
Darshan Thummar
@MightyCompletionist
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This rule detects attempts to modify the Windows Registry remotely, specifically targeting the 'HKLM' hive and paths containing 'shell\open\command'. This pattern is often used by adversaries to establish persistence or achieve privilege escalation by modifying how applications or the system execute commands, for example, by hijacking file associations or application startup commands. The detection is based on network traffic over TCP port 445, which is commonly used for SMB/CIFS, indicating a remote registry operation.
This rule detects a potential DNS Reflection Amplification Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack. It triggers an alert when UDP traffic targeting port 53 (DNS) on the home network has a data size greater than 512 bytes and occurs at a rate of 100 or more packets within a 5-second window from the same destination.
This rule detects a direct ICMP Flood Denial of Service (DoS) attack. It triggers when more than 500 ICMP echo request (type 8) packets are sent to a single destination within a 5-second interval. This high volume of ICMP traffic is characteristic of an attempt to overwhelm a target system or network with ping requests, leading to service disruption.
This rule detects an outbound email bombing campaign by monitoring TCP connections to port 25 (SMTP). It triggers an alert if a single source IP address initiates 200 or more established connections to port 25 within a 60-second window. This high volume of outbound email connections from a single source is indicative of an attempt to overwhelm an email server or recipient with a large number of emails, often associated with denial-of-service attacks.
This rule detects attempts to modify the end-of-file marker on a network share, specifically looking for the 'SetEndOfFile' operation over SMB. This activity can be indicative of an attacker manipulating file sizes or content on shared resources, potentially as part of data staging or to evade detection. The rule is configured with a threshold to alert on 20 such events from the same source within 30 seconds, aiming to reduce noise from legitimate, infrequent operations.
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) activity where commands are hidden within PNG image files. It specifically looks for HTTP traffic flowing from the server to the client (to_client) that contains the PNG file signature (89 50 4E 47) within the first 4 bytes of the file data, and where the file size is greater than 100,000 bytes. A threshold is applied to trigger an alert if 10 such events occur within 60 seconds from the same destination IP address, indicating a potential high volume of C2 communication disguised as image downloads.
This rule detects HTTP POST requests where the client body contains a large string (over 200 characters) that appears to be Base64 encoded. The `pcre` (Perl Compatible Regular Expression) `/^[A-Za-z0-9+\/]{200,}={0,2}$/` specifically looks for strings composed of Base64 characters (alphanumeric, '+', '/', and optional '==') with a minimum length of 200 characters. This pattern is often used by malware for command and control (C2) communication to obfuscate data within HTTP traffic.
This rule detects an active remote session hijack attempt. It triggers when three or more TCP connections are established to the same destination within a 10-second window, originating from the internal network and destined for the internal network. This pattern could indicate an attempt to take over an existing network session.
This rule detects attempts to establish a VNC (Virtual Network Computing) connection on TCP port 5901, which is an alternative port often used for VNC. The detection is based on the presence of the 'RFB 00' string, which is part of the VNC protocol handshake, within the initial bytes of an established TCP connection flowing to the server.
This rule detects Kerberos Domain Trust Discovery attempts by monitoring for a high volume of Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) requests to port 88 (Kerberos) on the home network. A threshold of 20 requests from a single source IP within 10 seconds triggers the alert, indicating a potential network scan activity aimed at mapping domain trusts.
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