associated with a compromised Trivy scanner. Detection indicates successful execution of the compromised scanner and attempted exfiltration.
Detects the creation or manipulation of the specific archive file (tpcp.tar.gz) used by TeamPCP to bundle stolen credentials. This rule monitors command line activity, cloud process execution, and file system events for references to 'tpcp.tar.gz'.
This rule detects processes executing from the `/tmp/pglog` path or with the filename `pglog` within `/tmp/`, which is a known technique used by the TeamPCP threat actor to masquerade malicious binaries as legitimate PostgreSQL processes for post-exploitation activity.
Detects the execution of `kubectl` commands designed to dump all secrets across all namespaces within a Kubernetes cluster. This activity is indicative of an adversary attempting to gain access to sensitive credentials, as observed in supply chain compromises.
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