Montaser Ismail
@M0nt3xTrusted contributorCompletionist
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This rule detects the creation or modification of suspicious files (extensions associated with web shells or modules, such as .aspx, .ashx, .asmx, .dll, or .config) within common Microsoft IIS and Exchange web directories. It correlates these file events with process activity initiated by common web server or management processes (e.g., w3wp.exe, powershell.exe) and filters out trusted files (Microsoft-signed), known administrative update activity, and files with a broader footprint in the environment to identify potentially malicious, low-prevalence artifacts.
Detects execution chains where archive utilities (7-Zip, WinRAR) or explorer.exe, when initiated from temporary or download directories, spawn common scripting engines (PowerShell, mshta.exe, cmd.exe, wscript.exe) that contain suspicious network-related or obfuscated command-line indicators.
Detects potential exploitation of the ScreenConnect SetupWizard.aspx to bypass authentication and create unauthorized administrative users. The rule monitors for the creation or modification of User.xml or Users.xml files in the ScreenConnect application directories, correlating these file events with suspicious process activity (such as cmd.exe or powershell.exe) or web requests to the SetupWizard.aspx endpoint.
This rule detects suspicious process execution chains originating from ScreenConnect (ConnectWise Control) service. It monitors for common living-off-the-land binaries (LolBins) or specific suspicious command-line patterns (e.g., encoded commands, credential discovery commands) being spawned by the ScreenConnect process, which is often abused by threat actors such as APT35/Magic Hound for remote access and persistence.
Detects the use of the BITSAdmin utility to create, add, resume, or complete download jobs, which may indicate an adversary attempting to download malicious files or tools onto a system.
This rule detects unauthorized or suspicious registration of native Internet Information Services (IIS) modules. It monitors command-line activity involving common administrative tools used to modify IIS configurations (appcmd.exe) and manage .NET assemblies (gacutil.exe), as well as the execution of specific PowerShell cmdlets like New-WebGlobalModule. Such activities are often indicative of an attacker attempting to establish persistence on a web server by loading malicious modules.
Detects execution of processes that reference suspicious Windows API functions related to token manipulation or process injection, specifically when initiated by critical system processes like svchost.exe or lsass.exe. This activity often indicates attempts at credential access or privilege escalation.
This rule detects potential webshell activity by monitoring the correlation between web server processes spawning suspicious child processes (e.g., cmd.exe, powershell.exe, rundll32.exe) and the creation of executable or script files within identified web directories. The logic establishes a high-confidence correlation when both events occur on the same device within a 15-minute window, while also surfacing uncorrelated individual process spawns or suspicious file writes as lower-confidence indicators. It includes exclusions for known administrative and deployment processes to reduce noise.
This rule detects the use of double extensions in file names to masquerade executable files as benign document or media file types (e.g., 'document.pdf.exe'). This is a common technique used by attackers to trick users into executing malicious files by hiding their true extension.
This rule detects potentially malicious PowerShell activity characterized by the co-occurrence of file download indicators (such as Invoke-WebRequest, WebClient, or UserAgent strings) and file execution or staging commands (such as IEX, Expand-Archive, or Copy-Item) within the same command line. It is designed to identify ingress tool transfer and command-line execution patterns often associated with post-exploitation or malware staging, while reducing noise by requiring both download and operational intent.
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