ills3c Intel&Coffee
@Ills3CUS MidwestCompletionist
0 followers425 downloads1,089 copies12 likes3,494 views
344 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
283
58
2
1
Categories
142
119
59
49
42
Platforms
215
125
39
25
23
Products / Services
152
29
27
23
22
MITRE Techniques
114
76
67
62
54
CVEs
3
3
3
2
2
IDS Classtypes
2
IDS Protocols
2
Detects the creation of cook.pth or cook.py in Python site-packages or dist-packages directories by package managers or interpreters, followed by a Python interpreter execution on the same device within one hour. This pattern matches the malicious supply chain behavior observed in compromised LiteLLM versions (e.g., 1.107.0) utilizing .pth auto-import chains for persistence and execution.
Detects modification or creation of .htaccess files within WordPress directory structures followed within 24 hours by the creation or modification of .cache files in the same directory. This behavioral pattern is often indicative of web shell deployment or persistence installation via compromised web applications.
Detects the execution of unapproved Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) software tools followed by subsequent outbound public IP network activity from the same process on the same device, indicating an active remote session.
Detects the execution of Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tools followed closely (within 1 day) by potential data exfiltration activity using tools like WinSCP or Rclone, or connections to cloud storage providers (OneDrive, Google Drive) from the same device.
Detects potential password spraying behavior in Entra ID sign-in logs, characterized by a single source IP attempting authentication against numerous distinct user accounts with a low number of attempts per user.
Detects instances where a web browser accesses a domain listed in the 'AdFection_Domains' watchlist, followed closely by the browser spawning a script interpreter (such as PowerShell, wscript, cscript, mshta) or dropping an executable/script file in user profile or temporary directories.
Detects successful Palo Alto GlobalProtect VPN authentications where no Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) challenge or related text is recorded in the firewall logs, and no corresponding successful MFA sign-in event is found in Entra ID (SigninLogs).
Detects attempts to inhibit system recovery by stopping the Volume Shadow Copy Service (VSS) using utilities like net, net1, or sc, or deleting shadow copies using vssadmin.exe, excluding known backup agents.
Detects the correlation of remote execution tools (such as PsExec, WinRM, or specific PowerShell remote execution commands) with RDP or ScreenConnect remote management activity on the same device within a one-hour window, potentially indicating lateral movement or unauthorized remote control.
Detects potential SafePay ransomware activity by correlating mass file encryption (.safepay extension) with the creation of potential ransom notes and subsequent self-deletion of the encrypting process.
Page 16 of 35