Emiliano Mema
@NosalvaGreeceTrusted contributorCompletionist
0 followers634 downloads589 copies6 likes1,947 views
282 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
159
62
43
18
Categories
95
52
49
34
29
Platforms
156
52
34
25
17
Products / Services
74
55
40
40
19
MITRE Techniques
81
76
34
31
22
CVEs
2
2
1
IDS Classtypes
22
14
4
3
IDS Protocols
22
9
5
5
1
Detects network traffic consistent with SynkLoader malware communicating with its C2 infrastructure. The rule identifies suspicious TLS SNI requests to known hardcoded domains and HTTP POST requests using the application/octet-stream content type, which are characteristic of SynkLoader C2 beaconing.
Detects periodic (beaconing) HTTP POST requests directed to '/api/beacon' from endpoints. The detection logic monitors for consecutive connections occurring within a 3-second interval, specifically searching for JSON payloads containing identification fields (id, user, host, pid) characteristic of C2Looper backdoor traffic.
Detects instances of Chrome or Edge browsers initiating a network connection to the localhost (loopback) while executing commands associated with the Chrome DevTools Protocol, specifically targeting Page.setBypassCSP. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to disable Content Security Policy (CSP) protections, often as part of a browser-based attack or malicious extension activity using remote debugging features.
Detection rule for a specific Rust-based Windows x64 backdoor known as C2Looper. The rule uses file hashes, debug strings, hardcoded configuration files/paths, and specific C2 API endpoints to identify the malware presence.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests with a specific URI pattern associated with C2Looper malware communication, indicating potential C2 activity or data exfiltration.
Detects the use of 'net.exe' or 'net1.exe' to add a user to the 'Enterprise Admins' group, which is a highly privileged Active Directory group. This activity is indicative of privilege escalation and persistence attempts by an adversary to gain full control over the domain.
Detects a sequence of common discovery commands (ipconfig, whoami, nltest, net group, wmic) executed within a short timeframe (60 seconds) by the same process. This activity is indicative of an adversary performing internal reconnaissance to understand the environment, network, and user privileges.
This rule monitors outgoing HTTP traffic for a specific numeric URI path pattern ( /49890878) which is characteristic of beaconing behavior to a command-and-control (C2) server. Such static, non-descriptive URI paths are frequently used by malware to maintain consistent connectivity to an adversary-controlled infrastructure.
Detects DNS queries containing high-entropy domain labels that exhibit patterns common to Domain Generation Algorithms (DGA). The rule triggers when a threshold of such suspicious queries is exceeded from a single source within a 60-second window, which is a common indicator of malware beaconing or C2 communication.
Detects the creation of a file named 'c2_out.txt' in common temporary or user directories ('\Users\', '\Temp\', or '\AppData\') shortly after a 'cmd.exe' process execution on the same device. This behavior is indicative of a potential command-and-control (C2) activity where output from malicious shell commands is being saved to a file.
Page 13 of 29