Lacey Cochrane
@NullVectorXUSTrusted contributorCompletionist
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232 detections
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Detects successful logon events (Event ID 4624) utilizing Schannel (TLS client certificate) or PKU2U (peer authentication) logon processes. This behavior may indicate an attacker using forged or stolen certificates to authenticate against a system, potentially bypassing Kerberos-based authentication monitoring.
Detects Kerberos TGT requests (Event ID 4768) that utilize RC4 (PreAuthType 23) for pre-authentication. This is a common indicator of an Overpass-the-Hash attack, where an adversary uses a stolen NTLM hash to authenticate as a user and request a Kerberos ticket in environments that are typically configured for AES encryption.
Detects unauthorized remote write operations (via SMB, Named Pipes, or TCP) to the Windows Certificate Services CertLog directory (C:\Windows\System32\CertLog\). This directory contains sensitive CA database, transaction logs, and checkpoint files. Any modification by a process other than the legitimate certsvc.exe is indicative of potential CA database tampering, malicious log manipulation, or anti-forensics activity.
AD CS ESC8 Certificate Request via NTLM
Cortex XDR
Detects Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) certificate requests that utilize NTLM authentication rather than Kerberos. This behavior is indicative of potential NTLM relay attacks (ESC8), where an attacker forces a machine account to authenticate to the AD CS web enrollment endpoint via NTLM to obtain a certificate on behalf of that machine.
Detects Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) certificate requests where the Subject Alternative Name (SAN) contains a User Principal Name (UPN) that does not match the requester's identity. This pattern indicates potential exploitation of ESC1 or ESC6 certificate template misconfigurations, allowing an attacker to request certificates for arbitrary identities.
Detects NTLM network logons (NtLmSsp) for accounts that may have been targets of certificate-based identity abuse (e.g., ESC1). Attackers often leverage this technique to extract NTLM hashes from PKINIT TGT PACs and subsequently utilize Pass-the-Hash for lateral movement within the network.
Detects anomalous login activity in Google Workspace characterized by a high volume of login failures (5 or more) originating from a single IP address. The rule identifies potential brute force or credential stuffing campaigns and flags instances where a successful login occurs following a burst of failure events from the same source.
Detects the issuance of certificates using templates associated with the Certificate Request Agent. This is a critical component of the ESC3 attack vector, where an adversary first acquires an Enrollment Agent certificate and subsequently uses it to enroll for certificates on behalf of other privileged users or principals.
Detects the use of PowerShell (Invoke-WebRequest or Invoke-RestMethod) to download files to the AppData directory, followed by the execution of a file using a 'token-raw' argument. This pattern is often associated with malicious payload delivery and execution.
Detects the execution of known Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) and remote access tools. The rule specifically flags these tools when they are executed from high-risk directories such as AppData, Temp, Downloads, or ProgramData, which is a common indicator of unauthorized installation or persistence efforts by an adversary.
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