Thiru N
@IamthiruIndiaCompletionist
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This rule detects process execution events on Linux systems where the command line contains references to 'dirtyfrag.conf'. This file is associated with a mitigation for the 'Dirty Frag' Linux vulnerability. Detection indicates that a process is interacting with this specific mitigation configuration, which could be part of a system hardening effort or an attempt to modify/disable the mitigation.
This rule detects process execution events on Linux systems where the command line contains references to 'dirtyfrag.conf'. This file is associated with a mitigation for the 'Dirty Frag' Linux vulnerability. Detection indicates that a process is interacting with this specific mitigation configuration, which could be part of a system hardening effort or an attempt to modify/disable the mitigation.
This rule detects the execution of the `unshare` utility with parameters to create a new user namespace (`-U` or `--user`). This activity is a known precursor for the Dirty Frag Linux kernel Local Privilege Escalation (LPE) exploit, where an unprivileged user can gain elevated privileges. The rule specifically targets Linux process execution events.
This rule detects the execution of the `unshare` utility with parameters to create a new user namespace (`-U` or `--user`). This activity is a known precursor for the Dirty Frag Linux kernel Local Privilege Escalation (LPE) exploit, where an unprivileged user can gain elevated privileges. The rule specifically targets Linux process execution events.
Detects inbound network connections from external, non-private IP addresses to local ports 6081 and 6082. These ports are used by the PAN-OS User-ID Authentication Portal, which is actively targeted by CVE-2026-0300.
Detects inbound network connections from external, non-private IP addresses to local ports 6081 and 6082. These ports are used by the PAN-OS User-ID Authentication Portal, which is actively targeted by CVE-2026-0300.
Detects the command line execution of VS Code initiating a tunnel using a GitHub provider. This technique has been observed to be used by threat actors like Tropic Trooper to establish interactive remote access while blending in with legitimate developer activity.
Identifies active command and control or exfiltration connections associated with the recent AMOS Stealer campaign delivered via AI agents by matching known C2 infrastructure IP addresses.
Identifies active command and control or exfiltration connections associated with the recent AMOS Stealer campaign delivered via AI agents by matching known C2 infrastructure IP addresses.
This query detects activity associated with the BlueHammer, RedSun, and UnDefend toolset used in post‑exploitation campaigns (including "Nightmare Eclipse" intrusions). It identifies:
- Execution of suspicious binaries (FunnyApp.exe, RedSun.exe, undef.exe, z.exe) and command‑line flags (-h, -aggressive).
- File creation in unusual user directories (e.g., Pictures or two‑letter Downloads subfolders).
- BeigeBurrow tunneling via agent.exe.
- Reconnaissance commands (whoami /priv, cmdkey /list, net group).
- Network connections to known‑malicious IP addresses.
- Use of the REDSUN named pipe for privilege escalation.
The query combines process, file, and network events to surface potential hands‑on‑keyboard activity and follow‑on tooling
- Execution of suspicious binaries (FunnyApp.exe, RedSun.exe, undef.exe, z.exe) and command‑line flags (-h, -aggressive).
- File creation in unusual user directories (e.g., Pictures or two‑letter Downloads subfolders).
- BeigeBurrow tunneling via agent.exe.
- Reconnaissance commands (whoami /priv, cmdkey /list, net group).
- Network connections to known‑malicious IP addresses.
- Use of the REDSUN named pipe for privilege escalation.
The query combines process, file, and network events to surface potential hands‑on‑keyboard activity and follow‑on tooling
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